


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Strategic Implications of Moscow's Concept
For Collective Security in Asia

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Final report 11 June 1976



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A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to
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Seven years have passed since Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev proposed the need for a system of collective security in Asia. Investigation reveals that Brezhnev's pronouncements on this subject were not propaganda exercises designed to secure short-term political objectives. Instead, as the thesis of this study demonstrates, the Soviet initiative for Asia constitutes a concrete, realistic policy option which challenges America's interests in that important region and deserves the attention of US strategists equal to that given Soviet interests in Europe. The Soviet 'Grand Design for Asia' represents a broad security framework as a means of bolstering the USSR's global position while enhancing the accomplishment of its increasingly crucial regional objectives and interests. The primary objective of the Kremlin's security design relates to the Sino-Soviet dispute. One fundamental outcome of the deep-seated antagonism between the two adversaries is the Soviet Union's efforts to contain China as a major theme of its policy in Asia.

A secondary objective of Moscow's security scheme relates to the expansion of the USSR's regional power at the expense of the Western world. The steady buildup of Soviet influence, prestige and military capabilities throughout Asia indicates that Moscow hopes to fill the regional security vacuum left by the departure of the British and the perceived retrenchment of American power.


A more recent possibility of a Sino-Japanese partnership with the de facto backing of the United States has forced Moscow to focus its interests on its increasingly vital geopolitical East Asian front. Hence, Asia is now an area no less important to the interests of the USSR than Europe and the Middle East.

The Pacific Doctrine, as articulated by President Ford in January 1976, declares the fundamental need for US strength to insure a stable balance of power in the Pacific. That doctrine, with its stated goal of opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia and throughout the globe may provide an essential framework to counter the inimical objectives of Moscow's concept for collective security in Asia.

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FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1976

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF MOSCOW'S CONCEPT
FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.A., City College of New York, 1960
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1976

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of
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the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
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ABSTRACT

Seven years have passed since Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev proposed the need for a system of collective security in Asia. Investigation reveals that Brezhnev's pronouncements on this subject were not propaganda exercises designed to secure short-term political objectives. Instead, as the thesis of this study demonstrates, the Soviet initiative for Asia constitutes a concrete, realistic policy option which challenges America's interests in that important region and deserves the attention of US strategists equal to that given Soviet interests in Europe. The Soviet "Grand Design for Asia" represents a broad security framework as a means of bolstering the USSR's global position while enhancing the accomplishment of its increasingly crucial regional objectives and interests. The primary objective of the Kremlin's security design relates to the Sino-Soviet dispute. One fundamental outcome of the deep-seated antagonism between the two adversaries is the Soviet Union's efforts to contain China as a major theme of its policy in Asia.

A secondary objective of Moscow's security scheme relates to the expansion of the USSR's regional power at the expense of the Western world. The steady buildup of Soviet influence, prestige and military capabilities throughout Asia indicates that Moscow hopes to fill the regional security vacuum left by the departure of the British and the perceived retrenchment of American power.

A more recent possibility of a Sino-Japanese partnership with the de facto backing of the United States has forced Moscow to focus its interests on its increasingly vital geopolitical East Asian front. Hence, Asia is now an area no less important to the interests of the USSR than Europe and the Middle East.

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PREFACE

The burning problems of the current international situation do not conceal from our view longer-term tasks, namely the creation of a system of collective security in areas of the globe where the danger of another world war, or armed conflicts is concentrated . . . we are of the opinion that the course of events is also putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia.

Speech by L. I. Brezhnev
7 June 1969
International Meeting of
the Communist and Workers
Party in Moscow

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Nowhere else is the balance of power and influence in the world changing more rapidly than in Asia. The smoldering Sino-Soviet dispute, aggravated by contemporary ideological hostility, by power rivalry and national antagonisms, has caused Moscow to reassess its political-military options in that region. Consequently, it now seems reasonable to question whether America can continue to give Europe pride of place in its global strategy, for Asia is where the security concerns of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan intersect. These four nations, often referred to as the quadrilateral powers,¹ will principally shape the future configuration of power now beginning to emerge in Asia (see Appendix 1).

The thesis of this research paper is that Moscow's concept for collective security in Asia constitutes a concrete, realistic policy option which challenges America's interests in that important region and deserves the attention of US strategists equal to that given Soviet interests in Europe.² Reflecting Moscow's strategy in light of shifting regional events, the Kremlin's security design evidences



the USSR's willingness to increase its commitments in Asia. Simultaneously, the growth of Soviet regional military capabilities sharply contrasts with an American tendency to reduce its military presence in that important arena.³

After three decades of unprecedented power in world affairs, America finds itself questioning its role as world policeman. More importantly, today the world appears to be evaluating perceived erosion of US resolve and confidence. As a result of America's experiences in Vietnam, US foreign policy in the Far East seems to be characterized by a degree of strategic uncertainty, indecisiveness and drift. At the same time, dynamic changes in the balance of forces in recent years demonstrate that Asia is becoming a more crucial geopolitical region for America's post-Vietnam strategy. As a result, the potential constellation of power in Asia may offer realizable options to deter Soviet military intervention throughout the globe and enhance US national security interests.

Although the United States remains the predominant global power, the humiliating withdrawal from Southeast Asia has had an effect on America's superpower image. Recently, increasingly sharp questions have been raised throughout international forums concerning America's place in the global balance of power, as well as its willingness to resume a leadership role in world affairs.

The end of Pax Americana in Asia, signalled by the US setback in Vietnam, was soon followed by another visible policy defeat in Angola. Once again, crucial questions are being raised about the declining credibility of US global power. One example of this perspective can be gleaned from a Chinese assessment contained in Peking Review in January 1976. America's perceived decline in contrast to Soviet expansion is outlined in the following Chinese commentary:

After World War II, US imperialism established its spheres of influence all over the world. On the decline today, it is trying hard to maintain its vested interests, while Soviet revisionism . . . is trying to outstrip US imperialism. Carrying out rabid expansion abroad it is seeking world hegemony. It is wildly ambitious and more adventurous. Whenever it makes a step forward, the United States is pressed a step backward.⁴

Appearing before a Senate Subcommittee in January 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger underscored Washington's current dilemma in blunt terms:

If the United States is seen to emasculate itself in the face of massive, unprecedented Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will be the perception of the leaders around the world as they make decisions concerning their future security?⁵

Dr. Kissinger succinctly keyed on the significant precedents set by Moscow's successful intervention in the Third World when he stated:

Angola represents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the US has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted the Executive's action while it was in the process of meeting this kind of threat.⁶

In essence, few could dispute the adverse effect on US policy that resulted from Moscow's successful intervention in Angola. When faced by an absence of effective Western resolution and response, Soviet actions were predictable: the Kremlin demonstrated the will and capacity to fill the power vacuum.

In an era of military bipolarity and political multipolarity, Moscow's policy-makers are paying increasing attention to the emerging balance of global power. In contrast to Western conceptions of the balance of power concept,⁷ the Kremlin's leaders have always expressed their conviction that what they call the "global correlation of world's forces" has been changing in their favor. Even more significant is Moscow's expressed view that the balance of forces has already shifted in its favor.⁸

Soviet sources indicate that the shift in the global balance actually occurred in 1969. At that time, L. I. Brezhnev announced that the world socialist community, led by the USSR had "firmly grasped the historical initiative," and "changed the balance of power to the detriment of imperialism."⁹ This period also marked the end of America's nuclear primacy with the achievement of nuclear parity by the USSR. This factor, combined with the growing capability of the Soviet Union to project its military power throughout the globe, appeared to provide the substance for Moscow's view.

When speaking about the concept of correlation of forces, the Soviets emphasize that they have in mind an integrated analytical framework which encompasses the sum total of relevant political, economic, military, psychological, and ideological factors and future trends.¹⁰ Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev highlighted the importance of this concept in his report to the XXV CPSU Congress in February 1976.¹¹

Comparing the relative advantages of their concept with Western analytical views, Soviet observers stress that their framework considers all the factors of power which include moral as well as material aspects. Consequently, from Moscow's perspective, it follows that the relative weakness of Western conceptions stem from Western emphasis on preserving the status quo and concentration on only part of the overall power equation. Allegedly, Western political analysts, as a rule, focus attention on "economic and military factors" and fail to grasp the other important components. As one Soviet analyst emphasizes in International Affairs, November 1974:

The fundamental change in the correlation of forces between imperialist states themselves and their different groups, of course, is also of importance for understanding the real situation of the world. Talk about so-called American leadership of the world in our days is an echo of the past, there is no real ground under it.¹²

Moscow's alleged skill in understanding and manipulating the inherent "contradictions" within the global capitalist

system was highlighted in the April 1975 issue of Kommunist. A Soviet commentator clearly stipulated that Moscow is now drawing conclusions "about the real possibility of carrying out an offensive strategy within the Western world.¹³

As Brezhnev noted at the XXV Party Congress, "The general crisis of capitalism is continuing to deepen."¹⁴ Apparently, Moscow perceives the US in a relative state of global decline. The "dynamic" and "progressive" advance of the Kremlin's foreign policy is contrasted with the erosion of US influence and self-confidence in global affairs. The relative weakening of the ability of the West to use its power is now considered to be an objective fact. Economic, as well as attendant political, military and moral crises are underscored by Soviet observers as the main causes for the crisis of capitalism. Long-term trends are also cited as further evidence of the irreversible ascent of Soviet power in relation to the decline of the West. For, as Brezhnev stated at the recent Party Congress, "The developments of recent years forcefully confirm that capitalism is a society without a future."¹⁵

Considering Moscow's analysis of the relative weakening of the American Presidency, US setbacks in Southeast Asia, and Angola, the Watergate scandal and the Congressional investigations of the CIA, few could wonder about the Kremlin's optimistic view of favorable trends and comparable advantages. From Moscow's vantage point the rapidity and extent of the

shift in the balance of forces in favor of the USSR will ultimately hinge on America's willingness to support its global commitments.

By now there is no disputing the fact of a US propensity toward readjustment regarding certain global commitments does exist. Simultaneously, this tendency coincides with a period of seemingly increasing Soviet power and global commitments.¹⁶ Upon evaluation, the dynamics of future international relations are too unpredictable at this stage to guarantee the permanence of trends which point to the relative decline of the West. Even Brezhnev refused to predict the "automatic collapse" of the West because it still had "considerable reserves,"¹⁷ or, in the Western vernacular, "options."

How then can America effectively use its more limited options to influence a desirable long-range goal of contributing to a more stable international world order? How can the United States achieve a reasonable degree of equilibrium among potential adversaries to enhance its national security? Ten years ago, the French political scientist Raymond Aron provided one answer to these perplexing questions. In his magnum opus on political-military action in international relations--Peace and War, Aron noted that the long-term goal of the Soviet Union was to:

eliminate the capitalist regimes and to utilize the revolutionary movements, movements of national or social liberation to this end . . . [Whereas] the

Americans dream of an agreement between the two. The Soviet leaders declare a reconciliation to be impossible Reconciliation becomes all the more impossible because one side wants to believe in it and the other side does not.¹⁸

Aron suggests one complicating development for his conclusion of long-term Soviet-American irreconcilability--the Sino-Soviet dispute. He stipulates:

Only one possible event, and one that is even probable in the indeterminable future, would be likely to modify the situation profoundly: the Soviet realization of a danger created by China. [Emphasis added]¹⁹

Aron's prophetic words are linked to the underlying theme of this study and underscore the fact that China can play a constructive regional role with global consequences. Essentially, the growing cohesiveness of a Sino-American connection is becoming a more important factor of international relations. This important relationship should now become the subject of more widespread American discussion and debate.

Since four of the five major world powers are inextricably linked to Asia and the Pacific,²⁰ it is doubtful the US strategy can afford to relegate that region to a secondary position to Europe for the foreseeable future. While political, economic and military trends will most likely lead to readjustments in America's Asian commitments, events in that region will begin to demand the increasing attention of US policy-makers.

One significant trend worthy of consideration by American strategists is a de facto partnership among China, the United States and Japan which offers the promise of

enhanced global equilibrium and stability. Of course, such an eventuality could not be structured on a foundation of myths and fantasy. If a de facto relationship among the three powers is to work effectively, mutual interests and equal advantages must serve as the basis for such an accommodation. Necessity rather than illusions, may eventually bring Washington, Peking and Tokyo to realize that only through their collaborative efforts can the overall regional balance of power be effectively maintained. For the foreseeable future, China is likely to remain a potential global power, while Japan continues to reject the military option and concentrate on economic goals. Thus, America's continued regional involvement will be essential if a credible balance of power is to evolve. Accordingly, the US, China, and Japanese link may well assume a greater degree of significance in the future.

Even though divergent ideological and national interests exist among the three nations, mutual perceptions concerning the formidable growth of Soviet global power are likely to stimulate the need for a more positive Sino-American-Japanese relationship.

Undoubtedly, the Soviets are quite dubious about the long-term consequences that might result from the evolving Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Moscow remains particularly disturbed about any possible development which might presage an adverse change in the correlation

of global forces. The Soviets perceive that the goal of American diplomacy is to bring China more directly into the global balance of power.²¹

Moscow alleges that the Sino-American rapprochement is a joint Sino-American attempt to offset the correlation of forces that had shifted in favor of the USSR.²² Thus, the Kremlin's suspicion of the notion of a "pentagonal" or multi-polar balance evokes the following response by one Soviet commentator in USA: Economics, Politics and Ideology, January 1975:

Guided by geopolitical aims US diplomacy is making definite efforts to find levers to influence the foreign political position of the Peking regime, having insured the PRC's functioning as a structural element in the "balance of power" system. The sometimes benevolent attitude of certain US circles toward Peking's great power ambitions is also linked with this . . . the United States is interested in the existence of a 'strong' China insofar as it serves as a 'counterweight' to the growing might of the Soviet Union and, as such, is a 'stabilizing factor' of world significance.²³

In Asia, the USSR must now confront realities which no amount of polemics can obscure. The Sino-Soviet dispute has created new regional security imperatives for the Soviet Union. Continuing friction between Moscow and Peking demonstrates with stark clarity that significant contradictions also exist within the socialist camp. Thus, attempts by Moscow to exploit opportunities in the "capitalist" world, a cardinal aim of Soviet policy, cannot possibly remain a one-sided game of unilateral advantage, particularly should the West choose to react to the Sino-Soviet impasse.

The Kremlin faces the realization that similar ideological bonds are insufficient to guarantee voluntary socialist world unity. Indeed, in viewing the pattern of Sino-Soviet relations during the past decade, no other single development appears to have had such a profound impact on international relations as the schism between the two former ideological allies. One observer, Professor Donald S. Zagoria, believes that the Sino-Soviet dispute "is likely to have lasting significance much like the split in the Christian Church during the Middle Ages."²⁴

The net effect of the split has given greater significance to the concept of political multipolarity, particularly in Asia. While providing greater diplomatic flexibility to the quadrilateral powers in Asia, multipolarity reinforces the effects of the schism and causes a reduction in Soviet willingness to provoke crises in Europe. Although a major shift in Soviet policy in Europe is not foreseen, the steady buildup of Soviet influence, prestige and military capabilities throughout Asia provides evidence of Moscow's realization of the need to allocate resources in order to minimize the danger of a hostile, nuclear power on its Eastern border. Consequently, one fundamental outcome of the deep-seated antagonism between the two contemporary adversaries is the Soviet Union's efforts to contain China as a major theme of its policy in Asia.

Despite the uncertainties pertaining to the future directions of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the limited possibilities of a genuine rapprochement between the former allies, has led to an increase in Soviet coercive pressure against China in order to influence the outcome of a post-Mao succession struggle. Under the circumstances of deep internal turmoil in China where a breakdown of central authority exists, speculative Soviet actions to solve its China problem might include limited actions to foment and then support a minority rebellion in "Sinkiang," or the seizure of the "economically important and exposed salient, Manchuria as the Japanese did in 1931."²⁵ While many other outcomes of Soviet coercive pressures and actions can be conjectured, the evidence indicates that the Kremlin's actions to influence a successor regime to accommodate on Moscow's terms has already begun.²⁶

From the American viewpoint, a successful Soviet coercive action against China would have an adverse impact on the regional and global balance of power. Notably, America has been involved in three wars in Asia to insure that no single nation became dominant in that vital region. Therefore, in light of recent events, the question of a stabilizing American influence should now be assessed. As the other superpower, only active US involvement can insure stability and equilibrium in that region in the foreseeable future. Because of the wide disparity of usable power

between the PRC and the USSR, China has limited means to deter or resist a serious major or limited coercive move by the Kremlin. Therefore, Western assistance will be essential if a Sino-Soviet balance is to be maintained.

Following this introduction, Chapter II will assess both historic and contemporary aspects relating to Moscow's security design for Asia, emphasizing the Soviet point of view. Chapter II focuses on the ideological dimension of the Sino-Soviet dispute and surveys the increasing rivalry between Moscow and Peking in Southeast and East Asia. Chapter IV discusses the underlying reasons for the change in US policy from detente to a strategy of "Peace through Strength." Focus is also placed on the significant implications of the US Pacific Doctrine as a framework to enhance stability and equilibrium in Asia. Chapter V highlights the strategic implications of Moscow's security design for the United States. Chapter VI summarizes the conclusions and findings derived from the assessment of the Kremlin's initiative for collective security in Asia.

Available evidence in these chapters suggest that Moscow's security initiative is directed at both China and the West. Consequently, the Kremlin's security design for Asia, which must also be interrelated with its growing capabilities to project power throughout the globe, deserves the serious attention of Western policy-makers.

Notes - Chapter I

¹ George W. Ball, "The Superpowers in Asia," Adelphi Papers, No. 91, November 1972, pp. 1-9.

² In December 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger underscored the dominant theme of America's relationship with Western Europe and the Atlantic community. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Year of Europe," American Foreign Policy, expanded edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974), pp. 271-282.

³ Guy Halverson, "While Soviet Naval Presence Grows US Cutbacks in East Asia Worry Pentagon," The Christian Science Monitor, 2 February 1976, p. 3. Halverson notes that the Soviet Union has dramatically stepped up its naval presence throughout the Pacific during the past year. At the same time, this reporter indicated that the US carrier presence in East Asia, long the cornerstone of US defensive strategy was reduced from three to two. Halverson also stated that:

Primarily because of the general American decline in Asia--and the upsurge of Soviet activity--US defense planners are putting increased pressure on Japan to step up its defense force levels, while cautiously optimistic about increased Chinese production of naval vessels. [Emphasis added]

⁴ Jen Ku-ping, "The World in 1975: Factors for Both Revolution and War are Increasing," Peking Review, 2 January 1976, p. 21.

⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, "Angola: Security Depends on Equilibrium Not Surrender," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXXII, No. 10, 1 March 1976, p. 291. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in Africa generally consisted of:

Nearly two hundred million dollars of arms, and its military technicians and advisors, with 11,000 Cuban combat troops, and with substantial sea and airlift and naval cover in adjacent waters." (p. 290)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Balance of Power is a concept that describes how states deal with the problems of national security in the context of shifting alliances and alignments."

This concept implies the clustering of states with mutual interests against a revisionist state that threatens the

status quo. The balance of power concept is considered to be a central feature of the struggle for power in the international arena. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 124-125; and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 161-211.

A detailed critique of Morgenthau's concept of the balance of power is contained in Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 25-36. A more contemporary critique of the US pentagonal balance of power thesis expounded by former President Nixon and attributed to Secretary of State H. Kissinger is presented in Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," Foreign Policy, No. 7, Summer 1972, pp. 54-59. Brzezinski believes that the balance of power model which depicts the US, Europe, Soviet Union, Japan and China is an insufficient analytical concept for understanding world affairs. Brzezinski notes that the balance of power model should not be confused with "diplomatic maneuvers designed to offset the power of another state or to increase one's leverage vis-a-vis another party." A balance of power implies something more enduring and more stable.

⁸ The Soviet concept of "correlation of forces" also referred to as "balance of forces" is elaborated in F. D. Kohler, et al., Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972), pp. 41-42. The reference to the "favorable correlation of forces" is consistently repeated in the statements made by Soviet policy-makers and commentators. Sh. Sanakoyev, "The World Today: Problem of the Correlation of Forces," International Affairs, November 1974, pp. 40-50; and T. Timofeyev, "The Banner of the Proletariat's Revolutionary Struggle," Kommunist, No. 6, April 1975, pp. 98-108. Timofeyev states:

The new phase of international class struggle is developing at a time when the balance of . . . forces in the world is changing as a result of new major victories on the part of world socialism and a sharp intensification of contradictions within the capitalist system.

⁹ G. V. Astafyev and A. M. Dubinsky (eds.) From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism: The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 67; and I. D. Ovsyany, et al., A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 18. Interestingly, the launching of Sputnik in 1957 led Khrushchev to state

that a serious change had occurred in the relation of forces between the countries of socialism and capitalism in favor of the socialist nations. Although Soviet leaders at the XXI Party Congress claimed that the shift in the world relation of forces was decisive and irrevocable, and that rough parity of power between the West and the communist camp existed, the year 1969 was allegedly the first time that Soviet sources indicated that the balance of forces actually bypassed the West in favor of socialism led by the Soviet Union. Raymond L. Garthoff, The Soviet Image of Future War, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 5.

¹⁰ Sanakoyev, op. cit., p. 40.

¹¹ L. I. Brezhnev, XXV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU): Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy, 24 February 1976, in Moscow News Supplement to issue No. 9 (2685), 1976, p. 4.

¹² Sanakoyev, op. cit., p. 46.

¹³ Timofeyev, op. cit., p. 98.

¹⁴ Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Russia's Dangerous Game--A Bold Gamble for Africa," U.S. News and World Report, 15 December 1975, pp. 43-45. The article notes that:

Angola is considered a Soviet test of American will--one of the probing operations both superpowers carry on regularly. The Kremlin is often puzzled by President Ford and uncertain about the spirit of post-Vietnam America. US responses to Russia's challenge in Angola could provide clues as to what Washington might do in future conflicts The adventure in Angola is the Kremlin's boldest overseas move in years, and one considered by experts to have been planned as a challenge to the U.S. [Emphasis added] (p. 43.)

¹⁷ Brezhnev, loc. cit.

¹⁸ Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, (New York: Praeger Publications, 1967), p. 510.

¹⁹ Ibid. Another two volume background of the Sino-Soviet dispute explicitly underscores Soviet anxiety about the possibility of a potential two front confrontation and stresses that this tangible weakness invites a new US policy of increased pressure on Moscow. Despite the nuclear stalemate, a Sino-American rapprochement vis-a-vis the strategy of Oton Ambroz, Realignment of World Power, Volumes 1 and 2, (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, 1972), p. xxi.

²⁰ Even if the Western European Community astonishes the world and makes rapid progress toward unity, it is unlikely that Western Europe would resume a significant Asian role. See Chapter II and III in Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 58-90.

²¹ The notion of the change from a bipolar world to a multipolar world order was outlined by former President Nixon who stated:

We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a balance of power. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.

Time, 3 January 1972, as quoted in Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945-1973 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1974), p. 141.

²² One Soviet text states that:

Chinese leaders would like to create a real axis between . . . the U.S. and China in Asia, the intended purpose being to resolve all Asian problems by mutual agreement without the participation of other powers, as was suggested by the communique of 2 February 1972 [Shanghai Communique].

Astafyev, op. cit., p. 162.

²³ B. N. Zegegin, "Certain Aspects of U.S. Chinese Relations," U.S.A. Economics, Politics and Ideology, No. 2, 9 January 1975, p. 35. Zegegin also provides proof of the rationale behind the Sino-American rapprochement by reference to the following quote attributed to R. Scalapino's January 1974 article in Foreign Affairs:

At present . . . the US and People's Republic of China are proceeding from a few very broad aims. Both countries want a military-political equilibrium in the Pacific-Asian region which will prevent the dominance in this region of any individual power since each now lacks either the will or the capability to play such a role by itself. (p. 39)

²⁴ Zagoria's testimony before the 1970 House Hearings is contained in "China and U.S. Foreign Policy," Congressional Quarterly (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1971), p. 64.

²⁵ Ralph N. Clough, et al., The United States, China and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 15-18.

²⁶ Chou En-lai stated that:

Brezhnev publically announced continuation of a policy of subverting the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and ranted about 'struggling . . . for bringing it back to the road of internationalism.' . . . Soviet revisionists [say] even more brazenly at mass rallies in Moscow that 'sooner or later the healthy forces expressing the true interests of China will have their decisive say and achieve the victory of Marxist-Leninist ideas in their great country,' . . . What they meant by the 'road of internationalism' is the road of reducing China to a colony of Soviet revisionist social imperialism.

Appendix I, "Chou En-lai: Political Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (24 August 1973) as quoted in Gene T. Hsiao (ed.) Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 307-308. A more recent Soviet commentary provides evidence that Moscow's efforts to subvert the Chinese leadership has not changed. One November 1975 analysis in Kommunist states that the Soviet Union will continue the struggle against Maoism and that:

This struggle is a form of internationalist assistance to the Chinese people's revolutionary cause . . . a struggle for the socialist future of the Peoples Republic of China, a struggle to return this country to the united formation of fighters against imperialism.

"The Maoist Regime at a New Stage," Kommunist, No. 12, August 1975, pp. 102-123, as quoted in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 42, 12 November 1975, p. 11.

CHAPTER II

MOSCOW'S CONCEPT FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA

Historical Aspects

With almost two-thirds of the Soviet Union's Territory in Asia, Moscow has a significant incentive to become a leading Asian power.¹ Generally, Moscow's pervasive interest in the east conforms to a long historical tradition. When examining the indispensable links between the contemporary period and the Russian historical experience, the Kremlin's fixation on the subject of Asian security seems inescapable. The Mongol invasion and conquest of 1237-41 was one of the most traumatic historical experiences of the Russian people. For the first and only time in their history, Russia was totally subjugated by an eastern invader. After bearing the devastating burdens of alien rule for over one century, the Russian victory at the battle of Kulikovo in 1380 effectively ended Mongol control over most of Russia.²

Almost six centuries later, when the world spotlight focused on the Sino-Soviet border conflict in the spring of 1969, Yevgeny Yevtushenko published a poem which identified Mao and the Chinese as the "new Mongols." Said Yevtushenko in his famous poem called, "On the Red Snow of the Ussuri":

You can see in the murky twilight
The new Mongol warriors with bombs in
their quivers
But if they attack the alarm bells will ring
And there will be more than enough fighters
For a new battle of Kulikovo³

Since Peter the Great to the present Soviet regime, the complex interrelationship between Russia's expansion towards the East and the USSR's contemporary concern with Asian security has become more obvious. The Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 signified the first pact signed by the Chinese Empire with a European power. With the decline of Chinese regional power, Russia inexorably expanded its eastern frontiers to the Pacific. Today, almost three hundred years later, partly because of what China calls the "unequal treaties" of both Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860), the Soviet Union is again faced with the dilemma of secure frontiers in Asia.⁴

While Russia's relative security priorities in the distant future are by no means clear, Soviet fear of the potential threat from the East is increasing. For the Kremlin's decision-makers, the outcome of this probable ongoing debate will have important long-range security implications. During the coming decades, the Soviet Union is likely to shift their security priorities toward the East. Undeniably, this appeal appeared to be the main thrust of Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn's advice in his Letter to the Soviet Leaders. In 1974, before his exile from the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn wrote:

From all sides except China we have ample guarantee of security for a long time to come For the next half-century our only genuine military need will be to defend ourselves against China A well established Northeast is our best defense against China. No one else on earth threatens us, and no one is going to attack us.⁵

Against this backdrop, which highlights the profound future Soviet security dilemma, one might more readily understand the historical relevance of Moscow's pronouncement of a "Grand Design for Asia."

Three months after the outbreak of border skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev on 7 June 1969 proposed the need for a system of collective security in Asia during an international Communist Conference in Moscow. Almost seven years have passed since Brezhnev observed that "the course of events is putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia."⁶ Since that date when that proposal was first announced, subsequent elaboration of the Soviet concept has been nonspecific. Yet, Moscow's officials and commentators have consistently reemphasized the need to create a Soviet-backed system of collective security in Asia. The absence of explicit rationale to support Moscow's repetitive assertions, has triggered a flood of global speculation that has yet to run its course.⁷

Available documentary evidence from Soviet sources does not amplify the specific principles. Background events, however, continue to support the assumption that Moscow's

priority motivation for their security initiative is to contain China.⁸ Conflicting ideological and national interests that have become more visible as a result of the border clashes in March 1969, stimulate Moscow's resolve to create a political-military alliance in Asia. One might predict that the Kremlin's pronouncement is merely the conceptual stage of an evolving security design. Given the growth of Soviet political-military capabilities, a future security framework could evolve to support a probable geopolitical aim to isolate, constrain and coerce the PRC.

Additionally, Brezhnev's remarks seem to imply a second, more diffuse objective. During the period when the Soviet initiative was initially proposed, the Nixon Administration had already announced its intent to disengage from the war in southeast Asia. Further, Britain had previously outlined its intent to withdraw its remaining forces east of Suez by 1971. Hence, Moscow assumed that the retrenchment of Western power was inevitable. Growing Soviet strategic and conventional military capabilities also prompted the Kremlin to assert its intention to exploit an anticipated regional security vacuum. Thus, Brezhnev's announcement of the collective security concept provided the means for exploring Asian receptivity for a security design that could replace "tired" Western regional security managers and preclude a potential resurgence of Japanese imperialism.⁹

Furthermore, during a later period, President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, suggested a Sino-American

rapprochement that worried Moscow more than any other aspect of Chinese external policy, with the possible exception of China's nuclear weapon potential.¹⁰ The Ford visit to the PRC in December 1975 represents an event with a potential impact analogous to that of the previous Nixon visit. Consequently, Moscow remains quite concerned about the uncertain implications of the future balance of forces in that region that could result from a firm Sino-American connection. This factor has become increasingly apparent since Brezhnev's initial pronouncement of the Soviet security design for Asia.

Soviet concern about the implications of a probable Sino-Japanese rapprochement are calculations that rank immediately after the growing Sino-American relationship. Moscow realizes the relative difficulty it has in competing effectively for Japan's favor or at the very least Tokyo's benign neutrality. Hence, the Kremlin appears to be capitalizing, sometimes crudely, on what appears to be the most potent weapon available in its arsenal--Soviet military power.¹¹ As long as Moscow refuses to return the northern territories to Japan, and for as long as the Sino-Soviet border dispute remains in force, the deterrent force of the Kremlin's security design in Asia will continue to be an increasingly significant Soviet regional objective.

To be sure, the Sino-Soviet dispute provides the major incentive for Moscow's contemporary focus on Asia.

In fact, the Kremlin's increasing stress on its role and image as an Asian power, may be directly traced to the Bandung era. Since 1955, a distinctive feature of Soviet foreign policy has been its increasing attention toward the emerging nations of Asia. Soviet references trace the idea of collective security in Asia to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, held in 1956.¹² This point was also underscored in September 1969 by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko who noted:

Many Asian countries are looking for the possibility of ensuring peace and security by collective effort. This idea in fact permeates the decisions of the Bandung Conference.¹³

Significantly, in 1955 Bandung, Indonesia was the site of the first major meeting of the Afro-Asian nations.¹⁴ Certain developments at that gathering impacted on the direction of Sino-Soviet relations. For, regardless of the important position it occupied in Asia, the Soviet Union was not represented at that conference. In contrast to Moscow's absence, the Peking regime through Chou En-lai, manifested a readiness to coexist with the various Asian and African states without the constraints posed by differing ideological perspectives. At the same time, Chou exercised so dominant an influence at Bandung, that India's Nehru, who anticipated wearing the mantle of Third World leadership, was obviously eclipsed by the Chinese. In retrospect, Bandung saw the visible rise of China to a role as the potentially dominant leader in the world of emerging nations.¹⁵ Significantly, this period also saw the initial development of friction

between the two socialist allies. Notwithstanding, Moscow's territorial credentials as a regional power, the Soviets were seemingly forced by China to defend their role as an Asian power.

For those in the Kremlin that believed that China would be governed by the spirit of proletarian internationalism rather than a fundamentally nationalist outlook toward Asia, Bandung proved to be a rude awakening. The concepts of national interests and national survival, combined with strong feelings of ethnic nationalism that underly historic Sino-Russian relations, appeared to outweigh any altruistic desire to share the Asian stage. The Soviet competition with the West which initially caused Khrushchev to reverse his earlier adverse stand on "neutralism" and "nonalignment" also brought about the beginning of the contemporary Sino-Soviet rivalry for influence in the Third World.¹⁶

Significantly, though an Asian power, the Soviet Union had not been invited to attend the Bandung Conference. This apparent exclusion by China reinforced Moscow's annoyance and fear that the PRC, which played the most prominent role at the meeting, might gain an uncomfortable lead against the USSR for the allegiance of the emerging Afro-Asian nations. Since the Bandung era, the Chinese media has consistently stressed that the USSR is a superpower predominantly oriented toward Europe.¹⁷ Clearly, when Khrushchev adopted an unprecedentedly active policy towards the

developing world, incorporating expanded political, economic and military aid programs, this course of action became a serious factor exacerbating the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia.¹⁸ Soviet activity in the Third World which began almost immediately after Bandung represented an important milestone in Soviet Asian strategy. As a result of the growing Sino-Soviet confrontation, this theme has become even more significant.

Ten years after the Bandung Conference, Peking again attempted to discredit the Soviet image as an Asian power. Prior to the Afro-Asian Conference which was planned to be held at Algiers in 1965, the Chinese again firmly registered their objections to Soviet attendance. Notwithstanding the objections of the Chinese, the offended Soviet leadership even reversed Khrushchev's stand on the question of attendance by indicating publicly Moscow's desire to have representation at the Algiers Conference. This issue was finally shelved only by the failure of the Conference to meet at all.¹⁹

A Search for Definition

To better define the underlying meaning that the Soviets may actually ascribe to the collective aspect of their Asian security initiative, an assessment of the general theory of collective security is instructive. Available Soviet sources do not explicitly define the role the prospective Asian members are expected to play. Hence, the

significance of the regional nations part in the Kremlin's security design must be derived through further analysis.

The International Relations Dictionary generally defines collective security as:

A concept that provides for a global security system based on the agreement of all or most states to take common action against any nation that illegally breaks the peace. To be effective, a collective security system requires agreement to defend the status quo against violent change, a definite assurance from member states that action will be undertaken against law-breaking states, and a willingness of states not directly threatened to participate in sanctions against an aggressor.²⁰

How applicable is the Soviet security design in the obscure and fluid Asian environment? Interestingly, during a previous decade, Dr. Inis Claude, the author of Power and International Relations provided an analysis that may be meaningful for any assessment of the Kremlin's collective security design.²¹ Briefly, Dr. Claude argued that the concept of collective security (as it applied to the members of the United Nations) was neither an appropriate nor effective response to the realities of managing the problem of global power relationships. Dr. Claude's caveat emphasized during a previous decade is certainly relevant to the dynamic regional environment in contemporary Asia. For as the author noted:

Neither statesmen nor their peoples have undergone the transformations in attitude and outlook, in loyalty and commitment, which are demanded by the theory of collective security.²²

At first glance, the concept of collective security presents many valid and practical constraints against its effective implementation in Asia. Yet, there are some significant benefits to be derived by those statesmen who are able to effectively manipulate the positive aspects of a concept which retains a great deal of appeal, particularly the Afro-Asian nations of the Third World. Dr. Claude noted the psychological positivism of the concepts appeal when he stated:

The proposition that international aggression is legally and morally reprehensible, the idea that any aggression is everybody's business, the view that a general international organization should concern itself with all disturbances of the peace, the notion that potential aggressors should be forewarned of the solidarities with which they may be confronted. Such basic propositions as these, attributable in large part to the doctrinal impact of collective security, have become imbedded in twentieth-century thinking about international relations. In this limited but important sense, collective security has been adopted. [Emphasis added]²³

Obviously, Soviet reference to this concept provides evidence to conclude that the positive notion of collective security has not been discarded. Upon analysis, it appears that in dealing with the Afro-Asian members of the Third World, Moscow's focus on the collective nature of Asian initiative includes several advantages:

First, the ideological popularity of the theory of collective security might enhance the flexibility and appeal for a Soviet sponsored regional security system.

Second, Moscow's persistent stress on the need for their initiative legitimizes the growth of unilateral

Soviet military capabilities in Asia without unduly alarming the regional nations, with the exception of China and Japan.

Third, the Kremlin has underscored its invitation to invite any regional nation whose independence is perceived to be threatened by a mutual adversary to become a member of Moscow's security pact.

Fourth, the intentionally obscure security framework provides Moscow with the ideal theoretical camouflage to cloak the Kremlin's unilateral strategic objectives in Asia.

Regardless of the bilateral or multilateral underpinning inferred by their collective security proposal for Asia, one must emphasize that unilateral Soviet power capabilities will ultimately play the most decisive future role in any conceivable power equation that would likely evolve. Indeed, Soviet regional capabilities will provide the essential determinants for the success or failure of their design. Few can doubt that Moscow's self-interest will remain paramount. For Soviet security objectives will not be subordinated to the dictates of any potential regional ally.

At best, where mutual security interests overlap between the Kremlin and a Third World regional member, Soviet economic, political, military and related assistance is likely. The Soviet relationships with India, Vietnam and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) provide visible examples of this point. Thus, Moscow's recurrent endorsement of their collective security theme for Asia legitimizes the growth of Soviet regional power capabilities and enhances

the prospective use of Third World nation strategic facilities within respective Asian security zones. To a great extent, these factors explain Moscow's consistent stress on their collective security initiative for Asia.

Asian Reaction

During the initial stage of its propagation Japan and India were the regional cornerstones of Moscow's collective security design for Asia.²⁴ Although the Soviet relationship with Japan was historically strained, Moscow evidenced a desire to improve relations with Tokyo. Moscow's substantial involvement in South Asia was graphically demonstrated by its military support to India against China in 1962 and its successful mediation between Pakistan and India at Tashkent in 1965. Soviet Asian policy prior to Brezhnev's security proposal in 1969 was almost exclusively confined to supporting North Vietnam's efforts in Southeast Asia. Solidarity with Hanoi against Washington enabled Moscow to provide North Vietnam with the bulk of its technologically sophisticated military support throughout the Vietnam war. Brezhnev regarded support for North Vietnam in its conflict with the United States as a "cardinal objective of the Soviet Union's foreign policy in Asia."²⁵

Briefly, it is worth recounting several major events that preceded Moscow's Asian security proposal. These events included:

• Notification by the British government in 1968 that the United Kingdom intended to withdraw from Asia by 1971, with the exception of retaining minimal security forces in Hong Kong.

• Although the Nixon Doctrine was not publically formulated until July 1969, just one month after Brezhnev's initial pronouncement, in March 1968, President Johnson had announced his intention to withdraw from the presidential election because of America's difficulties in Vietnam, indicating the possibility of a US withdrawal from that country, and a retrenchment from other Asian regions as well.

• More significantly, the escalation of a simmering conflict along the Sino-Soviet border was given global attention in March 1969. This action was coupled with China's attempts to normalize its foreign relations after the internal disruption of the Cultural Revolution.

To be sure, the foregoing events contributed substantially to Moscow's impetus for proclaiming the need for a regional security framework. Clearly, Brezhnev's assertion that the course of events indicated a requirement for a collective security system in that region served as a prelude for a more dynamic phase of Soviet policy toward Asia.

The weeks following Brezhnev's initiative saw a subsequent flurry of Soviet diplomatic and commercial activity that heightened Asian speculation. A specific Soviet proposal for a conference was soon expected to follow. When Soviet spokesmen failed to clarify repeated inquiries from various Asian governments, the lack of resolution inferred that the proposal was merely a trial balloon to elicit reactions from potential members of the security system before further elaboration.²⁶

The spotlight of Soviet focus soon shifted to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, and Singapore. Observers also speculated that the Philippines and the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan were to be potential candidates for the Soviet security system. The choice of potential candidates, to include their geopolitical possibilities, added fuel to the anti-Chinese design of the system.

Review of Soviet statements in the seven years since the concept was first proposed indicates that, with the exception of Mongolia, the Communist states along China's periphery (North Vietnam, North Korea and more recently Laos) have not been specifically mentioned as potential members. As long as the PRC perceived the Soviet security design to be detrimental to its interests, Hanoi and Pyongyang would likely proceed warily on Moscow's sensitive proposal.

Invitations to discuss the Kremlin's proposal were directed primarily toward the non-Communist states of Asia. Although Moscow's security initiative was enthusiastically disseminated throughout the Asian arena, the proposal initially encountered a cool reception. Apparently, most of the Asian nations suspected that Brezhnev's rather cryptic remarks were aimed at the encirclement of China. Few Asian governments, especially those along the periphery of the PRC were willing to offend Peking by supporting Moscow's elusive

security program. Even though the Soviet Union has continued to welcome China as a member of the collective security design for Asia,²⁷ Peking's rigorous denunciation of Moscow's proposal also suggested the fundamental anti-Chinese nature of Moscow's idea.

Without revealing much positive substance, Soviet diplomats took pains to reassure the suspicious Asian governments that all regional states would be welcome. Moscow also stressed that regional economic cooperation and non-alignment were entirely compatible foreign policies. Yet, if the Soviet idea were primarily concerned with economic development, aid or trade with the Third World nations of Asia, there would be little reason for Moscow to keep their concept obscure. Hence, one may argue that the vagueness and flexibility of the Kremlin's regional security design primarily enhances unilateral Soviet geopolitical aims.

Essentially, the Asian governments are quite aware of the fact that the region represents a quandary for both Soviet as well as American policy-makers. The catastrophic US experience in Southeast Asia is unlikely to be ignored by Moscow. Undisputedly, the Soviets are well aware of the potential for failure in the Third World. Moscow's costly losses experienced in Indonesia (1965) and more recently in Egypt (1976) will require the Kremlin to cautiously assess the costs and risks that could be anticipated in sponsoring a Soviet security design. Thus, a more definitive Kremlin

move must await the increase of Soviet regional capabilities. Most assuredly, should a decisive shift in the balance of regional forces occur in favor of unilateral Soviet advantage, few could doubt that Moscow's security design would contain far more substance. Until the period when the USSR's regional capabilities become more apparent, one may conclude that Moscow will probably continue to keep their options open.

To a subsequent inquiry made by the former Japanese foreign minister, Kiichi Aichi, in June 1969, the Soviet ambassador to Japan, A. Troyanovsky, admitted that Moscow had not worked out any specific details for the system and had not even decided which countries would be invited to join.²⁸

In 1970 a Singapore newspaper cited two fundamental reasons for the relatively cool or negative Asian reception to Brezhnev's collective security proposal. First, most of the regional governments, with the exception of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) which is a virtual Soviet satellite, feared the PRC's reaction. Obviously, those nations along the periphery of China were even more cautious. Second, many Asian governments were well aware that Moscow's main motivations in raising the security idea were based on self-interest and were prompted by a reluctance to develop too close a dependence on the USSR.²⁹

Brezhnev's failure to mention the collective security proposal, until three years after he initially introduced

the concept, was one indicator of Moscow's difficulty in winning a positive Asian reaction to the Soviet security design. Yet, even with the unimpressive regional reception given Moscow's initiative, the events taking place in South Asia provided a significant stimulus for Moscow's Asian security initiative. In 1971, amidst signs of mounting tension between India and Pakistan over events in East Bengal, Moscow accused Peking of supplying military aid to Pakistan and precipitating regional conflict in collusion with Washington.³⁰ Significantly, approximately three weeks after Dr. Kissinger's trip to China in July 1971, Moscow signed a friendship treaty with New Delhi to offset what the Kremlin viewed to be a de facto Sino-American alliance in support of Pakistan.

Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty signed on 9 August 1971, contains significant implications, particularly for China. This article implies that the Soviet Union would take countervailing action against Peking, should China intervene in an armed conflict against India.³¹ As a postscript to the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty, India decisively defeated Pakistan and promoted the secession of Bangla Desh. New Delhi had apparently waited before moving against Pakistan until the Himalayan passes were covered by snow. Six divisions were deployed along the Sino-Indian border as insurance against a Chinese attack. Possible retaliation by the Soviet Union, however, was a more cogent

reason for China's failure to provide more than verbal support to Pakistan.³²

Although Washington did send a carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal in mid-December, the Soviet Union's extensive contributions in both military equipment and diplomatic support to India, contrasted sharply with the failure of the US and China to provide similar assistance to their Pakistani ally. The outcome of the Indo-Pakistani conflict appeared to provide an instructive lesson to the Third World nations of Asia. Moscow had clearly demonstrated the will and capacity to successfully exert strong military and political leverage in support of an ally during a crisis situation in Asia.

Generally, the subsequent failure of American political-military efforts in South Vietnam contrasted with the successful Soviet support for India. While comparisons are superficial, the outcomes of these regional events probably impacted on Asian perceptions. Regardless of disparate circumstances, few could dispute the obvious final results, America's failure contrasted with the USSR's Asian success.

Although the outcome of the Indo-Pakistani crisis did not result in a rush of applicants for similar assistance from Moscow, the long-term message was probably not lost on various Asian governments. More importantly, the successful Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty appeared to suggest that bilateral treaties with friendly states could serve as the

building blocks for Moscow's future Asian collective security system. Believing that the Kremlin's initiative for guaranteeing security on a collective basis might arouse increasing regional interest, Moscow appeared to be capitalizing on its successful support to India. For, in 1972, Brezhnev provided the most explicit elaboration of the Soviet collective security design given to date:

To our mind, collective security in Asia should be based on such principles as the renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, noninterference in domestic affairs and extensive development of economic and other cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantage. We have advocated the establishment of such collective security in Asia and will continue to do so; we are ready to cooperate with all countries for the sake of carrying out this idea.³³

While less vague than Brezhnev's initial proposal, his subsequent elaboration did not succeed in winning additional Asian nation support for Moscow's security design. Yet, there are some interesting similarities between the Brezhnev's clarified proposal and the standard Chinese variant of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,³⁴ proposed during the Bandung Conference in 1955. Briefly, the Five Principles, also called Panch Shila, envisage peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation. These principles had a significantly favorable impact on the emerging Third World nations when they were first proclaimed by both China and India in June 1954.³⁵

Apparently as indicated by Brezhnev's elaboration of the collective Security initiative, Moscow was attempting to capitalize on at least four general conditions:

- The outcome of the USSR's successful support to India in comparison with Washington and Peking's failure to support Pakistan;
- Co-option of the successful theme which had an inherently favorable appeal to the Afro-Asian nations at Bandung;
- Pronouncement of a willingness to welcome Peking as a member in the security design given a substantial change in Sino-Soviet relations, essentially on Moscow's terms; and
- Soviet desire to counter a perceived Sino-American and Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Significantly, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were also contained in the Shanghai Communique signed by the US and the PRC in February 1972.

Moscow's willingness to cooperate with Peking on any other basis than the Kremlin's terms, appeared to have limited promise in view of the significant degree of Sino-Soviet hostility. Essentially, Brezhnev's elaboration did not obscure the fact that Moscow's security initiative was primarily directed against Peking.

The Macist leadership is consistently lambasted by Moscow's media for being first in violating the Bandung principles. By directing their foreign policy against the Soviet Union throughout the globe, for provoking armed conflict against India in 1962 and for adopting a position of "Great-Power Chauvinism," the Chinese leadership is a key target of Soviet concern. China's support of the US military presence in Asia and the PRC's support for the NATO

alliance are cited as evidence of Chinese collusion with "Western imperialism," and the depth of the anti-Soviet betrayal.³⁶ In Moscow's view, the advantage of their security initiative lies in the fact that it "will close all possible loopholes to potential disturbers of the peace." The target of Moscow's security design is unmistakably clear when one Soviet commentator states:

The idea of creating a collective security system in Asia . . . is opposed by the Peking leaders, who naturally cannot justify their position without deliberately distorting the very essence of collective security. . . . If some difficulties were to arise to China's accession to such a system, they would only be created by the Peking leaders themselves who more than once have resorted to hostile actions against neighboring Asian countries.³⁷

From Moscow's viewpoint, the principle which specifies "non use of force" among Asians and the inviolability of frontiers has obvious linkages with the long-term Soviet desire to secure its borders against the territorial claims of both China and Japan. V. Kudryavtsev, a political commentator, clearly underscored this point in Izvestia, in September 1975. He stated:

The third principle--on the inviolability of frontiers--is giving rise to objections on the part of certain political circles in Asian countries that dream about revising borders. That is precisely the case with the objections emanating from certain Japanese circles. This principle affects Peking as a red rag does a bull, in as much as the revision of borders, up to and including changing them with the aid of armed force, is a component part of Peking's great-power hegemonic policy.³⁸

Soviet policy-makers are well aware of the difficulties involved in obtaining regional support for their

security initiative. In addition to the formidable opposition to the Soviet security concept by Peking, Moscow acknowledges that the practicality of their concept is still doubted by most of the Third World Asian nations. Coolness to the USSR's security design on the part of the regional nations, however, could change should China become a threat to these countries. Additionally, the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states" appears to offer the potential of Soviet assistance to any Asian nation also threatened by possible Chinese inspired or abetted insurgencies.³⁹

Nevertheless, Moscow commentators realize that many problems still exist before their concept can win a more favorable reception by the regional nations. The long-term nature of their design, as well as the type of structure envisioned by the Soviet design is indicated in the following article by Y. Zhukov in Pravda in December 1974.

There can be no doubt about the practicality in principle of collective security in Asia, or in Europe either. Needless to say, one cannot imagine circumstances in which a universal security system could be created in Asia at once, immediately, by a single act. Such a security system can probably be created step by step, through both collective and bilateral efforts by states. There is a broad field of activity for the realization of the . . . tasks set by the Soviet proposal on the creation of a collective security system in Asia.⁴⁰

This same theme had been indicated one month earlier by a Moscow radio broadcast, which quoted Brezhnev's statement reportedly made in Ulan Bator in November 1974.

Without a doubt . . . there is no magic formula which would solve all the problems of the Asian continent at a stroke . . . bilateral and sometimes multilateral cooperation is being arranged for creative purposes . . . we can say without justification that these are the elements out of which the edifice of lasting peace on Asian soil is built.⁴¹

Hence, while Soviet policy-makers underscore the bilateral and multilateral foundation of such a design, one should not ignore the most important aspect of their regional security initiative--unilateral Soviet power. This factor will ultimately determine the success or failure of their security proposal for Asia.

Where the Concept Stands Today

Aside from the MPR, Iran appears to be the only other state that has given the Soviet proposal official respectability. The Soviet-Iranian Communique (August 1973) specifically notes that both parties declare their "intention to contribute to realizing the idea of creating a collective security system in Asia."⁴² Yet, it is obvious that Iran's support for this proposal is ambiguous, for a large gap exists between intent and the actual implementation of the idea.

Relations with both India and North Vietnam appear to be Moscow's major contemporary successes in Asia. While there are no official indicators that these two nations have officially indicated their willingness to be partners in the Soviet Asian security design, events have indicated that they might be considered de facto members. Even though the

idea remains controversial in India, and while New Delhi continued to withhold its official endorsement, close Indo-Soviet cooperation has become more apparent since Brezhnev's initial pronouncement.

In November 1973, during a speech before the Indian Parliament, Brezhnev again reiterated the need to hold a thorough and comprehensive discussion of the Soviet concept for collective security in Asia.⁴³ While the various press accounts of the time attempted to dispel the notion that Brezhnev's talks had anything to do with a Soviet-Indian military alliance, events since that period have seen India expand its hegemony over occupied Kashmir and Sikkim, while China and Pakistan remain on the side lines as impotent observers to India's fait accompli.⁴⁴

Indo-Soviet defense cooperation was implied during the visit of the USSR's former Defense Minister, Marshal A. A. Grechko, to India in February 1975. Accompanied by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, Commander in Chief of the Navy, and Marshal P. S. Kutakhov, the Chief Marshal of Aviation, Marshal Grechko emphasized that, by virtue of the Friendship Treaty, "the Soviet Union and India are in full agreement" on various security issues in Asia.⁴⁵ While showing some signs of nervousness over the potential of a possible Sino-Indian rapprochement, Moscow remains well aware of the fact that both India and the Soviet Union share substantial common interests against China: both nations have not yet concluded satisfactory territorial agreements with Peking.

Before a defense seminar in New Delhi, in April 1975, Indian Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan noted that "American reverses in Indochina are a gratifying vindication of India's foreign policy." Chavan added that "those who rely on the United States must learn a lesson from the happenings in Indochina."⁴⁶ Apparently, this Indian policy-maker appeared to be legitimizing the close Indo-Soviet security links.

Renewed Soviet support to India became more obvious in the fall of 1975. Izvestia reported that in October 1975 four Indian border guards were ambushed by a Chinese detachment of forty soldiers in the most serious incident on the Sino-Indian border within several years. Possible Soviet assistance to India was implied when Moscow cited the Chinese for provoking a "dangerous incident."

Noting that the Chinese have repeatedly carried out aggressive actions between 1959-1967, I. Kovalev stated:

In recent years, however, many strategic roads have been built on the Chinese side of the [Indian] border. Peking has been training separatist rebels in border regions and supplying them with weapons.⁴⁷

During the XXV Party Congress in February 1976, Brezhnev noted that Indo-Soviet relations have significantly improved during the past five years. Brezhnev cited the importance of Soviet bilateral ties with India and underscored their mutual relationship as a "stabilizing factor in South Asia and the continent as a whole."⁴⁸ Essentially, Moscow's consistent support to India continues to provide a concrete example to demonstrate the advantages of the Soviet security alternative to the Asian nations.

Although the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship will be treated in more detail in subsequent chapters, since the end of America's involvement in Vietnam, Moscow has improved its relations with Hanoi apparently to the disadvantage of Peking. Despite China's geographical proximity, the Hanoi-Moscow link has become closer because of the USSR's superior capabilities to provide economic aid and technological support. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Peking and Hanoi appear to be engaged in competition for influence in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indochina. As a result of China's takeover of Vietnamese territory of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, Vietnam appears to have joined both India and the Soviet Union as nations with territorial disputes with China. For reasons of mutual interests, Hanoi's de facto membership in a Soviet security design should not be discounted. Unquestionably, Peking will be assessing the meaning and implications of Brezhnev's related statement made at the XXV Party Congress. The Soviet Party Chief emphasized that "Vietnam's victory has opened new horizons for all of Southeast Asia." Only future events will clarify the significance of Brezhnev's remarks.⁴⁹

As far as China's reaction toward Moscow's concept of collective security in Asia is concerned, V. Kudryavtsev states:

Only the sick imaginations of the Peking leaders could conceive the idea of using a security system for the 'encirclement and isolation' of the P.R.C. One would

have to lose all sense of reality to believe that a country with a population of 800,000,000 and an ancient culture could be isolated at all Peking refuses to accept such a system precisely because it dreams of hegemony in Asia, under which all the other countries would be its private domain. In candid moments, Mao Tse-tung himself used to talk of such a policy.⁵⁰

While Moscow's security initiative reportedly met with a favorable reception by India and some other undesignated Asian countries, the Kremlin appears to be quite sensitive about Japan's reception of the Soviet concept. Moscow's commentators take exception to the Japanese objections to their security design. When the Japanese press indicated that the security formula concluded in Helsinki in August 1975 was "inapplicable to Asia," Soviet commentators were quick to reply. Japanese newspapers that carried unfavorable commentaries were accused of ignoring principles that could be useful to Asian countries. Typical principles for Asia include the dismantling of the American military bases in Asia which Moscow regards as a potential threat. Kudryavtsev clearly rejected Japanese criticism of Moscow's security proposal by emphasizing that the principles which guarantee the "inviolability of frontiers" in Europe at Helsinki, would also be suited to Asia as well.⁵¹

The resurgence of Moscow's collective security concept is clearly based on the uncertainty created by the changing balance of regional forces in Asia. Multipolarity, which has overtaken the world has also affected Asia. The Sino-Soviet dispute, combined with the rise of Japan to

regional economic predominance has vastly complicated the Asian security equation. Although Moscow has achieved strategic parity with the United States during a period when the latter continues to reduce its presence on mainland Asia, the US still retains important regional interests and capabilities and constitutes a formidable Asian power. Thus, the resurgence of Soviet interest in creating a security system in Asia is postulated on the conflict potential that continues to threaten the Asian continent. From the Soviet perspective the increasing urgency for their security concept for Asia is based on a number of important factors. These factors deal with the actions signaled by the other members of the quadrilateral balance. In the Kremlin's view, the United States' activities in Asia are contrary to Moscow's expectations and interests. One Soviet commentator notes that:

The imperialists, having suffered bitter defeats in Vietnam and Cambodia, have not given up the ruling in Asia; they have only shifted the center of their military undertakings from Southeast Asia to the area of South Korea and Japan.⁵²

Apparently, seven years of persistent efforts have helped the Soviets to legitimize their concept for Asia. Although many observers still regard Moscow's collective security aims as completely unrealistic, a trial balloon, a device to isolate China, or at best a propaganda exercise devoid of serious political intent, it should be remembered that this same view prevailed during earlier years when the

Soviets first called for a European Security Conference. Soviet patience and persistence proved successful when the European Security Conference met in August 1975 to endorse the status quo in Europe.⁵³ With the exception of China and Japan, Asian responses to the Soviet concept have evolved from generally cool responses, when it was initially proposed, to a warmer "wait and see attitude" during the contemporary period.

Notes - Chapter II

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1973), p. 175.

In this book outlining Soviet international policies, written three years after his initial pronouncement of the need for collective security in Asia, L. I. Brezhnev stated:

Comrades, you have probably noticed that questions pertaining to Asian countries have lately become prominent in our policies. This is quite understandable. Nearly two-thirds of Soviet territory are situated on the Asian continent . . .
 [Further] Asia's role in world politics is growing rapidly. [Emphasis added]

² Sidney Hargrave, Russia: A History (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1959), p. 37.

³ Harrison E. Salisbury, War Between Russia and China (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 35.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 58-60.

⁵ Aleksandr I. Solzhnitsyn, Letter to the Soviet Leaders (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), p. 46.

⁶ L. I. Brezhnev in address to the International Meeting of the Communist and Workers Party in Moscow as quoted in V. Pavlovsky, "Collective Security the Way to Peace in Asia," International Affairs, July 1972, p. 23. For additional comprehensive Soviet views and statements on the concept for collective security in Asia, see L. I. Brezhnev, "The Decisions of the 24th C.P.S.U. Congress Are a Militant Program of Activity for the Soviet Trade Unions," Pravda, 21 March 1972, pp. 1-3, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSP), Vol XXIV, No. 12, 19 April 1972, p. 7; "Fidelity to the Great Union of Fraternal Republics," Pravda, 25 September 1973, pp. 1-3, in CDSP, Vol XXV, no. 39, 24 October 1973, pp. 105. L. I. Brezhnev, "For the Good of the People and in the Name of Soviet Man," Pravda, 15 June 1974, pp. 1 & 3, in CDSP, Vol XXVI, No. 24, 10 July 1974, pp. 1-2. "Speech by L. I. Brezhnev," Pravda, 15 June 1974, pp. 1-3, in CDSP, Vol XXVI, No. 24, 10 July 1974, pp. 1-2; L. I. Brezhnev, "In the United Ranks of Soviet Republics," Pravda, 16 August 1973, pp. 1-3, in CDSP, Vol XXV, No. 33, 12 September 1973, pp. 4-5; and speech by L. I. Brezhnev "XXV Party Congress," Moscow News Supplement to Issue No. 9, (2685), 6-13 March 1976, p. 4.

⁷ Alexander O. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," Asian Survey, Vol XIII, No. 12, December 1973, pp. 1075-1091; Peter Howard, "A System of Collective Security," Mizan, July/August 1969, pp. 199-204; Arnold L. Horlick, "The Soviet Unions' Asian Collective Security Proposal: A Club in Search of Members," Pacific Affairs, Vol 47, No. 3, Fall 1974, pp. 269-285; Sheldon W. Simon, "The Japan-China-USSR Triangle," Pacific Affairs, Vol 27, No. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 125-138; and Victor Zorza, "Collective Security," Survival, Vol XI, No. 8, August 1969, p. 248.

⁸ Many observers believe that the cardinal reason for Brezhnev's proposal was the desire to organize an anti-China front in Asia in response to the long-smoldering Sino-Soviet conflict along their common border. China's consistent focus on the "unequal treaties" also receives a distinct Soviet reaction. Pavlovsky, loc. cit.

⁹ Horlick, op. cit., p. 270.

¹⁰ Soviet concern over the implications of the Sino-American connection can be observed in V. P. Lukin, "American-Chinese Relations: Concept and Reality," U.S.A. Economics, Politics and Ideology, No. 2, February 1973, pp. 12-23, in CDSP, Vol XXV, No. 11, 11 April 1973, pp. 107.

¹¹ S. Ivanov, "Victory in the Far East," and S. Zakharov, "The Pacific Fleet in the War Against Japan," in Krasnaya Zvezda, August 1975, pp. 2-8. These articles provide the type of coverage that has been appearing in Soviet military journals during the past year.

¹² J. D. Ovsyany, et al., A Study of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 315.

¹³ Ibid.; and A. Sergeyev, "Problems of Collective Security in Asia," International Affairs, August 1975, p. 52.

¹⁴ Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. vii.

¹⁵ Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1959 (London: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 72-73.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁷ See the full account of Chou's Report to the 10th Congress contained in Hsinhau (text), 31 August 1973, NCNA (Peking); excerpts from Chou's Report to the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, The New York Times, 1 September 1973; and "In Face of Growing Soviet Menace," Peking Review, No. 1, January 1976, pp. 24-25.

¹⁸ Hinton, op. cit., p. 73.

¹⁹ Ib d., p. 256.

²⁰ Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, 1969), p. 274.

²¹ Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962).

²² Ibid., p. 198.

²³ Ibid., p. 204.

²⁴ Victor Mayevsky, "Collective Security in Asia is an Urgent Problem," Pravda, 21 June 1972, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol XXIV, No. 25, 17 July 1972, pp. 1-8; and V. Kudryavtsev, "The Peace Programme and the 'Third World,'" International Affairs, September 1973, pp. 27-31.

²⁵ L. I. Brezhnev, "The Communist Movement Has Entered a Period of New Upsurge," Kommunist, No. 11, July 1969, pp. 3-16, in CDSP, Vol XXI, No. 32, 3 September 1969, p. 7; and L. I. Brezhnev, "For Strengthening the Solidarity of Communists, For a New Upswing in the Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Pravda, 8 June 1969, pp. 1-4, in CDSP, Vol XXI, No. 23, 2 July 1969, p. 16; and L. I. Brezhnev, On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation, op. cit., p. 177.

²⁶ Horlick, op. cit., p. 273.

²⁷ Ovsyany, op. cit., p. 317.

²⁸ Tokyo Radio, 29 June 1969.

²⁹ This view is indicated in one Singapore Newspaper during a period when the negative or cool reaction on the part of the regional nations in Asia caused the Soviet plan to be shelved. "Soviet Plan for the Far East Pact is Shelved," The Straits Times, 18 February 1970, p. 1.

³⁰ G. Yakubov, "Conflict in Hindustan and the Mao Groups Provocative Role," Pravda, 28 December 1972, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol XXIII, No. 52, 25 January 1972, pp. 1-3.

³¹ Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of India, Pravda, 10 August 1971, p. 1, in CDSP, Vol XXIII, No. 32, 7 September 1971, p. 5.

³² Harold C. Hinton, Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 240.

³³ Brezhnev, On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International Situation, op. cit., p. 177.

³⁴ O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia The Great Game (New York: Columbia University, 1971), p. 407.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ V. Kudryavtsev, "Asia: Problems of Security," Izvestia, 28 August 1975, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol XXVII, No. 35, 24 September 1975, pp. 1-2; and V. Kudryavtsev, "Problems of Collective Security in Asia," International Affairs, December 1973, pp. 94-98.

³⁷ Y. U. Lugovskoi, "Asian Peoples Struggle For Freedom, Progress and Security," International Affairs, November 1973, p. 34.

³⁸ Kudryavtsev, "Asia: Problems of Security," op. cit., p. 2.

³⁹ Y. E. Zhukov, "Security and Peace for the Peoples of Asia," Pravda, 14 December 1974, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol XXVI, No. 50, p. 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Moscow Radio, 19 December 1974, in FBIS Soviet Union.

⁴² Lugovskoi, op. cit., p. 33.

⁴³ Brezhnev, "Indian-Soviet Friendship is Indestructible," Pravda, 28 November 1973, pp. 1-2, in CDSP, Vol XXV, No. 48, 26 December 1973, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴ "Resolutely Support the Just Struggle of the Sikkimese People," NCNA (Peking), 9 May 1975.

⁴⁵ "A. A. Grechko's Visit to India," Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 February 1975, pp. 1-3.

⁴⁶ "India Sees Vindication of Its Policy," The Washington Post, 24 April 1975, p. A-11.

⁴⁷ I. Kovalev, "Dangerous Incident," Izvestia, 4 November 1975, p. 3.

- ⁴⁸ Brezhnev, Speech at XXV Party Congress, op. cit., p. 4.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 2.
- ⁵⁰ Kudryavtsev, "Asia: Problems of Security," op. cit., p. 2.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., p. 1.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Vladimir Pavlovsky, "Asian Security: The Idea Gains Ground," New Times, No. 10, March 1975, pp. 4-5.

CHAPTER III

THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN ASIA

Introduction

While most observers surmise that global rivalry with the United States is the overriding preoccupation of Soviet foreign policy, the USSR's actions in Asia during recent years have been primarily influenced by its concerns about China. Since the advent of the Sino-Soviet dispute, a general increase in Russia's involvement in Asia has become manifest. Increasing Soviet focus on their initiative for collective security in Asia since the termination of hostilities in Vietnam provides evidence that the historic rivalry between China and the Soviet Union in Asia is becoming more significant. Hence, as a consequence of the perceived danger from China, Moscow's most likely objectives in Asia are to:¹

- Deter or contain any possible Chinese threat to the Soviet territorial status quo;
- Preserve or improve the Soviet position relative to China in the rivalry for influence in Third World Asia;
- Maintain primacy over Asian communist governments and parties;
- Keep open the option of normalizing relations with Peking in the post-Mao era;

- Improve the Soviet position in Asia relative to the United States and attempt to minimize the impact of a developing Sino-American rapprochement;
- Improve Soviet relations with Japan, particularly to preclude Tokyo from acquiring nuclear weapons; and
- Prevent a rapprochement or alliance between Japan and China, with the de facto backing of the United States.

Unquestionably, many conflicting national interests and ideological viewpoints exacerbate the current hostility between the two former allies. A definitive analysis of all the various factors which are linked to the current tension between Moscow and Peking is beyond the scope of this study. This chapter covers the increasing Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast and East Asia over competing ideological views and national interests. As a starting point, however, it is most important to focus on the ideological dimension of the Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Ideological Dimension

Essentially, the territorial roots of the Sino-Soviet conflict have been more obvious than the ideological aspects which have been obscured by polemics and have not been widely understood. Indeed, doctrinal terminology associated with Communist ideology holds significant importance in the foreign policies of both Peking and Moscow. During the past decade the Soviet Union has uniquely transformed its ideology into a double-edged sword. On one hand, the Kremlin has used aspects of its ideology as a means for

demonstrating voluntary socialist world unity. On the other hand, Moscow has literally refined the use of its ideology into a potent coercive weapon to legitimize the use of force against a recalcitrant member of the socialist camp. Notably, and in sharp contrast to the Soviet Union, China has not used its ideology in the same manner. The coercive element within Communist ideology has no counterpart among the Western allies, who are fundamentally unified on the basis of consensus.

Proletarian Internationalism

"Proletarian internationalism" is the unique doctrinal term which Moscow consistently employs to insure the unity of the "world socialist system."² In the Soviet lexicon, proletarian internationalism in the contemporary period facilitates the "safeguarding of the security of the socialist community." At the same time, this concept demands an uncompromising struggle against nationalism or "Great-Power attitudes." As noted in one definitive Soviet source:

National parochialism, diverts . . . [Socialist members] from the international revolutionary movement and leads to the weakening of the anti-imperialist struggle.

This theory provides Moscow with a great deal of latitude in choosing the necessary means to maintain the unity and solidarity among socialist nations. Obviously, the Kremlin's

*It should be emphasized that both China and the Soviet Union interpret Communist terminology according to their respective national interests. Their interpretations of "proletarian internationalism" and "peaceful coexistence" are examples of this point.

actions to implement socialist unity will be limited by the constraints of time, distance, and, more importantly, coercive capabilities. Yet it is significant to point out that in Eastern Europe Soviet intentions have been vividly demonstrated.

Clearly, a case can be made to show that Moscow's concept of proletarian internationalism has now become a more important instrument in its coercive campaign against China (see Figure 1). This is particularly relevant if pressures increase for a potential Soviet response to exploit a possible post-Mao succession crisis. Since the Sino-Soviet conflict has been detrimental to the cause of socialist unity, Moscow is likely to exploit any opportunity to influence a post-Mao regime. Although the exact form of the Kremlin's actions are difficult to discern, the use of force remains as a credible option. To be sure, the Sino-Soviet relationship continues to show signs of increasing instability. Essentially, the Sino-Soviet dispute undermines the Kremlin's global objectives by:

- Highlighting contradictions with socialist camp which can be exploited by capitalism led by the US;
- Challenging Soviet primacy and weakening socialist internationalist unity and promoting nationalist discord;
- Focusing on conflicting socialist interstate interests, i.e., political, military, economic, and ideological;
- Creating a "two front" dilemma for Moscow;
- Obscuring the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism;

- Exacerbating rivalry for influence between PRC and USSR in Third World; and most importantly,
- Impacting negatively on the shift in the correlation of world's forces in favor of socialism, led by the USSR.




Figure 1

Sino-Soviet Dispute
 The Ideological Dimension
 (The Soviet Dilemma)

PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM

- Maximizes the ability of the Soviet Union to exploit contradictions within the capitalist camp; while
- Providing Moscow with a lever to insure unity within socialist camp through
 - Mutual support, or when necessary
 - Coercion

Peking's Three Level World View

The Kremlin perceives Peking's theoretical view which divides the world into three distinct levels as further proof of China's anti-Sovietism.⁴ (See Figure 2) The first level is the arena preserved by the military superpowers consisting of both the United States and the Soviet Union. In the Chinese perception, both of the superpowers are contending against each other for global hegemony. The second level consists of the Second Intermediate Zone, a grouping that includes Japan, Western Europe and the smaller capitalist nations. The third level depicts the Third World arena. This region is given special status in Chinese pronouncements and is the "stake" in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the US for dominance. As far as the Kremlin is concerned, this Chinese ideological concept "is primarily directed against the Soviet Union and the world socialist system." In Moscow's view, Peking's conceptual model:


- Blurs the distinction between Moscow's ideological view of the irreconcilability of conflict between socialism and capitalism.

- Is essentially anti-Soviet. While challenging both superpowers, Peking's actions and pronouncements actually indicate that the USSR is the main threat to the nations in the Second Intermediate Zone and the Third World.

- Attempts to counter Soviet global aims and objectives.

- Exacerbates friction between both the USSR and US who are allegedly contending for global hegemony.

- Enables Sino-Japanese and Sino-West European (W. Germany) rapprochement; and, more importantly
- Cloaks the PRC's growing accomodation with the US as well as the creation of a Sino-American axis in Asia and throughout the globe.



Legend

Level I - (Military Superpowers) USSR and US

Level II - (Smaller Capitalist Nations)
Japan
Western European Nations
Canada, etc.

Level III - (Third World)
China and developing
Afro-Asian and Latin
American Nations

 Superpower contention for global hegemony

Figure 2

China's Three Level World View⁴

Territorial Issue

The historical Sino-Soviet territorial dispute provides one example of how Moscow manipulates the concept of proletarian internationalism to legitimize the possible use of force to protect its own national interests. By definition, proletarian internationalism condemns nationalist attitudes, particularly if those attitudes diverge from the Soviet understanding of that term. The territorial issue revolves around the status of the "unequal treaties" by which Tsarist

Russia annexed parts of Siberia. In 1964 during a period of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, Mao Tse-tung bitterly criticized the Soviet Union for its territorial ambitions. Before a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party, Mao raised the potentially dangerous issue of claims to Soviet territory by both China and Japan. Chairman Mao's following statement presents a possible threat to the Soviet territorial status quo and underlines the unpredictable future course of the Sino-Soviet conflict:


About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of [Lake] Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list. In regard to the Kurile Islands, the question is clear as far as we are concerned--they must be returned to Japan.⁵

No matter what form of government evolves after Mao, the future possibility that a strong, unified and self-reliant China might attempt to reassert its control over lost territories compounds the Kremlin's dilemma (see Map 2). To be sure, a powerful and imperialist China could attempt to unite and consolidate territories lost as a result of the humiliating division of China into spheres of influence by a number of foreign powers in the nineteenth century. Conceivably, Peking could reclaim the Far Eastern provinces and Outer Mongolia (MPR), which was once an integral part of China. Of course, the PRC does not have the capabilities to successfully challenge the Soviet Union, at least within the foreseeable future.⁶ Ironically, in the long-term a more

Map 2

CHINA'S LOST EMPIRE

U. S. S. R.



— — — Borders at the time of the

— — — Borders at the conclusion of the era of the Old Democratic Revolution, 1919

*Based on a Chinese Communist textbook,
"A Brief History of Modern China",
published in Peking in 1954*

NAME AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION

Source: CIA

powerful China might even use the ideological concept of proletarian internationalism against the Soviet Union. Thus, the territorial factor continues to stimulate persistent Soviet concerns over national interests and secure frontiers.⁷

Uncertainty over the future intentions and capabilities of China reinforce Russia's desire for a greater influence in Asia. At the same time, Moscow's desire to reestablish ideological primacy over Peking in the World Communist movement remains another important consideration.

As a result of the continuing tension between the two mutual antagonists, the PRC sees potent Russian military capabilities being oriented against China. Similarly, the Soviet leadership sees the need to limit the developing Chinese nuclear capability that is primarily directed against the USSR. This fear was probably implied by L. I. Brezhnev in the following statement made at the XXV CPSU Congress:

Certainly, the time will come when the inevitable association of other nuclear powers with the process of strategic arms limitation will arise on the agenda. And those which refuse would assume a grave responsibility . . . [Emphasis added]⁸

In assessing Soviet military activities in Asia during the past decade, it is clear that the USSR has increased its defenses along the frontiers with China. While the buildup of Soviet forces has more than doubled since the outbreak of fighting along their common borders, the number of divisions have been stabilized since 1973. While no further increase in Soviet manpower has been reported to

date, one article indicates that in July 1975 there was an increase in the deployment of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons in that region.⁹ (see Figure 3)




Figure 3
Build-up of Forces in Sino-Soviet Border Area

Notes: *Soviet Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern Military Districts and Outer Mongolia; Chinese Sinkiang, Shenyang and Peking Military Regions (also Outer Mongolia - formerly a separate Military Region, now part of the Peking Military Region) are included in the totals.

From 1963 to 1966 the Soviet Union strength in the Far East was 17 divisions. There was no data for China.

Soviet mechanized divisions have about 11,000 men, armored divisions about 9,000. Chinese infantry divisions have between 12,000 and 14,000 men, armored about 10,000. Soviet armored strength is 8-10 divisions; China may have as many as three armored divisions in the area.

Sources: Strategic Survey 1973, IISS, p. 67; The Military Balance, 1974-1975, IISS, pp. 9 and 49; and, The Military Balance, 1975-1976, IISS, pp. 9 and 49.

Coercive Diplomacy

When appraising the military equation, few Western observers believe that the Soviet Union will undertake substantial military action against China.¹⁰ Generally, Western commentators believe that future Sino-Soviet relations will most likely evolve into a pattern of protracted cold war. Intermittent outbursts of limited Sino-Soviet skirmishes along their common frontier are expected to exacerbate their mutual relationship. Although signs of normalization between both antagonists do exist and should not be discounted, coercive diplomacy, which implies some limited form of pressure, appears to be Moscow's most plausible option in preparation for the post-Mao era.¹¹

One may speculate that Moscow's concept of collective security in Asia is broad enough to incorporate at least two coercive levers against China: first, the real threat of an external political-military design to contain the PRC, and second, the threat of internal subversion. Evidently, Moscow's hope for resolving its current Chinese problem without resort to open warfare lies in the possibility of exploiting internal conflict within China. This could possibly occur during a post-Mao leadership succession crisis, or as a direct result of an appeal by a Chinese faction who would elicit Soviet aid. Continuing political campaigns in China against "pro-Soviet elements" suggest that there may be some residual pro-Soviet factions that desire to reduce Sino-Soviet tensions. For example, at the 10th PRC Party Congress, Chou En-lai accused

Lin Piao of capitulating to the Soviet revisionists and betraying China before he was allegedly killed in an aircraft accident while defecting to the Soviet Union.

Although various hypothetical scenarios could be contemplated, it should be emphasized that the Kremlin's policy-makers have never foreclosed their option to implement a variation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" against China.¹² The concept of proletarian internationalism which provides the ideological justification for the use of force against a misguided socialist regime, could be readily linked to their initiative for collective security in Asia, particularly in defense of Moscow's perceived security requirements. After all, by Soviet definition, China remains a socialist state.¹³ As noted beforehand, conflicting Sino-Soviet interests could bring about a combination of possible ideological rationalizations to justify the use of force against China. From the Kremlin's point of view, the leadership succession after Mao is critical. An anti-Soviet successor government may cause the Soviets to move against China.

One example of the Kremlin's use of ideological rationale to reconcile the concept of proletarian internationalism with Moscow's national interests was demonstrated during the height of Sino-Soviet tensions. Approximately four months after Brezhnev's initial proposal for collective security in June 1969, the Kremlin's use of coercive diplomacy as part of a broadening war of nerves against Peking,

was made evident in a dispatch by a Soviet journalist. In September 1969, Victor Louis, a controversial correspondent of the London Evening News, stated:

Some circles in Eastern Europe are asking why the doctrine [i.e., the Brezhnev Doctrine] that Russia was justified in interfering in Czechoslovakia's affairs a year ago should not be extended to China. Events in the past year have confirmed that the Soviet Union is adhering to the doctrine that socialist countries have the right to interfere in each other's affairs in their own interest or those of others who are threatened. The fact that China is many times larger than Czechoslovakia and might offer resistance is, according to Marxist theoreticians, no reason for not applying the doctrine. Whether or not the Soviet Union will attack Lop Nor, China's nuclear center, is a question of strategy, and so the world would only learn about it afterwards.¹⁴

China Requests a Change in Sino-Soviet Relations

Peking's recognition that proletarian internationalism could be turned into an ideological weapon to legitimize the use of force against China, appears to be one major reason behind its repeated requests to Moscow to establish a new relationship based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.¹⁵ Evidence of the foregoing was discerned in the following statement made by L. I. Brezhnev during his speech to the Soviet Trade Unions in Moscow, 1972:

Official Chinese representatives tell us that relations between the USSR and the PRC should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Well, if Peking does not deem it possible to go any farther than this in relations with a Socialist state we are prepared to construct Soviet-Chinese relations on this basis.¹⁶

Subsequent events, however, have evidenced Moscow's repeated refusal to accede to PRC requests for a change in

the Sino-Soviet relationship. From the Kremlin's point of view, relations between both nations are still based on proletarian internationalism. While not all-inclusive, reasons for Soviet refusal to consider a change can be inferred from an assessment of relevant Soviet sources which also provide conclusive evidence of the significant deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.

The extent of Soviet displeasure over the evolution of Peking's foreign policy was made clear in a monograph entitled From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism.¹⁷ The primary significance of this document lies in the fact that it appears to be an authoritative document produced by the Foreign Policy Department of the Soviet Far East Institute. An overview of the contents of this monograph reveals the Kremlin's official rationale for the significant deterioration of relations between the two former allies during the period 1949 to 1973.

In the authors' perspective, China's betrayal of the USSR was borne out by Chou En-lai at the 10th PRC Party Congress in 1973 when he declared that the Soviet Union was China's primary threat. This admission not only exacerbated the contradictions within the socialist camp and hampered Soviet global policies, but more importantly, the PRC provided aid to the cause of capitalism.¹⁸ Hence, Moscow's collective security proposal is predicated on the fact that the Soviets must now find a means to undermine the Maoist regime. In fact, the text reveals the psychological

dimensions of Moscow's coercive diplomacy, particularly Peking's sharply negative reaction to their Asian security proposal.¹⁹ At the same time, the authors make no secret of the primary aim of the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia--the prevention of Peking's ascendancy in that region.

More significantly, the text also reveals the explicit reasons for the Soviet refusal to change their present ideological relationship with China. In the authors' view, the main purpose for Peking's desire to change the policy from proletarian internationalism to one of peaceful coexistence is that the latter concept would enable China to accomplish its strategic aims. Peking's alleged goals are the establishment of "spheres of influence" and "hegemony" in Asia. A possible allusion to the growing rivalry in Asia between Russia and China is inferred when the analysts note that Peking's "demagogical appeals for peaceful coexistence" are merely a pretext used for the purpose of interfering in the internal affairs of Asian states.²⁰

The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, Singapore, India and Bangladesh are cited in the text as nations that Peking is attempting to subvert. The document also infers that those Asian nations who are threatened over territorial issues or subversive attempts by Peking, would now find Moscow a willing partner of collective security

in Asia, which has now become a more urgent regional requirement.

Revealing the Soviet obsession over Peking's attempts to find a "common language with the USA on an anti-Soviet basis," the text condemns the fact that the PRC insists that America reverse its withdrawal from Asia to preclude the creation of a "dangerous vacuum" for Soviet expansion.²¹

This monograph indicates that Moscow's deteriorating relations with China have become the major reason for current Soviet stress on their initiative for collective security in Asia. Moreover, since China's motives are regarded in the most adverse light, coercive diplomacy appears to be the key option that may be used by Moscow to counter Peking's growing anti-Sovietism. Thus, it seems unlikely that the Kremlin will forsake the weapon of proletarian internationalism for an ideologically benign policy of peaceful coexistence with Peking.

Emphasizing the danger of the PRC's "great power chauvinist designs," Soviet press accounts clearly spell out the Kremlin's threat of subversion within China to undermine the Maoist regime.²² Further, Moscow's observers consistently stress that Peking's policy-makers should not ignore the fact that the "danger of Soviet influence is considerably more menacing than the influence of capitalist regimes." The important point that Moscow's observers emphasize is

that Peking should recognize that there are distinct limits beyond which the Soviets would react if China's activities are considered detrimental to its national security interests. The Soviet intention to support potentially friendly elements in China is made clear when one September 1975 Izvestia commentary states:

China still retains . . . basic elements of a socialist character. Given favorable conditions, these elements can gain strength and develop in the proper direction and this in turn will have a positive influence on the superstructure of Chinese society. The Maoist leaders understand this and are doing everything they can to prevent such a turn of events.²³

In November 1975, four months prior to the XXV CPSU Congress, Pravda printed the following Chinese message to the Soviet leadership:

The fundamental disagreements between China and the Soviet Union should not impede the normal development of Chinese-Soviet relations on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Border questions between our two countries should be resolved, in strict accordance with an achieved mutual understanding, by taking practical steps through equal negotiations, the aim being to make relations between our countries relations of friendship and good-neighorliness.²⁴

Predictably, Party Chief Brezhnev again turned down the Chinese request at the XXV CPSU Congress when he emphasized that good relations between the USSR and the PRC were possible only "if Peking reverts to a policy truly based on . . . the principles of socialist [proletarian] internationalism."²⁵

In another section of his February 1976 speech, Brezhnev provided the clearest definition of what he meant

by "proletarian internationalism." The Soviet Party Chief noted that "there are even people who openly suggest renouncing internationalism." Probably alluding to China, Brezhnev inferred that proletarian internationalism was clearly a potent Soviet weapon to enhance the cause of socialist world unity. Brezhnev stated:

But as we see it, to renounce proletarian internationalism is to deprive Communist Parties . . . of a mighty and tested weapon. It would work in favor of the class enemy who, by the way, actively coordinates anti-Communist activity on an international scale. We Soviet Communists consider defense of proletarian internationalism the sacred duty of every Marxist-Leninist. [Emphasis added]²⁶

With few exceptions, the tirade of polemics indicates that minimal progress has been made during the past few years in resolving substantial Sino-Soviet differences. Although the reasons which concern conflicting national interest and important ideological issues are multiple and complex, the Soviet leadership has ignored every previous offer to revise relations with Peking on any basis other than Moscow's terms.²⁷

Behind all this ideological jargon, it appears that Moscow refuses to formally acknowledge the ideological equality of China. Recognition of Peking as an equal would challenge Moscow's position as the authoritative head of the socialist camp. In the Kremlin's view, the emergence of a second power center within a single ideological movement is totally unacceptable. There can only be one ideological head of world Communism. This factor underlies Soviet

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polemics heralding the need for unity of the socialist camp. There is no evidence to conclude that Moscow's leadership will give up its ideological predominance over Peking. Further, there is no indication that Moscow will give up ideological weapons that could rationalize the possible use of force against China. Thus, Peking's policy-makers seem to be well aware of the fact that conflicting Sino-Soviet interests may lead to an escalation in Russia's campaign of coercive diplomacy against China.

Chinese View

Fear that Moscow will most probably exploit internal turmoil when a breakdown of central authority exists, particularly during any post-Mao crisis, was made clear by Chou En-lai. In an address before the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, Chou noted Moscow's tactics in obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union. Chou accused the Soviet leadership of taking steps to worsen relations by conducting "subversive activities and provoking armed conflicts on the border." He noted that Sino-Soviet border negotiations since 1969 had "yielded no results." Further, the former premier underscored Chinese diplomatic flexibility by posing the following challenge to Moscow:

We wish to advise the Soviet leadership to sit down and negotiate honestly to do something to solve a bit of the problem and stop playing such deceitful tricks.²⁹

Although this statement was made during a period of bitter Sino-Soviet polemics, Chou further clarified his remarks during an interview by C. L. Sulzberger. The Chinese Premier indicated his belief that Moscow was primarily dragging the border negotiations on "while waiting for other opportunities." Apparently, the Brezhnev regime is now analyzing its available coercive options for possible use against China.³⁰

As part of its coercive diplomacy, Moscow's current strategy seems to be based on a two pronged drive to "encircle" China, while "seeding" the regime with pro-Soviet agents.³¹ Apparently, the Kremlin's actions infuriate Chinese policy-makers and cause stubborn resistance. Yet, Peking still appears willing to offer a moderate formula for settling the longstanding territorial dispute. The fact that Moscow is ignoring China's seemingly moderate solutions indicates that the Soviets hope to attain broader objectives. Apparently, Moscow may feel that increasing coercive pressure against Peking may gain the Kremlin additional strategic advantages. This explains why China "wants the US to be alert" to the growing Soviet military threat. In thwarting Brezhnev's desire to forge an Asian security pact directed against Peking, China does not want a precipitous draw down on US military capabilities in Asia that could create a possible vacuum that could invite Soviet intervention.

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Although the anti-China focus of Moscow's initiative for collective security in Asia is repeatedly denied by Soviet commentators, it constitutes an anathema for Peking. The Chinese continue to regard it as a coercive Russian scheme to isolate Peking. During an address before the 28th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1973, Chiao Kuan-Hua, the former Chairman of China's UN delegation, presented Peking's view of the Soviet proposal:

The Asian collective security system . . . reminds us of the American by the name of John Foster Dulles who . . . hastily rigged up the so-called SEATO concept which was directed against China The Soviet Union is a European country and the Chief of the Warsaw Pact alliance. Why should she be so eagerly concerned about the collective security of Asian countries? Has the ghost of John Foster Dulles gone to the Kremlin? Actually would it not be less devious and more direct simply to expand the Warsaw Pact in Asia?³²

Assessments made by Chinese commentators continue to indicate that Peking is not only acutely concerned about the potential increase of the Kremlin's influence in Asia, but also fearful about the coercive potential of the Soviet security idea as well. Moscow's collective security system is visualized by Peking as a means of "intervention, control, infiltration and expansion." While noting that the concept "peddled by Soviet revisionism" had made little headway in Asia during 1975, the Chinese press still continues to warn of the necessity for Asians to remain vigilant against Soviet "social imperialism," which, in Peking's view, is clearly the most deadly regional threat to China.³³

Significantly, a March 1976 Peking Review commentary also focuses on the link between the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia and the USSR's Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Chinese commentator notes that:

Brezhnev also talked about 'working for Asian security based on joint efforts by the states of that continent.' This means that he still wants to impose an Asian version of the European security conference on the Asian countries despite the fact that they have rejected Moscow's Asian security system.³⁴

Apparently, the Chinese object to Soviet attempts to accomplish what has already been achieved in Europe--the recognition of the Asian territorial status quo. Peking fears that those Asian states which have border disputes with Peking could now find a potential ally in Moscow.

Sino-Soviet Rapprochement?

Soviet ideologues are well aware of Peking's sensitivities and appear optimistic over the possibility that a post-Mao China may become more amenable to reconciliation on Soviet terms. A February 1976 Soviet Military Review assessment expresses this point of view:

The time will come when the artificial barriers erected by the Peking leadership to cooperation of the PRC with the USSR and other socialist countries will be removed and the Chinese people will occupy a worthy place in the common formation of fighters against imperialism. [Emphasis added]³⁵

Available evidence suggests that Moscow's policy-makers must ride out the Mao era and hope that a successor regime will significantly moderate anti-Soviet polemics and activities. The anticipation that a successor regime will

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be less unified than the current centralized dictatorship may be another Soviet assumption. Soviet assessments have undoubtedly given up on influencing Mao himself. Therefore, subversion and political-military pressure as elements of coercive diplomacy, appear to be key options by which Moscow can possibly force Peking to temper its current anti-Soviet activities. In essence, the Kremlin suggests with characteristic optimism that a reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union is likely after the passing of Mao. In Moscow's view, there is only one correct path for China, cooperation with the Soviet Union in the struggle against the imperialists led by the United States. This is the only path prescribed by the Kremlin within the ideological context of proletarian internationalism.

Yet, even if a limited reconciliation takes place, it is doubtful that China will ever return to a system in which it would play a subordinate role. The PRC would not willingly allow itself to become subjugated to alien tutelage. Such a course does not fit the perspective of a Chinese nation that evolved from the Middle Kingdom. Since both nations have little faith in the intentions of the other, mutual hostility and tensions are more likely to increase than decrease.

Now that the Sino-Soviet dispute has again raised conflicting ideological perspectives and national interests, Moscow must devote more attention to coping with its Chinese problem. The Helsinki agreements of 1975 provide the Kremlin

with a precedent for its initiative for collective security in Asia. In the Kremlin's view, the significance of the successful Helsinki conference, lies in the fact that the Western powers formally recognized and approved the post-war map of Europe. Repeated affirmations of the link between its European success obtained at Helsinki and collective security in Asia by the Kremlin, suggests a global design that could guarantee the security of all Soviet territorial gains since World War II. Even though conflicting ideological views remain significant, the Soviet campaign for collective security in Asia also appears to be related to the territorial context of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

It seems clear that the achievement of collective security in Europe will be the model for a long-term campaign to achieve the same status in Asia. Consistent Soviet statements to the effect that their initiative for Asia will prevent Peking's hegemony in the region underscores the anti-Chinese bias in their design. This factor is likely to remain in force during the foreseeable future.

Traditional animosities between both nations are again resurfacing. The end of the Vietnam War has once again brought into play the historic rivalry between China and Russia in Asia. Yet, a major contemporary difference exists, particularly as far as the Kremlin is concerned. The important ideological dimension provides the necessary legitimacy for coercive action in defense of socialist unity.

Only time will tell with greater certainty how Moscow actually intends to employ the weapon of proletarian internationalism against China.

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia

At this juncture it is necessary to shift our focus to the Sino-Soviet rivalry now taking place throughout Asia. Significantly, this rivalry has minimized the impact to US national security in the aftermath of America's setback in Southeast Asia.

As previously noted, Moscow has indicated its willingness to take sides with those Asian nations that have territorial disputes with China (see Map 2, p. 62). In November 1975, Krasnaya Zvezda focused on the potential danger of Chinese "hegemonism" by citing the example of the Paracel Islands. These islands were taken over by China in January 1974. The article emphasizes that Chinese maps explicitly incorporate territories belonging to "Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore."³⁶


In Moscow's view, the Chinese use of military force against the Paracel Islands provides an obvious example of Peking's "cartographic aggression."³⁷ With reference to the "unequal treaties" also in mind, the Soviets now appear to be exploiting Sino-Vietnamese tensions over divergent territorial questions. The Paracel Islands have special meaning for Hanoi. Unlike the Soviet media, the Vietnamese have remained silent over the Chinese occupation of these contested

islands (see Map 3). Shortly after the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime, the North Vietnamese quickly occupied the Saigon-held Spratly Islands which were also claimed by Peking. Prior to the actual takeover of the Paracels, the Chinese issued a formal statement declaring that it would not tolerate encroachment on the Spratly Islands which are claimed as territory belonging to China.³⁸ Since these islands are located in a region believed to contain rich oil deposits, this territorial dispute is almost certain to lead to tension between Hanoi and Peking.

The Sino-Vietnamese disagreements may have found expression in the establishment of closer links between Hanoi and Moscow in October 1975. Indeed, both nations whose relations are based on the principles of proletarian internationalism, now have territorial disputes with China. Since their victory over South Vietnam, Hanoi has demonstrated increasing independence from China and appears to be moving toward closer relations with Moscow. During the XXV CPSU Congress, Le Duan reportedly praised Soviet support for national liberation movements, an area in which Peking has consistently claimed particular leadership.³⁹

Peking is sensitive to the possibility that the Soviets may attempt to obtain former US bases in Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay, etc.) as a means of countering China's power in Southeast Asia.⁴⁰ After the fall of South Vietnam, one Canadian observer reporting from Peking, observed that

Map 3
CONTESTED ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA



Source: CIA

historical precedents could provide the possible cause for future friction between Vietnam and China. Assessing the legacy of two thousand years of Chinese suzerainty and the potential differences between Hanoi and its northern neighbor, this commentator stated:

The Chinese clearly do not want a Hanoi dominated Indochina, stressing at almost every public pronouncement on Cambodia and Laos the importance of their remaining independent and nonaligned. They will be wary over any sign that Moscow's influence in Vietnam is at their expense.⁴¹

In March 1976, at a banquet welcoming a Lao delegation, Acting Premier Hua Kuo-feng, signalled an obvious message to Hanoi when he emphasized China's interest in maintaining Laos as an "independent" and "self-reliant" country.⁴² Conflicting Sino-Soviet interests in Southeast Asia were observed when Soviet articles alluded to Chinese construction units in Laos as "occupation forces." The future possibility of friction cannot be discounted when the Soviets reportedly began to increase their "advisor" support to that nation which directly borders on China.⁴³

Practically speaking, there remains only one functioning regional organization in Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This organization has moved to accomodate the "new realities" in the region. Since 1967 when ASEAN was formally established, the organization has slowly grown. While there are doubts as to whether ASEAN will ever become truly important, there is at least a reasonable chance that it will prove viable.⁴⁴

The Asian signatories (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) appear to have adjusted to the changes in Southeast Asia after the fall of South Vietnam.

According to one assessment in the Asia 1975 Year Book, the members of ASEAN were attempting to negotiate with North Vietnam in an effort to enlarge the membership of the organization. The ASEAN members reportedly envision the possible membership of North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and possibly Burma "in a neutral but effective political and economic grouping." In the view of several unidentified Thai statesmen, there would then be some possible benefit to a withdrawal of remaining American military bases. This assessment notes that Peking would probably not welcome the departure of the Americans. Apparently, the Chinese do not desire to see the spread of "Hanoi's power and influence within Indochina and among other neighboring states."⁴⁵

The Soviet view of the Asian proposal was contained in Izvestia, January 1976. A possible connection between ASEAN's plans for the neutralization of Southeast Asia and the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia was implied when the Soviet commentary stated:

It is not surprising that progress in carrying out the proposal for neutralizing Southeast Asia is slow. It is a great and complex problem . . . discussion of the neutralization proposal indicates that ASEAN countries are leading the search for ways to . . . strengthen security in the region. Indonesian Foreign Minister A. Malik pointed out while speaking to

journalists in March 1974, that the neutralization idea set forth by ASEAN has a great deal in common with the Soviet Union's proposal to create a system of collective security in Asia.⁴⁶

While preferring the acceptance of their own plan to any neutralization scheme, the Soviets indicated that they would still be receptive to any proposal that would prevent a closer alignment between ASEAN and China. Consistent Soviet warnings to the Southeast Asian countries to beware of Chinese hegemony demonstrate that Moscow does not want China to fill the vacuum left by any drawdown of US military forces.

One factor of ASEAN concern, however, dealt with the speculation that China might have sounded out the US before moving against the South Vietnamese on the Paracels. When the US issued a statement that it would remain uninvolved in that incident, that American action sharply contrasted with the vehement denunciations of the Chinese invasion by the USSR. Reportedly, China's use of force to resolve a territorial dispute, "impressed upon the ASEAN states that the US could not be depended upon to countervail China's future power and influence."⁴⁷ Despite the evident lack of a favorable ASEAN response to the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia, this assessment indicates that ASEAN acceptance of the balancing presence of the Soviet Union to counter Chinese power in the foreseeable future should not be ruled out.

Clearly, the current situation appears far more stable than the period following the immediate aftermath of North Vietnam's victory over the South. Yet, the Prime

Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, echoed the future apprehension of his neighbors when he stated:

It is fair to assume that the contest for influence over the peoples of the region will be mainly between the Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union . . . the fate of Southeast Asian countries is to be caught in a competitive clash between the two.⁴⁸

Apparently, China has been establishing a superior margin of influence than the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. With the exception of Indonesia which maintains the most conservative position of the ASEAN countries toward China,⁴⁹ the other ASEAN members have established official diplomatic relations with China. Malaysia established formal relations with Peking in May 1974, followed by the Philippines and Thailand in June and July 1975, respectively.⁵¹ Singapore established diplomatic relations with China in April 1976. Two factors in particular work to the advantage of Moscow. First, Peking's primary associations with local insurgent movements in the various Southeast Asian countries. Secondly, Southeast Asian governments' fear of China's influence over the regions' local populations of ethnic Chinese. Moscow continues to exploit Southeast Asian concerns about the fifth column potential of the overseas Chinese populations.⁵² Thus, Peking is compelled to expend a great deal of diplomatic energy to counter Moscow's propaganda and overcome concerns of the ASEAN governments.

Soviet backing of its foreign commitments (1971 Indo-Pakistan dispute and the 1975-1976 support to the MPLA faction in Angola), in concert with the relative inability of the US to counter Moscow's support, have not been ignored by the various nations of Asia.⁵³ There are indications that a Soviet presence in the area may provide a useful counter-weight to any possible Chinese attempt to gain regional predominance in that area. This view was best expressed by Ghazali Shafie, Malaysia's Minister for Home Affairs. Shafie reportedly emphasized at a Singapore conference in 1973 that of the four big powers in the region, "perhaps the Soviet Union is the one that appears to be moving . . . with a design and a purpose."⁵⁴ Indicating potential support for the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia, Shafie stated:

It would seem that any Soviet initiative that is designed or even only such as to appear to further the Soviet cause in the Sino-Soviet dispute is not likely to gain the support of the countries in the region. This factor is unfortunate because the Soviet Union has much to contribute to the development of the region.⁵⁵

In spite of Soviet vulnerability to Peking's propaganda charges that Moscow's actions in the region provide clear examples of superpower exploitation and "hegemony," some Southeast Asians may deem it safer to deal with a distant superpower than with a nearby China. Looking toward the future, one observer believes that Southeast Asia's mainland nations will diverge from their seaward partners in

the years ahead. One may reasonably speculate that the mainland nations along the periphery of China will most likely attempt to establish the best modus vivendi with China. At the same time, the seaward nations in the region, to include Malaysia and Singapore, will most probably retain sufficient flexibility to maneuver diplomatically between the four quadrilateral powers.

One Southeast Asian observer, however, implies that a Sino-American agreement on the future direction and control of the region has already been agreed upon. In effect, the 1972 Shanghai Communique between the US and China apparently sealed the fate of continental Southeast Asia as a recognized sphere of Chinese influence.⁵⁶ Essentially, this act may have signified a redefinition of American interests in Southeast Asia to make them more compatible with the legitimate interests of Communist China.

While Moscow's concept for collective security may well pit the Soviet Union in contention with China over its neighbors to include Burma, Thailand and a North Vietnam controlled Indochina, that concept could conceivably bring Moscow into direct competition or conflict with Washington over the peninsula of Malaysia, Singapore and the Islands of Indonesia and the Philippines. It is interesting to note that after President Ford's trip to China in December 1975, the president visited both Indonesia and the Philippines. Further, one week after his Chinese trip, Ford emphasized

America's future role as a Pacific power and indicated a growing US interest in the ASEAN organization.⁵⁷

The growing intensity of the Sino-Soviet rivalry after the fall of South Vietnam seems to be a significant factor that has limited the damage to American influence in Asia. With the impact of the American disengagement and the Sino-Soviet confrontation, Sino-American relations have improved. Apparently, Peking does not wish to see America become a paper tiger overnight. China desires to obtain at least the passive support by Washington against the Soviet Union.

A rapid disengagement of the US military presence in Southeast Asia, at least in the near future, would create a vacuum that Moscow would willingly fill. The Soviet desire to fill a possible security void is indicated by its consistent stress on the need for a system of collective security in Asia. Moscow's initiative appears to be one of the primary means to enhance Russia's influence as an Asian power. Further, this concept also appears to be an important psychological instrument that can be used to counter China's virulent anti-Sovietism.

Northeast Asia--Moscow's Growing Dilemma

After the collapse of the US position in Vietnam, Soviet commentators began placing greater attention on Northeast Asia. From Moscow's vantage point, the US is now shifting its strategic emphasis to that important region.

For example, in October 1975, an Izvestia commentator noted US attempts to "involve Japan even more actively in support for the South Korean regime." A joint US-Japanese communique, signed by Japan's Prime Minister Miki in Washington during a meeting with President Ford in August 1975, is cited as proof of the "incipient trend toward trilateral cooperation between Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul." Apparently, the Soviets have concluded that the "security of South Korea," as well as "the security of Northeast Asia" is an increasing vital mutual interest of both the US and Japan.⁵⁸

When tensions heightened between North and South Korea during the summer of 1975, the Western press speculated that China played a key role in cautioning North Korea against launching a precipitous attack against the South. Peking's desire to stabilize this region can be seen by continued Chinese stress on "peaceful unification" of both Koreas in their communiqus.⁵⁹ Further, according to the Western press, Japanese sources visiting Peking were informed "that China and North Korea had agreed that no 'objective conditions' existed for the liberation of the South."⁶⁰

One Tokyo source cited in the Western press revealed that Washington was also engaged in "secret talks" with Peking to obtain China's understanding "for a proposal that would guarantee security in the vital area of Northeast Asia--in return for virtually writing off its allies in Indochina . . ."⁶¹ If true, the possibility of stability

in Northeast Asia is likely to be enhanced through a de facto Sino-American concern for regional equilibrium. Further, it is unlikely that either Moscow or Peking would risk destabilization of this region at this time, particularly since such efforts would seriously threaten their relations with both the US and Japan.

Far more disturbing to Moscow is the long-term potential of a Tokyo-Peking rapprochement. Moscow appears to be well aware that a "treaty of peace and friendship" between Japan and China could turn into a compact of hostility against the Soviet Union. The basic issue that disturbs Moscow relates directly to the Soviet Union's territorial status quo. The Kremlin now considers both Japan and China to be irredentist powers with territorial claims against the Soviet Union. The potential link between China's claims inferred by Peking's continual reference to the "unequal treaties" and Japan's efforts to obtain the return of post-war territorial losses is particularly threatening to Moscow.⁶² Return to Japan of the four northern islands taken by the USSR after World War II could only open a Pandora's box and set a dangerous precedent for territorial claims on the Soviet Union by China, as well as by a host of nations in Europe.

Since 1972 this basic territorial issue has been obscured by a flood of polemics which have revolved around the subject of "hegemony in Asia." The Soviets appear to

realize that this issue "provides grist for Peking's anti-Soviet mill." In reality, Peking has continually raised the issue of Japan's territorial claims primarily as an indirect way of bringing attention to its own territorial claims against Moscow. Soviet retention of the four Japanese islands "is proclaimed by the Peking press as proof of "Soviet hegemonism" in Asia (see Map 4).

MAP 4

Four Soviet-occupied Territories Formerly under Japanese Control



Source: Peking Review, 29 August 1975, p. 10

The Soviets are well aware of China's insistence that the final peace treaty between Peking and Tokyo would include a clause condemning the effort of any nation to

achieve "hegemony" in Asia. In November 1972, V. Kudryavtsev, an Izvestia commentator took obvious exception to the following provision:

Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, and each country is opposed to the efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.⁶⁴

One must stress that the foregoing clause is contained in the Shanghai Communique signed by both China and the United States in February 1972.⁶⁵ In June 1975, Pravda, stressed that the hegemony clause was obviously aimed against the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ There is little doubt that from the Kremlin's perspective, the use of the term "hegemony" is merely a thinly disguised anti-Soviet code word for the USSR.

Therefore, the Soviet Union has consistently applied diplomatic pressure against Japan. The Kremlin has warned Tokyo that the inclusion of the hegemony clause in a Sino-Japanese peace treaty would be considered an undisguised anti-Soviet act and would "harm Japan's existing relations" with Russia.⁶⁷

The eventual signing of a treaty of peace and friendship between Japan and China was, however, one of the main points contained in a statement signed by Chou En-lai and the former Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka during the latter's visit to Peking in 1972. Interestingly, this statement also contained the hegemony clause. Review of Soviet polemics during that period indicate that Moscow did not react as strongly against the inclusion of this clause as they are

during the contemporary period. While subject to speculation, the Kremlin now fears that this clause is primarily aimed at the possible increase of Soviet regional power. Further, in February 1975, Western sources reported that the Soviet ambassador to Tokyo had warned the Japanese that the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and China would have an unfavorable impact on Soviet-Japanese relations.⁶⁸ Clearly, a rapprochement between Peking and Tokyo, combined with Moscow's sensitivity to the anti-Soviet implications of this trend, is causing the Kremlin growing concern. Hence, the Soviet government warned Japan against allowing "itself to be drawn into the orbit of Chinese policy."⁶⁹ While expressing the hope that Japan would not take any action to prejudice good relations with the USSR, the Soviets were thoroughly dismayed by the success of Chinese attempts to prevent an improvement in Russo-Japanese relations. Apparently, Moscow's veiled warnings to Tokyo against any major move toward Peking during the past few years have had little success.

Four years after Japan established diplomatic relations with China in 1972, Tokyo signaled a major shift, with significant future policy implications. In contrast with the foreign policy of the previous Tanaka Government, which remained equidistant between Peking and Moscow, in January 1976, Prime Minister Miki made a clear choice. He proclaimed Japan's intent to sign a peace treaty with China, which would

also include the controversial hegemony clause, despite repeated Soviet warnings against that course of action.⁷⁰

Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko failed to prevent the Japanese move by reportedly offering to return two of the four Russian-held islands if Japan would sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Japanese officials, however, refused to agree to such a peace treaty unless all of the four islands were returned to Japan. At the same time, Western sources noted that Mr. Gromyko refused to accept Mr. Miki's explanation that the hegemony clause had universal application and was not directed at the Soviet Union.⁷¹

Furthermore, Western sources implied that Premier Miki had used the Soviet-Japanese talks to stress the importance of Japan's security ties with the United States. In answer to questions from reporters on current global issues, Mr. Miki replied that he was not concerned with the effect of US setbacks in Indochina "or America's unwillingness to become involved in Angola." Western sources also noted that Mr. Gromyko had appeared somewhat concerned about the possible implications of President Ford's Pacific Doctrine which was enunciated one week before the Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Tokyo. Mr. Gromyko apparently registered heightened concern about the military implications of the US Pacific Doctrine. In Gromyko's view, the US Pacific Doctrine appeared to be based on a "US intention to seek a rapprochement

with China." The Japanese link to this speculative US design might be inferred when Mr. Miyazawa, the Japanese Foreign Minister, replied that "Japan welcomed the promotion of friendly US ties with China."⁷²

Undoubtedly, the implications of Tokyo's tilt toward China because of economic (oil) and security factors are clear to Moscow. As indicated by Mr. Gromyko's concern, a strengthened relationship or de facto partnership between Tokyo and Peking, who both have irredentist territorial claims against the Soviet Union, is a matter of significant Kremlin dismay. This factor is also complicated by the possible backing of a Sino-Japanese rapprochement by Washington through the framework of the US Pacific Doctrine. Because of these developments, the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia now attains greater significance. As indicated previously, Moscow hopes to eventually repeat its Helsinki success in Asia. For, the ultimate realization of Moscow's concept would help guarantee formal recognition of the USSR's historical and World War II territorial acquisitions. To be sure, no assessment concerning Soviet motivation for their initiative in Asia should lose sight of this fact.

At the same time, Moscow is confronted by a dilemma. There is no indication that any of the other quadrilateral powers are now prepared to favorably recognize the Soviet concept, particularly since its objectives are predominantly aimed at China and the West. Thus, Moscow could face

the prospect of being isolated from the trend of a growing relationship among the other quadrilateral powers in Asia. This fear of being the odd man out is compounded by the fact that a military-political combination could possibly evolve among the other major powers, whether by accident or calculated design.

While the framework for such a combination between Washington, Tokyo and Peking is highly speculative, few could deny that at this juncture of history, these nations now perceive the Soviet Union as their primary security threat.⁷³ Obviously, three of the four quadrilateral powers have agreed to oppose the efforts of any country or group of countries to establish hegemony in Asia. While one may argue over the actual meaning given to this phrase by each of the signatories, the evidence is clear that the Kremlin views the use of this clause with apprehension. From Moscow's perspective this term has obvious anti-Soviet implications. Although these implications remain speculative and hypothetical, the fact that a trend of rapprochement between the other three powers is taking place is cause for the Kremlin's insecurity.⁷⁴

When viewing the dynamic trends in Asia, there are indications that Moscow is becoming increasingly alarmed over the possible evolution of anti-Soviet partnership between Tokyo and Peking with backing from Washington. Sensitivity to the use of the term "hegemony" by the other

quadrilateral powers, coupled with increasing emphasis on the need for a collective security pact in Asia, provides some evidence of Moscow's insecurity. Obviously, should such a partnership exist and be directed at containment of the Soviet Union, there would be little basis for the Kremlin's optimistic assertions that the correlation of forces is shifting in favor of socialism, particularly in Asia. Indeed, an effective alliance among China, Japan and the United States would cause the Kremlin's optimism to be founded on a structure of illusion.

By what method then can Moscow demonstrate its will to reinforce its future security interests and objectives in Asia? Undoubtedly, the Soviet initiative for collective security in that crucial region provides an obvious framework. This concept serves as a means to signal Moscow's intention to become a major actor in the evolving quadrilateral power relationship in Asia.

Moscow's security design is broad and flexible enough to offer inducements to any of the other participants. Even China in the post-Mao era is not specifically excluded. Given a tempering or reconciliation of the Sino-Soviet dispute, particularly as a result of reduction in ideological friction and the recognition of the USSR's territorial integrity, a formal collective security system with Peking's participation, while not likely, is still conceivable. Territorial adjustment with Tokyo would probably be far

easier for Moscow to attain once China formally recognized Soviet frontiers.

After the demise of Mao, a successor regime might make progress in normalizing relations by resolving the issue of the threatening "unequal treaties." This outcome is more likely if a moderate or pragmatic Chinese collective leadership succeeds after the demise of Mao. If Peking would limit interference in Soviet spheres of influence and avoid collusion with the US and Japan for anti-Soviet purposes, Moscow would most likely be prepared to take quid pro quo measures. In turn, the Soviets would most probably ease China's fears by minimizing their coercive diplomacy now being waged against China. Moscow would probably accede to Chinese spheres of influence in Southeast Asia. Yet, complex ideological issues that divide both nations would also have to be adjusted if mutual hostilities are to diminish. Assessment of both antagonists' polemics and actions will ultimately provide the best indications of the future direction of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia.

There is minimal evidence for any projected tempering of the mutual hostility between the two former allies. On the contrary, the trends actually indicate greater Sino-Soviet hostility and tensions in the future. The animosity resulting from fundamental differences between both Moscow and Peking provide the raison d'etre for Moscow's present focus on its initiative for collective security in Asia. Because of basic

Soviet security concerns, stemming primarily from its confrontation with China, the outlook for an expansion of Soviet military power in Asia cannot be discounted. Essentially, Soviet concern over territorial and other national interest imperatives is increasing.

Furthermore, an ideological perspective which stresses that the correlation of force is indeed shifting in favor of the Kremlin, could provide further justification for Moscow to play a major role in Asia. Such a role, however, is still dependent upon capabilities. Since power is relative, any Kremlin assessment of the correlation of forces in Asia must also consider the degree of countervailing power in that region.

Notes - Chapter III

¹Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 147-157.

²M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin, A Dictionary of Philosophy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 365, note:

... the essence of proletarian internationalism is expressed in the slogan 'Working men of all countries unite!' [Hence] . . . every nation cannot regard its struggle disassociated from the struggle . . . of other nations. (p. 364.)

³Ibid.

⁴"Contrary to the Vital Interests of the Peoples," Pravda, 22 February 1975, pp. 4-5, in FBIS: Soviet Union, 25 February 1975, pp. C1-C8. This article states:

Peking's policy toward world socialism and toward the international communist and workers movement is profoundly hostile. It is outright complicity with anti-Communism. The Peking propaganda machine reiterates that China is a developing socialist country and is concerned with the Third World. By flattering the young developing states and demagogically representing itself as a fighter against 'superpower hegemonism,' the Mao grouping strives to impose itself as leader of the Third World. (p. 64)

⁵See excerpts from "[Mao Tse-tung Provides] Support for the Reversion of the South Kurile Islands," Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo, 13 July 1964, as quoted in Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis (Stanford University: Hoover Institute, 1965), p. 44.

⁶Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Coexistence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959), p. 160.

⁷In September 1964, Khrushchev reportedly expressed himself at some length on Mao Tse-tung's irredentist views. He observed that "Chinese emperors and Russian tsars had engaged in conflict." Khrushchev also warned, "The borders of the Soviet Union are sacred, and he who dares to violate them will meet with a most decisive rebuff on the part of the peoples of the Soviet Union." The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, (CDSR) Vol. XVI, No. 38, 14 October 1964, pp. 3-6, as quoted in O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 498.

⁸ Speech by L. I. Brezhnev, "XXV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy," 24 February 1976, in Moscow News Supplement to issue No. 9, (2685) 6-13 March 1976, p. 5.

⁹ "Top Russian at the 'Front'," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 November 1975, p. 26.

¹⁰ A number of assessments which alluded to the possibility of substantial Soviet military action against China were found in Joseph Alsop, "On the Soviet Military," The Washington Post, 24 August 1973, p. 21; Reading the "Samokin Papers," The Washington Post, 31 August 1973, p. A19; Jack Anderson, "A Sino-Soviet Collision?" The Washington Post, 7 October 1973, p. A10; "Russia vs. China in Big War?" U.S. News and World Report, 27 August 1973, p. 30. However, observers who feel that a major Sino-Soviet war is improbable include: C. P. Fitzgerald, "The Struggle for Power in Asia Goes on," Pacific Community, vol. 5, October 1973, pp. 16-27; Roger E. Kanet, "The Soviet Union and China: Is War Inevitable?" Current History, October 1973, p. 179; Robert P. Martin, "Out of 3 Decades of Turmoil - A New Asia Emerges," U.S. News and World Report, 14 January 1974, pp. 34-39; W. H. Overholdt, "The Rise of the Pacific Basin," Pacific Community, July 1974, pp. 516-533; and, "Will the Soviet Union Attack China?" Strategic Survey 1973, IISS, pp. 65-69.

¹¹ The release of three Soviet helicopter crewmen, on 27 December 1975, by Peking is seen by Victor Zorza as a signal of a possible Chinese desire to reduce tensions and reconcile Sino-Soviet differences. This release after more than 20 months, combined with various hints in speeches made by former Prime Minister Chou En-lai, leads Zorza to believe Peking has made a significant concession to Moscow. In Zorza's view, Moscow has decided to "wait for the demise of Mao in the expectation that the confusion and weakness which might then overtake China would allow the Soviet Union to drive a far harder bargain, and obtain more far-reaching concessions than any obtainable now." Peking's initiatives in the release of the crew members and in conciliatory statements obscured by the smokescreen of polemics are seen as "designed to persuade Moscow to make a deal now with Mao's blessing." Victor Zorza, "A Moscow-Peking Pact?" The Washington Post, 2 January 1976, p. A19; and "Soviet Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter Crew Released," Peking Review, 2 January 1976, p. 7. Yet, no pardon was granted to Soviet crewmen since official PRC sources indicated that these crewmen were not found guilty of any crime. Another Western source, however, reported that Western aerial reconnaissance noted "severe outbreaks of fighting near the Ussuri Amur

Rivers" in the same region where Sino-Soviet border clashes took place in 1969. In view of alleged Soviet military superiority, it is possible that Moscow's coercive actions against China may have already begun as a prelude to a post-Mao succession crisis. "Communists: TOP SECRET Skirmishes," Time, 22 March 1976. Pravda denied armed clashes on the Sino-Soviet border and accused Peking of attempting to divert their people's attention from the "intensified power struggle" in China. "The Latest Peking Canard," Pravda, 7 February 1976, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. XXVIII, No. 6, 10 March 1976, p. 26.

¹² L. I. Brezhnev stressed that there were common laws that governed socialist construction and warned that the "restoration of a capitalist order" in a socialist state is considered a threat to the entire socialist community. "Only if the principle of socialist internationalism is sacredly observed," and "the unity and fraternal solidarity of socialism be insured." Thus, "military aid to thwart the threat to the socialist order . . . can be provoked only by direct actions of enemies [within the socialist camp]. L. I. Brezhnev, Speech at the 5th Congress of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party, Pravda, 13 November 1968, cited in Foy D. Kohler, et al., Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973), p. 200. Another authoritative Soviet source emphasizes that the failure to settle frontier issues and other anti-Soviet action on the part of the Chinese has caused Moscow to reject Peking's "ideological and political attacks on the . . . [USSR]." Thereby "the Soviet Union will firmly uphold the principles of . . . proletarian internationalism" in its relations with China. B. Ponomaryov, History of Soviet Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 420.

¹³ Rosenthal and Yudin, loc. cit.; and Ponomaryov, loc. cit.

¹⁴ Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), p. 107. Victor Louis is suspected of also being a high ranking agent in the KGB. When he bluntly stated "that Soviet nuclear missiles were already zeroed in on significant areas in China," he was most likely reflecting the official Kremlin line.

¹⁵ Kulski, op. cit., pp. 301-303.

The five principles of peaceful coexistence promise:

- (1) Respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;

- (2) Non-aggression;
- (3) Non-interference in domestic affairs for whatever reason--economic, political, or ideological;
- (4) Equality and mutual benefits; and
- (5) Peaceful coexistence.

Kulski notes that these principles are taken for granted between members of the international community. Yet, it is unfortunate that such principles must be solemnly reaffirmed in relations with Communist countries. In any case, equality envisioned by peaceful coexistence has essentially been repudiated in the practice of international proletarianism. First place is always assigned to the Soviet Union. Obviously, the invariable Soviet insistence on maintaining its role as the leader of the socialist community indicates a "hierarchical rather than an equal concept" of relations between the USSR and China when Moscow defines the meaning of socialism.

¹⁶ "Speech by L. I. Brezhnev: The Decisions of the XXIV CPSU Congress are a Military Program of Activity for Soviet Trade Unions," Pravda, 21 March 1972, pp. 1-3, in CDSR, Vol. XXIV, No. 12, 19 April 1972, p. 7.

The US Department of State Background Notes: USSR (1973) indicated that:

In March 1972 Brezhnev reluctantly acceded to Chinese insistence that Sino-Soviet relations be based on 'peaceful coexistence' even though this view is counter to the Soviet contention that 'peaceful coexistence' applies only to relations between 'capitalist' and 'socialist' states.

Subsequent events have indicated that the Kremlin has refused to adhere to this change. In the Soviet view, the relationship remains firmly grounded on "proletarian internationalism."

¹⁷ G. V. Astafyev and A. M. Dubinsky (eds.), From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism: The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974).

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 183. The psychological dimension of Moscow's coercive diplomacy is indicated in the following quote:

The Chinese leaders regarded the Soviet [collective security] proposal as an attempt by the USSR to achieve . . . the encirclement of China and create an anti-Chinese grouping

The purpose of this proposal, Chou En-lai declared, is to promote the accomplishment of the USSR's aggressive annexationist designs towards China.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 185.

²¹ Ibid., p. 191.

²² O. Vladimirov, "Peking's Great Power Course," Izvestia, 11 September 1975, p. 4 in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 37, 8 October 1975, p. 3. Vladimirov states:

For the Maoists, scientific socialism as realized in the USSR is more dangerous than any other ideology . . . since this could lead to a second infiltration of Marxism into China and the destruction of Maoism.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "To the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Council of Ministers," Pravda, 9 November 1975, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 45, 3 December 1975, p. 5.

²⁵ Speech by L. I. Brezhnev, XXV CPSU Congress, op. cit., p. 3.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁷ Speech by L. I. Brezhnev, Pravda, 15 June 1974, p. 3, in CDSP, Vol. XXVI, No. 24, 10 July 1974, p. 7. The rigidity of the Soviet position was apparent to Peking almost two years before the 25th CPSU Congress. In June 1974, during a Moscow speech, Brezhnev stated:

As far as our relations with China are concerned, naturally we will continue to rebuff anti-Soviet slander and firmly protect our states interests and our security. At the same time, we will continue to advocate the normalization of relations with China and the restoration of friendship with the great Chinese people on the reliable basis of proletarian internationalism. [Emphasis added]

²⁸ O. Vladimirov and V. Ryazanov, "The 50th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China," Kommunist, No. 10, July 1971, pp. 76-90, in CDSP, Vol. XXII, No. 31, 31 August 1971, p. 7. The authors note:

Maoism is an ideological and political trend that is fundamentally inimical to Marxism-Leninism . . . Living parasitically on the fundamental propositions of socialist ideology, it virtually denies the . . . role of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the working class. Camouflaging themselves with anti-imperialist phraseology, the Maoists in fact oppose

the internationalist Communist movement . . . and strive to impose their nationalist program on [communist] parties. Thus the CPSU has taken the only correct position - a position of the consistent upholding of the . . . unity of the world Communist movement and the defense of the interests of the socialist homeland. [Emphasis added], p. 7-31.

²⁹ "Chou En-lai Report on Government," Hsinhau, (Text) 13 January 1975, New China News Agency (NCNA) Peking, 20 January 1975, in FBIS, Peoples Republic of China, Vol. 1, No. 13, p. C26.

³⁰ G. L. Sulzberger, The Coldest War: Russia's Game in China (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1974), p. 105.

³¹ Ibid., p. 80.

³² "Text of Chiao Kuan-hua Address to the UN on the Present World Situation," NCNA, Peking, China, 3 October 1973, as quoted in the author's "The Sino-West European Connection," Military Review, January 1976, p. 71.

³³ "Soviet Social Imperialism is the Root Cause of Unrest in South Asia," Peking Review, Vol. 19, No. 12, 19 March 1976, pp. 20-31. This article outlines Peking's current view of the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia:

For years now, the Kremlin bosses have been trying to use these projected 'Asian collective security system' as a wedge to divide the countries of South Asia and the whole of Asia and then control them. Although they have put their propaganda machines into high gear and sent out big and small flunkies to peddle this system, it has been rejected by the Asian countries . . . (pp. 20-21)

³⁴ Jen Ku-ping, "A Peace Programme or a Means of Contention for Hegemony?" Peking Review, Vol. 10, No. 12, 19 March 1976, pp. 18-19.

³⁵ Col A. Zvezdovsky, "By the Laws of International Solidarity," Soviet Military Review, No. 2, February 1976, p. 57.

³⁶ Y. Lugovskoi, "Peking's Policy in Asia," Krasnaya Zvezda, November 1975, pp. 45-46.

³⁷ A detailed analysis of Peking's action against the Paracel Islands is contained in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 4-10 March 1974, p. 26388. One Soviet commentator states that the Paracel Islands incident which caused "alarm to the countries of East and Southeast Asia indicated the creation of a Chinese-U.S. condominium." This link was reportedly demonstrated by fact that it had taken place "under conditions of the Chinese-US normalization." B. N. Zegeegin, "Certain Aspects of the U.S.-Chinese Relations," U.S.A. Economics, Politics, Ideology, Moscow, No. 2, 9 January 1975, pp. 33-42; in EBIS Soviet Union, 14 February 1975, pp. C1-C10.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Elizabeth Pond, "Hanoi Heard at Soviet Party Parley," The Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 1976, p. 4; and Geoffrey Godsell, "Hanoi Snubs Asian Overtures," The Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 1976, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Leo Goodstadt, "Hanoi Pushes Drive to Reunite," Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 November 1975, p. 22.

⁴¹ John Burns, "Peking Seen Wary of Hanoi," The Washington Post 1 May 1975, p. 38.

⁴² "Hua Kuo-feng's Speech," Peking Review, Vol. 19, No. 12, 19 March 1976, p. 6.

⁴³ "Laos: 1500 Soviets as Advisors," The Washington Post, 29 August 1975, p. A27; and Lugovskoi, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴⁴ "Cooperation," Asia 1975 Year Book: Far Eastern Economic Review, pp. 64, 68-69.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

⁴⁶ P. Svegov, "Searching for Ways to Cooperate," Izvestia, 30 January 1976, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 5, p. 20.

⁴⁷ Asia 1975 Yearbook, op. cit., p. 64.

⁴⁸ Lee Kuan Yew, "Southeast Asia: The End of an Era," The Washington Post, 13 April 1975, p. C6.

⁴⁹ Asia 1975 Year Book, op. cit., p. 64.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 272.

51 Ibid., pp. 28, 217-218; and Murry Marder, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry Limits Damage to U.S. Influence in Asia," The Washington Post, 13 April 1975, p. C6.

52 Asafyev and Dubinsky, op. cit., p. 186.

53 Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXII, September-October 1974, pp. 39-51.

54 Ibid.

55 As quoted in Wilson, ibid., p. 40.

56 Ibid., p. 51.

57 President Gerald R. Ford, "United States Pacific Policy: Responsible American Leadership," Vital Speeches of the Day, No. 6., Vol. XXXII, 1 January 1976, p. 164.

58 V. Kassis, "Behind the Scenes: Dangerous Triangle," Izvestia, 30 October 1975, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 44, 26 November 1975, p. 10.

59 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 11-17 August 1975, p. 27274.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 "Japanese People Fight Soviet Hegemonism," Peking Review, Vol. 18, No. 35, 29 August 1975, pp. 10-12; I. Latyshev, "Talks End Without Results," Pravda, 2 October 1975, p. 6 in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 40, 29 October 1975, p. 21; Yu Bandura, "Grist for Someone Else's Mill," Izvestia, 5 October 1975, p. 2, in CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 40, 29 October 1975, p. 21; and, Andrei Krushinsky, "Provocational Appeals," Pravda, 2 June 1975, p. 3, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 22, 25 June 1975, p. 15. Krushinsky notes that:

At every official reception and public meeting [Chinese] spokesmen . . . insistently called on the Japanese to make territorial claims against the Soviet Union.

63 Map outlines the four Soviet-occupied territories that were formerly Japanese controlled. This map is found in "The Japanese People Fight Soviet Hegemonism," op. cit., p. 10.

⁶⁴ V. Kudryavtsev, "Wandering in Search of New Paths," Izvestia, 2 November 1972, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. XXIV, No. 44, 29 November 1972, p. 2. Significantly, Kudryavtsev underscores Soviet dismay with President Nixon's statement that the US will continue its involvement in Asia and will remain a Pacific power. Kudryavtsev states that "we know that the USA is not an Asian country."

⁶⁵ "Appendix G. Joint Communique, 28 February 1972," T. Hsiao (ed.) Sino-American Detente and Its Policy Implications (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 298.

⁶⁶ Krushinsky, loc cit.; and V. Kudryavtsev, "Smokescreen," Izvestia, 15 July 1975, p. 2, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 28, 13 August 1975, p. 18. Kudryavtsev notes that the "entire world has long since grasped the anti-Soviet meaning of the Chinese proposal." In his view, there is no doubt that China is attempting to seduce Japan into taking a hostile position against the Soviet Union. Significantly, Kudrayavtsev indicates the anti-Chinese nature of the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia when he states:

It is widely known that it is precisely collective security that is directed against [Chinese] hegemonism and most important, that creates a guarantee against its possible realization.

⁶⁷ Against a backdrop of Soviet pressure against Japan, increasing coverage of Soviet World War II victories has been appearing in the Soviet press. S. Ivanov, "Victory in the Far East," and S. Zakharov, "The Pacific Fleet in the War Against Japan," in Krasnaya Zvezda, August 1975, pp. 2-8; "Soviet-Japanese Talks Fail," The Washington Post, 1 January 1976, p. A20; Peter Osnos, "Clause in China Pact Hurts Ties, Soviets Warn Japan Openly," The Washington Post, 19 June 1975, p. H23; and M. Kapitsa, "Victory in the Far East," Pravda 3 September 1975, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 35, p. 4.

⁶⁸ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 13-19 October 1975, p. 27384.

⁶⁹ Ibid. China oil diplomacy is another significant reason for Tokyo's tilt toward Peking. If China would allocate 10 percent of its future oil production to Japan, by 1980, Tokyo would be able to purchase "a minimum of 40 million tons of Chinese oil a year--and very possibly two-and-a-half times that amount." "The Region," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) Asia 1975 Yearbook, op. cit., p. 21. The Soviet military buildup along China's Northern frontier, coupled with

Moscow's focus on the ideological principles of "proletarian internationalism" threatened to limit China's independence, sovereignty and maneuverability. Hence, China moved rapidly toward improved relations with Japan.

Sensitive to Japan's need for oil, in 1974, China sent Tokyo approximately 4 million tons, nearly all of its petroleum available for export at prices slightly less than the world market. Chinese crude oil in quantity guaranteed Japan a stable source of supply by 1980, and underscored Peking's policy to support the future needs of Japanese industry.

Insofar as Japan's relations with the Soviet Union are concerned, the joint Siberian Tjumen oil development project faltered. Russian wrangling over contractual arrangements and refusal to return the four islands captured by Soviet forces during World War II caused a perceptible change in Japan's position.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.; and Richard Halloran, "Japan to Sign China Pact Despite Soviet Warnings," The New York Times, 14 January 1976, pp. 1-2.

⁷³Koji Nakamura, "Japan: Toeing the Peking Security Line," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 May 1975, p. 26. The primary security concerns of the United States and China are obvious. A detailed assessment of the Japanese view of their primary security threat would reveal multiple and complex reasons for the selection of the Soviet Union as their primary security threat. Essentially, this view is underscored by a Japanese correspondent who states:

For all the Japanese domestic strife over an international issue, the Soviets have to accept the unpalatable fact that they have been unable to take advantage of the situation to change their status in Japanese eyes: the Soviet Union is potential enemy No. 1. That view virtually dominates Tokyo's thinking.

⁷⁴Moscow's concern over the implications of growing Sino-Japanese ties was stressed by Party Chief Brezhnev in February 1976 at the XXV CPSU Congress when he stated:

In connection with questions relating to a peace settlement, certain quarters in Japan are trying, sometimes with direct incitement from without, to

present groundless and unlawful claims to the USSR. This, of course is no way of maintaining good neighborly relations . . . I should like to express the hope that Japan will not be induced to take the road into which those eager to reap advantages from Soviet-Japanese differences would like to push her. [Emphasis added]

Brezhnev, Report to XXV CPSU Congress, op. cit. p. 5.

CHAPTER IV

PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH AND THE US PACIFIC DOCTRINE

Detente: The View from Moscow

The Kremlin's initiative for collective security in Asia is compatible with its global policy of detente. Yet, at the time of this assessment, Moscow's support to the liberation movement in Angola has caused an American reaction. While the enunciation of the US Pacific Doctrine may be considered one element of the US response, President Ford has also rejected the use of the term detente as part of the official US policy vocabulary. Instead, the United States is now pursuing a policy of "Peace through Strength." While a more precise definition of this policy has yet to evolve, there are indications that Moscow may not have anticipated the cost in terms of Soviet-American relations following its intervention in Angola.¹ It is too early to predict whether the Kremlin will continue to support what US officials have labeled "adventurist" policies in the Third World at a risk of a further deterioration in relations between the superpowers. Given the significant implications for a possible change in future Soviet-American relations, and to

better comprehend the current US policy of "Peace through Strength" and its potential link with the US Pacific Doctrine for Asia, an assessment of the ideological underpinning of détente, as primarily viewed from Moscow, is instructive.

Literally détente is derived from a French word meaning a "lock on the trigger of a weapon." A similar three word phrase in Russian: Razryadka Mezhdunarodnoi Napryazhivnosti means "relaxation of tensions." Essentially, peaceful coexistence is the preferred Soviet expression which defines relations between socialist and nonsocialist countries.² Peaceful coexistence is based on Moscow's recognition that war in the nuclear age is suicidal and that a more pragmatic and innovative approach for the extension of socialism was required.

Peaceful coexistence implies "the renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes." Yet, peaceful coexistence does not limit the Kremlin's involvement in other forms of conflict. Avoidance of nuclear war does not imply any truce in Moscow's support and encouragement of "just wars," or wars of national liberation. A Dictionary of Philosophy published in Moscow in 1967 defines the precise meaning of the Soviet term:

Peaceful coexistence does not mean giving up the national liberation movement; on the contrary, it creates the most favorable conditions for it. Moreover, . . . peaceful coexistence is conducted against imperialism--the source of military danger.³

As observed by Soviet activities in the Third World, more visibly in Angola, this view has remained consistent to the present day.

Unequivocally, the right to give aid to indigenous peoples as a means of changing the status quo in the Third World is an integral part of Soviet dogma. Hence, détente neither precludes Moscow's aid to revolutionary movements to undermine Western supported regimes nor prevents the application of force through wars by proxy.⁴

For Soviet leaders, Communist ideology provides a uniquely peculiar framework. With or without détente, the Kremlin could be expected to side with anti-Western causes. This commitment is based on the irreconcilable ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism, a struggle which in Moscow's view will ultimately end "with the triumph of socialism and communism all over the world."⁵

Many in the West believe that the Soviet leadership is simultaneously pursuing two contradictory objectives: peaceful relations with the West on one hand, and supporting wars of national liberation on the other hand. This accounts for the differences that exist between Soviet and Western conceptions of détente. Essentially, the Kremlin sees nothing contradictory in its view of détente which simply promises a relaxation of tension at higher levels of conflict. To be sure, Moscow sees no incompatibility in its dual objectives. The Soviets have never promised to support

stability, equilibrium of the status quo in the Third World which would accrue to the benefit of the West. On the contrary, the Kremlin's leadership has consistently indicated its intent to support indigenous movements in their struggle against Western imperialism. Western observers, particularly those who neither believe nor understand Moscow's consistent pronouncements on this subject, accuse the Kremlin of using détente as a one-way street, a temporary tactic, or as a pretext to undermine the West by promoting the expansion of Soviet influence around the globe.⁶

Further, Soviet commitment to anti-Western causes is increasingly regarded in the United States as not only inimical to American interests, but as fundamentally incompatible with the Western conception of détente. This is particularly evident when the Soviet Union demonstrates the capability and will to intervene in Third World conflicts when the risks and costs to Moscow are acceptable.

During a major foreign policy statement on Soviet-American relations before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in September 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger outlined the US perception of détente. Emphasizing the need to reduce the possibility of conflict between the superpowers in the nuclear age, Kissinger cautioned that both powers had an obligation to "anchor their policies in the principles of moderation and restraint." After outlining previous examples of Soviet actions to exploit tensions throughout the globe,

the Secretary of State warned that America could "not yield to pressure or the threat of force Détente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or toward one group of countries." Instead, Dr. Kissinger emphasized, "détente is indivisible."⁷

Elaborating on the documents containing the Statement of Principles signed by President Nixon and Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev in Moscow in 1972, Kissinger noted that these principles were not a "legal contract" but a yardstick to assess Soviet behavior. While not expecting total compliance by the Kremlin, he stressed that Soviet violations would be costly. Thus, when forecasting the future of relations between the superpowers, Kissinger warned that "Soviet actions could destroy détente," particularly if Moscow used it as a smokescreen to gain military advantages, or if the Soviets adopted policies which sharpened global tensions.⁸

One year later, against the backdrop of Russia's intervention in Angola, the Secretary of State strongly condemned Moscow's actions. Reiterating his previous warnings during a major foreign policy address in Detroit, in November 1975, Kissinger stressed:

The United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy--so distant from its homeland and so removed from traditional Russian interests . . . time is running out, continuation of an interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships We will be flexible and cooperative in settling conflicts. But we will

never permit détente to turn into a subterfuge for unilateral advantage. The policy of relaxation of tension is designed to promote peace not surrender.⁹

In the Kremlin's view, Western warnings about Moscow's violation of détente are invalid. They have never agreed to a live and let live policy in the Third World as implied in Dr. Kissinger's foregoing remarks. The fact is, the principle of reciprocity which denies support for anti-Western liberation movements, does not appear in the Soviet definition of détente. Moscow's decision-makers have consistently stressed that détente does not mean an end to the struggle between the two political systems. In turn, the Russians feel that the US would probably take advantage of any available option to undermine Moscow's interests wherever possible. Soviet commentators provide many examples to show that détente has not eliminated the adversary relationship between both superpowers.¹⁰

Détente, rhetoric notwithstanding, has not obscured the clash of opposing Soviet-American interests throughout the globe. The American opening to China, the mining of Haiphong Harbor on the eve of Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972, and continued US government funding of anti-Soviet activities (Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe) are manifest examples that would be considered by the Soviet Union as proof of Washington's double standard.¹¹ Another example might include the Ford Administration's efforts to outmaneuver the Soviet Union, particularly in the Middle East (Egypt). Additionally,

accusations of US meddling into Soviet internal affairs in the name of humanitarian rights, as well as periodic American policy statements that focus on "positions-of-strength," provide the Soviets with abundant evidence that the gains and losses under détente have not been one-sided.¹²

In a detailed assessment of the significance of the Soviet-American détente relationship contained in Izvestia, September 1975, G. Arbatov, a ranking Soviet academician, acknowledges that despite the wide differences between both superpowers, there "is no alternative to peaceful coexistence . . . in the nuclear age."¹³ At the same time, however, Arbatov also emphasized the correctness of Moscow's dual strategy of promoting wars of national liberation in conjunction with their policy of peaceful coexistence. Indeed, while the two may seem mutually exclusive to the West, they do not from the Kremlin. Arbatov affirms this view by stating:

The fact that, in launching a broad peace offensive and a vigorous and consistent struggle for détente and for the triumph of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries do not assume . . . a commitment to guarantee the social status quo in the world . . . To halt the processes of class and national liberation struggles engendered by the objective laws of historical development is another question.¹⁴

Another Pravda commentary, December 1975, stresses that "peaceful coexistence is not a tactic but a strategy."¹⁵

Essentially, the USSR visualizes the use of peaceful coexistence as primarily a means to achieve broader and long-term strategic objectives as well as tactical aims in a manner that might minimize a serious Western counteraction. The use of détente as a strategy is not new in Soviet approaches to the West. Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev interspersed periods of détente within periods of militant hostility toward the West when it was in their interest to do so. Hence, Pravda implies that détente confers unique advantages for the forces of socialism, particularly because it hinders the ability of the Western powers to react forcefully against attempts to expand Soviet influence in the Third World. In Pravda's view, "détente significantly expands the possibilities that the forces of national and social liberation have to resist imperialist pressure." For example, and while détente's benefits for Moscow were global, there were definite achievements in Asia. Pravda states:

Here are the main facts. It was in conditions of the incipient easing of international tension that the Vietnamese people's heroic struggle against imperialist aggression came to a victorious conclusion and the people's movements in Laos and Cambodia won out.¹⁶

Noting the growing anti-détente sentiment in the West, another Soviet analyst emphasizes that attempts are being made to shift the blame for détente's "pre-planned failures" to the USSR. In a Moscow News article, March 1976, an analyst notes that certain factions of the US (presumably including Dr. Kissinger) are hinting that "détente is some

sort of great power collusion to preserve the . . . world status quo," or an "obligation" to act jointly to prevent "internal changes" in individual countries.¹⁷ The assessment implies that such a view is unrealistic, because "shifts do take place." They occur through evolutionary social processes, or "from the successes achieved by the national liberation movement." In the Moscow News commentator's perspective, it is unfortunate that "certain circles" in the US have confused the policy of relaxation of tensions with the word "entente," and interpret Moscow's actions in the Third World as "a violation of the conditions and obligations binding under détente, or as 'proof' that détente is ineffective."¹⁷

Denying that social change is the result of "intrigue" by the socialist states, the Soviet commentator further contends that progress of socialism is inevitable and cannot be halted by government agreements. The consistent Soviet foreign policy of giving such alleged momentum a periodic nudge, however, is inferred when this analyst promises that the "USSR will continue supporting the people's struggle for . . . national liberation and socialism."¹⁸

In his clearest presentation to date of the Soviet position on détente, during the XXV CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev scored Chinese and other unspecified opponents of détente in the US and West Germany. Without mentioning Western accusations that Moscow violated the spirit of détente

by supporting Cuban military intervention in Angola, Brezhnev stressed that détente would continue to be pursued with the West with "redoubled energy." He hastened to add, however, that détente would not interfere with the Kremlin's support to "the struggle of other people for freedom and progress."¹⁹

Brezhnev appeared to be replying to Kissinger's previous warnings when he noted that "some bourgeois leaders affect surprise" or anger over Moscow's support for national liberation movements. Such Western leaders were accused of being naive or obtuse. After all, reasoned Brezhnev, "détente does not in the slightest abolish . . . or alter, the laws of class struggle."

Further, détente does not mean that "Communists will reconcile themselves with capitalist exploitation or that monopolists will become followers of the revolution." Essentially, Brezhnev made no secret of the fact that Moscow sees "détente as the way to create more favorable conditions" for socialism.²⁰ Refuting any suggestion that peaceful co-existence would result in "freezing the status quo," his statement could also be read as a firm rejection to previous warnings from Washington that Moscow's intervention in the Third World would jeopardize the Soviet-American détente relationship.

Hence the background evidence indicates that, apart from the mutually recognized need to avoid dangerous confrontations, and despite the desire to limit direct conflict

between the superpowers, nothing in the détente relationship can be taken for granted. Faced with the choice between pursuing self-interest or cooperating in the name of détente, the Soviets would seem to have chosen the first, at least from a Western viewpoint. Irrefutably, Moscow perceives that the ideological conflict between the two political systems is irreconcilable. Regardless of the status of détente, national self-interest aimed at the accumulation of economic strength, military power and international influence at the expense of the West, is likely to remain at the core of Soviet policy.

The US Pacific Doctrine

Conflicting Soviet-American perspectives over the rules of détente have threatened to modify the relationship between the superpowers. This fact became clear when President Ford discarded the use of the word "détente" for describing relations between the superpowers. Instead, the President threatened to deal from a "position of strength" with Moscow.²¹

Further indications of the changing American attitude toward Soviet-American relations was subsequently signaled by Dr. Kissinger. In an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 1976, approximately one month after Brezhnev's keynote speech at the XXV CPSU Congress, the Secretary of State underscored America's intent to resist further Soviet "adventurism." Before that

Senate forum, he reportedly stressed that the United States would confront the "Soviet Union at the center of its power, on global issues." Hence, Dr. Kissinger appeared to firmly reject the Soviet thesis that wars of national liberation remain an issue that transcends the détente relationship between the two superpowers.²²

A potential blueprint for the US strategy of "Peace through Strength" in Asia was first alluded to by Secretary Kissinger one week before President Ford's trip to China. In the same speech where he warned Moscow that détente would not be permitted to "turn into a subterfuge for unilateral advantage,"²³ Kissinger unveiled Washington's counter to Moscow's initiative for collective security in Asia.

Noting that the rationale for President Ford's upcoming visit to China was to reaffirm America's stake in that region's future, and to strengthen important bilateral ties, Kissinger underscored the fact that the "United States is a Pacific Power." He also stressed Washington's intent to play a "continuing strong role in Asia" and preserve a firm and balanced military posture in the Pacific.²⁴

Acknowledging Japanese-American friction during the early 1970's due to economic strains and the failure of the Nixon Administration to consult Japan over the Nixon visit to China in 1972, policies which were "avoidable by more thoughtful US actions," Kissinger highlighted Japan as America's "principal Asian ally and largest overseas trading partner." With tensions resolved, he noted that Japanese-

American relations were the "best they have been in 30 years."

Turning to the Sino-American normalization process, Kissinger's message could not be mistaken by the Kremlin. He stated:

We and the People's Republic of China have parallel concerns that the world be free from the domination by military force or intimidation--what our many joint communiques have termed 'hegemony.' We have affirmed that neither of our two countries should seek hegemony and that each would oppose the attempts of others to do so. Our commitment to this policy will not change. The United States will continue to resist expansionism as we have throughout the entire postwar period.
[Emphasis added]²⁵

As far as the Korean peninsula was concerned, the Secretary of State focused on the US commitment to South Korea. Recognizing that the "security of Japan," America's "closest ally in the Pacific" is directly linked to the security of Korea, Kissinger pledged to work with "our friends" to preserve the balance. He warned that any attempt "to change or upset the equilibrium on the peninsula," would be resisted with determination.

Significantly, eight months after the fall of South Vietnam, Dr. Kissinger offered an olive branch to Vietnam by stating:

We have no interest to continue the Indochina war on the diplomatic front: we envisage the eventual normalization of relations. In the interim we are prepared to consider practical arrangements of mutual benefit in such fields as travel and trade.²⁶

Without naming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Secretary of State declared America's

intent to seek a new structure of stability in Southeast Asia. Underscoring US links with the individual nations of the region in varying degrees, he gave prominence to President Ford's upcoming visits to Indonesia and the Philippines, and highlighted important American ties with Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. After focusing on America's long-term association with its "ANZUS partners--Australia and New Zealand," Kissinger ended his tour d'horizon by stressing that Asia "is a central element in the design of our foreign policy."²⁷

After the conclusion of President Ford's visit to China in December 1975, the Sino-American interest in countering Soviet global expansion became increasingly apparent.²⁸ Significantly, during one subsequent press interview, Dr. Kissinger reportedly illustrated three cases where Chinese and American interests converged: first, Peking's encouragement of Washington's efforts to strengthen NATO; second, Chinese acquiescence to strong US ties to Tokyo; and third, the mutual Sino-American agreement on condemnation of Soviet intervention in Angola. In each case, Sino-American interests were diametrically opposed to those of the Kremlin.²⁹

Significantly, the new direction of US national strategy for Asia was officially proclaimed by President Ford on the 34th anniversary of Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. On 7 December 1975, President Ford outlined America's

"Pacific Doctrine" in a speech given at the University of Hawaii.³⁰ The principal aim of this initiative appeared to be an attempt to halt America's drift toward isolationism and to revitalize interest in Asia following the United States' setback in Indochina. The Pacific Doctrine is not a fundamentally new strategy for Asia. Instead, it basically stems from the Nixon Doctrine, which portended a lowered American military profile in Asia as the Vietnam War wound down. In concert with the Nixon Doctrine, primary responsibility for ground forces in a potential area of conflict lies with the country threatened; however, the Pacific Doctrine contains some significant and original innovations that diverge from the former. The basic contours of Washington's new Pacific Doctrine are outlined in the document's six premises of US policy.

The first premise declares the fundamental need for American strength to insure a "stable balance of power in the Pacific." The President noted that America's concerns in Asia have increased and "the preservation of the sovereignty and independence of our Asian friends remain a paramount objective of American policy." Thus, the link between US global policy of "Peace through Strength" and America's Asian strategy is made quite clear.

The second premise focuses on the fact that "Japan is the pillar of US strategy." The President stressed the importance of the Japanese-American partnership by stating

that "no relationship" has received "more attention, nor is there any greater success story in the history of American efforts to relate to distant cultures." Japanese-American "bilateral relations have never been better."³¹

Within the third premise, President Ford commented on his talks in Peking with Chairman Mao and Mr. Teng. While acknowledging "differing perceptions of respective . . . national interests," the President affirmed that "we did find common ground," and "share very important areas of concern and agreement." Reinforcing Dr. Kissinger's earlier statements on this subject, the President focused upon the essence of the growing Sino-American relationship. Undoubtedly, the Kremlin could certainly not ignore President Ford's statement that:

We share opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia or any other part of the world.³²

President Ford also reaffirmed the Sino-American normalization process based on the 1972 Shanghai Communique and noted that their bilateral relationship "is becoming a permanent feature of the international political landscape."

The fourth premise of the Pacific Doctrine underscores America's "continuing stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia." He commented on his visits to Indonesia and the Philippines and then stressed the future significance of the US link with ASEAN by stating: "I can assure you that Americans will be hearing much more about the ASEAN organization."³³

Interestingly enough, two months after Ford's statement was made, an article praising the ASEAN organization appeared in the March issue of Peking Review. Noting that unity and cooperation among ASEAN states is being strengthened, the article contrasted the fact that the "Asian collective security system hawked by the Soviet Union had been spurned."³⁴ This commentary appeared to reflect a significant change in China's attitudes toward the ASEAN organization, particularly in comparison to previous years.

America's willingness to settle political conflicts in Korea and Indochina is outlined in the fifth premise. This constituted the strongest statement made just eight months after the fall of Vietnam to indicate US willingness to consider the restoration of relations with the Communist states of Indochina. The President emphasized that if Hanoi exhibits "restraint toward their neighbors and takes constructive approaches to international problems," America would look to the future rather than the past.³⁵

There are symbolic indicators that Hanoi and Washington are edging closer together. In December 1975, the possibility of a resumption of American exploration of off-shore oil was discussed between North Vietnam and members of a US Congressional Subcommittee in Paris. Apparently, these members indicated that the Vietnamese would favor American oil drilling assistance once relations between both countries are established.³⁶ Reportedly, Hanoi believes that Western

oil companies are better equipped to assist the North Vietnamese in exploiting and marketing their oil than the Russians.

The trend toward a perceptible improvement in relations between Hanoi and Washington, however, could change for the worse, if either side takes actions that might be interpreted by the other as hostile. An escalation in North Vietnam's support to Thailand's insurgency is one example of actions that would likely halt a rapprochement between Hanoi and Washington. Hanoi's potential capability to support insurgencies was significantly reinforced by the takeover of an estimated \$12.5 billion worth of capital plant investment and \$6 billion worth of arms in South Vietnam.³⁷

It is reasonable to assume that China would support an improvement in relations between the US and Indochina. Peking is increasingly wary about growing ties between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. As a result of historical animosities and a territorial dispute over possible oil bearing regions, Peking fears that Hanoi might permit Russia use of military facilities. Both China and North Vietnam are now claiming sovereignty over the Paracel (Hsisha) and Spratly (Nansha) islands.³⁸

While the sixth premise is listed last, it contains profound long-term consequences. Noting America's growing interdependence in Asia, the President highlighted the fact that US "trade with East Asia now exceeds its transactions

with the European community." He also focused on statistics which showed Asian-American trade increasing by more than "30 percent annually--reaching \$46 billion in 1974."³⁹ If one assumes that political-military commitments are often shaped by economic requirements, America's increasing interdependence with Asia could have important long-term implications. US economic interaction with Europe is one factor that has been used to justify its continued military links with NATO. Thus, shifting economic priorities could bring about an increase in America's political-military commitments in the increasingly crucial Asian arena.

When speculating about America's future role in Asia, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that China is increasingly concerned about the need for US assistance to prevent the threat of Soviet regional hegemony. The Kremlin's consistent emphasis on its desire for collective security in Asia is seen by Peking as proof of Soviet intent to seek hegemony in the region. Therefore, President Ford's enunciation of the US Pacific Doctrine may be somewhat reassuring to China. Significantly, one may speculate that the third premise which deals with mutual Sino-American opposition to hegemony in Asia, or any other part of the globe, is essentially aimed at the Soviet Union. If so, then that Doctrine provides a de facto security framework for closer collaboration between Washington and Peking. This factor could serve to raise the risks and costs to Moscow if it should continue

to pursue policies which may be regarded by the US and China as "adventuristic."

Consequently, the President's emphasis on the fact that America and China "share opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia or any other part of the world," is important. This statement, which is also contained in the Shanghai Communique, and in similar documents signed by Washington, Peking and Tokyo, could imply that Washington might collaborate with these Asian powers in developing credible options to back up its previous warnings to Moscow.

The Ford Administration warned the Soviet Union that unless it exhibited restraint in Angola, the Soviet-American détente relationship would be impaired. When Moscow failed to heed repeated US admonitions, and continued its military intervention in Angola with Cuban proxies, Washington threatened a change in the Soviet-American relationship. Furthermore, if Moscow attempts to continue to use military means in support of anti-Western causes in the Third World, the US is likely to take reciprocal action. Such actions would most likely raise the costs for a similar Kremlin attempt to seek unilateral advantage. Should Soviet-American relations deteriorate further, the Ford Administration might even be forced to examine various credible alternatives to counter Soviet risk-taking. One of these alternatives is the forging of a close Sino-American and Japanese bond in Asia as part of a selective anti-Soviet containment strategy. Ironically,

Moscow's lack of caution might eventually bring about the alliance structure that it has long feared.

Although never officially acknowledged by the Nixon or Ford Administration, the hegemony clause provides the clearest implication that the Kremlin's actions would play a major role in determining the degree of Washington's possible support for a selective anti-Soviet containment strategy with China's participation. This speculative possibility as an element of "Peace through Strength" might have been alluded to in Dr. Kissinger's previous message when he cautioned that "continuation" of an interventionist policy [by the Kremlin] must inevitably threaten other relationships.⁴⁰

Acknowledgement of some form of Sino-American collusion was the theme of a speech by the late Marshal Grechko in the May 1975 edition of Krasnaya Zvezda. The Russian Minister of Defense stated:

The imperialists assign a special place in their plans [for] the creation of a united anti-Soviet front with the participants of China. In this endeavor, they find understanding on the part of the Peking leadership, which has openly embarked on a path of struggle against the Soviet Union and the world socialist system.⁴¹

The Kremlin's decision-makers now visualize that Washington and Peking have embarked on a clear anti-Soviet course. Moscow had few doubts that this possibility existed when Peking abandoned their virulent, anti-American policies after the border clashes between both antagonists in 1969. As the evidence seems to bear out, Moscow's leadership

assumes that both Peking and Washington appear to be gravitating toward each other and may be in collusion against the Soviet Union. To be sure, one may even speculate that a Sino-American military partnership with Japan's participation could possibly influence Moscow to exercise a greater degree of caution and a lesser degree of risk-taking during a future global crisis.

Sino-American Military Ties

There is evidence to conclude that Western arms aid is no longer a matter of hypothetical discussion. One week after President Ford proclaimed America's Pacific Doctrine, Peking signed a multimillion dollar contract with the British Government for the licensed manufacture of Rolls-Royce jet engines. Significantly, this arms transfer represented the first time that a Western armaments or aerospace corporation had agreed to license the manufacture of a major military item in a Communist country.⁴²

Manufacture of the Rolls-Royce jet engines will now permit China to deploy a new generation of fighter aircraft and thus, increase its military capability. Apparently, the Soviets failed in their reported attempt to pressure London to prevent the sale.⁴³ Hence, this agreement not only advances China's efforts to acquire advanced Western weapons technology, but further exacerbates Moscow's apprehensions.

Even though the Ford Administration is currently enforcing controls on American military arms sales to China

at this time, Washington has reportedly acquiesced to some European sales to China and to negotiations on future weapons sales. Apparently, this action paved the way for both French and British arms sales to China and enables those governments to bypass the Allied review panel known as "COCOM," short for coordination committee. The Rolls-Royce jet engine sale to China was reportedly the "first instance of a clear-cut military item being sold to a Communist nation without formal approval." COCOM was organized in 1949 and consists of all the members of NATO, except Iceland. Unanimous approval is first required before strategic military equipment sales can be sold to Communist nations.

The reported rationale for the Administration's actions was based on the fact that the Soviet Union has tended to benefit from their policy of "evenhandedness." Since the technological gap between Moscow and Peking favors the former by a wide margin, selling China only what the West is prepared to sell to the USSR would be to the disadvantage of Peking.⁴⁵

Additionally, the speculative Sino-American link was again raised when the Western press report indicated that Dr. Kissinger "had repeatedly told Chinese leaders that the United States had a vital concern in maintaining the Chinese-Soviet balance of power."⁴⁶

Not many years ago it would have been heresy to have contemplated US military aid to China. While Dr. Kissinger

was in Peking, an interesting discussion reportedly took place during a congressional committee meeting on long-range foreign policy planning. On the question of American military aid to China, John Paton Davies, a US Foreign Service Officer, provided an indication of a trend of Washington's thinking. Davies reportedly argued that "it would be very difficult to say no if the Chinese approached the US asking for purely defensive weapons."⁴⁷

During the current period when Moscow is engaged in coercive diplomacy against Peking, the danger of a limited surprise attack along the contested Sino-Soviet borders cannot be discounted. This possibility would certainly motivate China's need for Western arms, technology and intelligence. While speculative, Western military aid to Peking could be rationalized under the third premise of the Pacific Doctrine as a "quick fix" to deter a Soviet threat of invasion against China. It is reasonable to assume that the threat of a possible Soviet invasion of China could activate the potential Sino-American pledge under the third premise of the US Pacific Doctrine to "oppose hegemony in Asia." Indeed, China's expressed anxiety over the possible implications of Moscow's initiative for collective security in Asia may provide sufficient grounds for Peking to seek a counterbalance in the form of a military relationship with the United States.

One America observer postulates that a Sino-American military relationship would be advantageous to both nations. In the Fall 1975 issue of Foreign Policy, Michael Pillsbury noted that US military assistance to China would:⁴⁸

- Improve Sino-American relations, particularly during the post-Mao era, i.e., defense technology would "involve the influential Chinese defense establishment . . . in preserving good relations with America."
- Assist China in deterring a Soviet attack, reduce Moscow's military pressure against China, and "fore-stall a possible Sino-Soviet war that might jeopardize world peace."
- Stimulate Russian concentration on their two front dilemma. Decrease Soviet pressure against NATO by tying down a sizeable number of Soviet military capabilities. "Approximately one-fourth" of the total Russian military capability is already located proximate to China.

Pillsbury warns that US options must be calculated with great caution to minimize consequences that could be harmful to America's national security interests in Asia. Further, he emphasizes that US military aid should be strictly "defensive" and that this aid should be tempered to avoid stimulating a Soviet pre-emptive attack. Pillsbury also does not wish to embolden Peking's leadership to take provocative military risks during a future crisis.

Clearly, the potential option of "joint military contingency planning" between Peking and Washington, which was underscored in Pillsbury's article is not likely to be ignored by Moscow's strategists. This option could certainly be linked to the state of Soviet-American relations. If détente between the superpowers begins to deteriorate

because of Soviet risk-taking, or if Moscow's initiative for collective security in Asia serves as a raison d'ete for Soviet intervention in the Third World or against China, then joint Sino-American military contingency planning represents a credible option that could be explored.

The Pacific Doctrine provides the framework for a closer defensive alignment between Washington, Peking and Tokyo to prevent hegemony in Asia. A defensive alliance between the three major powers, as implied by the second and third premises of America's Pacific Doctrine, might induce Moscow to exercise a greater degree of restraint during global crises. Further, such a partnership against hegemony in Asia is also likely to temper an overconfident Kremlin view that the global balance of forces is shifting in favor of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet View of America's Pacific Doctrine

The basic contours of Washington's Pacific Doctrine were reiterated in Izvestia, December 1975, by V. Osipov, approximately one week after President Ford's speech in Hawaii. This commentator provided the following outline of the six premises:

(1) 'American strength,' the President stated, is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific; and the duty of the U.S.A. 'is to preserve a flexible and balanced position of strength throughout the Pacific';

(2) 'Partnership with Japan is the pillar of our strategy';

(3) The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China [and] the strengthening of our new ties with this great nation;

(4) A 'stake in the stability and security of Southeast Asia' which is interpreted primarily as support and aid for Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia, which form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);

(5) 'The maintenance of close ties' with South Korea and the continued presence of American armed forces there; and

(6) The creation of a 'structure of cooperation in this region' . . . [Emphasis added]⁴⁹

The foregoing Soviet assessment accurately reflected the thrust of the Pacific Doctrine with some significant exceptions. For example, Osipov makes no mention of President Ford's willingness to restore relations with Hanoi. This omission may imply Moscow's sensitivity on the subject. For improved relations between the US and Vietnam could be interpreted as a major ideological setback for the Kremlin. Additionally, no direct mention of the anti-hegemony clause in the third premise was made by Osipov. This omission in light of Moscow's acute sensitivity to the use of this word during the past few years, is particularly relevant. Further, Washington's important and growing economic ties in the region were only mentioned in passing.

Assessing the basic motivations for the US Pacific Policy, the Soviet commentator reasons, that America's "military failure" in Vietnam, the "ignominious fall of the Saigon regime, coupled with the obvious inadequacy of the Guam Doctrine" forced a reevaluation of Washington's strategy

toward Asia. Osipov asserts that the Pacific Doctrine was prepared well in advance. He implies that Washington's basic aim was to build up China as a counterweight to Russia, and to encourage Japan's hard-line in dealing with the Kremlin. The apparition of a Washington, Peking, Tokyo axis becomes clear when Osipov states:

One of the main goals of the American President's trip to China, Indonesia and the Philippines (as well as US Secretary of State H. Kissinger's visit to Tokyo on the way) was precisely to enlist support for the new Washington doctrine in these countries, and especially in Peking . . . [Emphasis added]⁵⁰

This Soviet analyst notes that the premises within the Pacific Doctrine indicate Washington's choices of potential allies. In Osipov's view, "Washington seemingly intends to reactivate [its] military political alliances" and is planning to strengthen "its military presence in Asia."

Significantly, one of the first signs of impending conflict between opposing Soviet and American initiatives for Asia becomes evident when Osipov indicates that the American Pacific Doctrine could "hardly be counted as a stabilizing factor," therefore, need for the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia "is becoming increasingly urgent." In essence, Osipov sees the Pacific Doctrine as simply another attempt by America to reimpose its own hegemony in Asia.

Further evidence of Moscow's increasing concern over the implications of the US Pacific Doctrine was outlined in Pravda in December 1975. V. Larin noted that Washington's new doctrine was causing many "observers" a great deal of

uneasiness.⁵¹ Because "concepts of strength" seemed to be the primary underpinning for the Pacific Doctrine, Washington was accused of again threatening to undermine the stability of Asia. The commentary clearly implies that America's Pacific Doctrine is in direct conflict with the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia. Consequently, Washington's moves were seen as being incompatible with Soviet objectives in the region.

The foregoing Soviet assessments provide evidence of Moscow's growing uneasiness about the possibility of collusion among the other quadrilateral powers. In the Kremlin's view the advent of a growing alliance among the US, Japan and China is taking place just when the global balance of power was shifting in favor of Moscow, particularly after America's political-military defeat in Vietnam. From the Kremlin's perspective, America's Pacific Doctrine now constitutes a major dilemma. The Soviets appear to see this doctrine as a strategic blueprint for a political-military structure composed of "Chinese Great Power Chauvinism," and "Japanese militarism" in alignment with "American imperialism."

The specter of a Washington, Tokyo and Peking axis now confronts Moscow's strategists with new and dangerous uncertainties. Soviet insecurity would substantially increase if Western arms were supplied to China and if joint military contingency planning and intelligence exchanges among the three other quadrilateral powers were instituted.

Undoubtedly, this factor would have a profound effect on the debate now taking place in the Kremlin. While there are serious doubts about Moscow taking action to deliberately provoke a war with China to achieve their objectives, the continuation of coercive pressure by other means to insure that Peking is eventually controlled by a cooperative regime can be anticipated. Exactly how the Kremlin chooses to force Peking to temper its anti-Sovietism and bring about fundamental Chinese policy changes remains a matter of speculation.

Available evidence suggests a trend of increasing Soviet coercive pressure against Peking. Indeed, an examination of alternative options to bring about a pro-Soviet Chinese regime and influence its return to the socialist community, is probably the core subject of a Soviet policy debate. At the very least, Moscow can be expected to use subversion and the threat of force to minimize Peking's anti-Soviet collusion with "imperialism." The USSR can be expected to escalate the use of various psychological weapons against China. These may include Moscow's increasing use of threatening ideological polemics, resort to military show of force campaigns, and missile rattling along China's borders, naval maneuvers in proximate oceans and seas, and alleged support for "friendly elements" within China. Possible miscalculation between both adversaries, however, might even result in the outbreak of conflict. Although

Soviet "intervention" could take many forms, the Kremlin's security design for Asia provides a political-military framework to coerce, contain and isolate the PRC.

Hence, to enhance a greater degree of stability and equilibrium in the volatile Asian arena, America's Pacific Doctrine, with its stated goal of "opposition to any form of hegemony in Asia or in any other part of the world," may provide a potential counter to Moscow's initiative for collective security in Asia.

Notes - Chapter IV

¹Elizabeth Pond, "Moscow Reacts Cautiously to US 'Detentless' Rhetoric, The Christian Science Monitor, 6 April 1976, p. 7.

²M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin (eds.), A Dictionary of Philosophy, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 334.

³Ibid., p. 335.

⁴At the XXV CPSU Congress, L. I. Brezhnev stressed that détente could not be equated with the preservation of the status quo. He stated:

For it is quite clear that détente and peaceful coexistence are concerned with interstate relations. This means primarily that quarrels and conflicts between countries should not be decided by war, use of force or the threat of force. Détente does not in the slightest abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of class struggle.

Speech by L. I. Brezhnev, "XXV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy," 24 February 1976, in Moscow News Supplement to issue No. 9, (2685), 6-13 March 1976, p. 7.

⁵Rosenthal and Yudin, op. cit., p. 334.

⁶Elizabeth Pond, "Détente Still Talked up by Moscow," The Christian Science Monitor, 9 March 1976, p. 3; and "Moscow Fumes over Détente," The Christian Science Monitor, 15 March 1976, p. 4; and G. Arbatov, "Maneuvers of the Opponents of Détente," Izvestia, 4 September 1975, pp. 3-4, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press (CDSR), Vol. XXVII, No. 36, 1 October 1975, p. 36. Arbatov notes that Western "enemies of détente" have been attempting "to prove that the advantages derived from this policy go only to the Soviet Union." (p. 2)

⁷"Secretary Kissinger's Statement on US Soviet Relations," Special Report, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, No. 6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19 September 1974), p. 6.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Secretary Henry A. Kissinger, "Building an Enduring Foreign Policy: Creative Leadership in a Moment of Uncertainty," Vital Speeches, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, 1 January 1976, p. 168.

¹⁰ Arbatov, op. cit., 1-6; and G. Shakhnazarov, "Peaceful Coexistence and Social Progress," Pravda, 27 December 1975, 6, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 52, 28 January 1976, p. 1; and V. Osipov, "Détente and Its Opponents," Izvestia, 22 May 1975, p. 4, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 22, 10 June 1975, p. 8.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² The connection between President Sadat's repeal of the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 in March 1976, is seen to stem from assurances of US support for Egypt's deteriorating economy. Henry B. Ellis, "Egypt's Anti-Soviet Shift Tied to US Assurances," The Christian Science Monitor, 16 March 1976, p. 3. The Soviet Press reportedly linked Egypt's cancellation of the Friendship Treaty to promised financial aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia. "Soviets Rap Egypt," The Christian Science Monitor, 22 March 1976, p. 2.

¹³ Arbatov, op. cit., pp. 4-5; and Osipov, loc. cit.

¹⁴ Arbatov, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁵ Shakhnazarov, op. cit., p. 1.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ V. Berezhkov, "Détente and Soviet-US Relations," Moscow News, 6-13 March 1976, p. 5.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Brezhnev, op. cit., p. 7.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Dana Adams Schmidt, "Kissinger Roughs Out Blueprint for Global Management of Soviets," The Christian Science Monitor, 17 March 1976, pp. 1-2.

²² Ibid.

²³ Kissinger, "Building an Enduring Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 168.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 169.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 170.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 171.

²⁸ James N. Naughton, "Ford Ends Four-Day Visit to Peking: Gain is Seen in Stand Against Soviets," The New York Times, 5 December 1975, p. 1.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ President Gerald R. Ford, "The United States Pacific Policy: Responsible American Leadership," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, 1 January 1975, pp. 162-4.

³¹ Ibid., p. 163.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ "ASEAN: First Summit Meeting," Peking Review, No. 10, 5 March 1976, p. 20.

³⁵ Ford, op. cit., p. 164.

³⁶ Geoffrey Godsell, "Washington, Hanoi Continue Smoke Signals," The Christian Science Monitor, 17 March 1976, p. 26; "Hanoi Hints Change of US Oil Deal," The New York Times, 9 December 1975, 6; and "US Ready to Talk with Indochinese," The New York Times, 15 November 1975, p. 9.

³⁷ Godsell, op. cit.

³⁸ Geoffrey Godsell, "Hanoi Snubs Asian Overtures," The Christian Science Monitor, 10 March 1976, p. 3.

³⁹ Ford, loc. cit.

⁴⁰ Kissinger, "Building an Enduring Foreign Policy," loc. cit.

⁴¹ "Speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense," Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 May 1975, pp. 1-2, in CPSU, Vol. XXVII, No. 22, 25 June 1975, p. 9.

⁴² Fox Butterfield, "China Pact with Rolls for Building Jet Engines," The New York Times, 14 December 1975, p. 23.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Leslie H. Gelb, "US Turns Its Head as Allies Sell Military Goods to China," The Kansas City Times, 26 April 1976, p. 6B.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid. Interestingly, while the Ford Administration tended to overlook Western European military sales to China, within a matter of days, another press report indicated that government action was being taken against a San Francisco firm for illegally exporting \$3 million worth of sophisticated electronic gear to the Soviet Union. "Firm Illegally Sold Technology to Russia," The Kansas City Star, 29 April 1976, p. 1.

⁴⁷ Leo Goodstadt, "The Men Who Guide the Plough," Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 November 1975, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁸ Michael Pillsbury, "U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?" Foreign Policy, No. 20, Fall 1975, 58.

⁴⁹ V. Osipov, "Notes to the Point: The U.S.A.'s New Pacific Doctrine," Izvestia, 16 December 1975, p. 3, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 50, 14 January 1976, p. 30.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ C. Larin, "Against the Current," Pravda, 16 December 1975, p. 5, in CDSP, Vol. XXVII, No. 50, p. 30.

CHAPTER V

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET SECURITY CONCEPT FOR THE UNITED STATES

Pax Sovietica

Abundant evidence exists to indicate the absence of any great amount of enthusiasm among prospective members of a Soviet-sponsored Asian security arrangement. Furthermore, this lack of Asian nation receptiveness for the Kremlin's proposal might lead to the conclusion that the concept is not given much credence in the West. However, America's unwillingness to back its Asian commitments, a gradual trend of US isolationism, and the dismantling of American bases in Korea, Japan and Taiwan would certainly generate a far greater degree of Asian interest in Moscow's security proposal. The foregoing, when combined with a heightened perception of a growing Chinese regional threat during the next decade, would provide even greater incentive for the nations of Asia to accept the Soviet security design. This possibility explains Peking's current reluctance to accept a rapid or total withdrawal of US forces from Asia, and also accounts for the PRC's growing acceptance of America's security links throughout the region. Peking is well aware

of the Kremlin's willingness to fill a potential regional vacuum. Chinese press accounts consistently portray the Soviet Union, not the United States, as the major regional security threat.

China appears to be well aware of the possibility that American isolationism would leave Peking with limited room for maneuver against her more powerful northern neighbor. An American retrenchment in face of growing Soviet Regional power would inevitably force China to accommodate itself to Moscow's dominance. This combination of US isolationism and a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, while considered unlikely at this time, would bring about the advent of a global Pax Sovietica. (See Appendix 2)

Regional Overview

To better assess the implications of Moscow's security concept for the United States a regional overview is instructive. One recognizes that various combinations of prospective Asian states could conceivably become future members of the Kremlin's security scheme. Presently, only India, Vietnam, the MPR, and perhaps Afghanistan currently appear to be candidates for possible membership in a Soviet-backed regional security effort.

To date, Soviet hopes to win broad Asian nation acceptance of their security design have not been realized. In fact, when compared to the Chinese diplomatic success in Asia during recent years, Moscow's efforts to obtain positive

Asian support for its collective security proposal have been virtually ignored by most of the regional nations. Yet, this current reality should still be treated with a degree of caution. Although few Asian states have openly indicated any support for the Soviet scheme, only China and Japan have categorically rejected the concept. One must note that both nations are irredentist powers with claims on Soviet territory in Asia. Even though the other regional powers have generally been cool to the Kremlin's proposal, one must emphasize the fact that most of the Asian nations have not entirely foresworn the concept either. The future membership by any other Asian nation, especially those nations whose security could possibly be threatened on the basis of possible territorial claims by a powerful China, is primarily based on conjecture.

1. Southeast Asia. It can be argued that Peking neither supported nor anticipated the rapid defeat of the United States political-military policies in South Vietnam. The PRC would probably have preferred the continued existence of a divided Vietnam and a more gradual phaseout of American forces from South Vietnam. This view is supported by the significant Sino-Vietnamese discord that has become more evident during the past year. Rival territorial claims, historical animosities, and China's support for the continued independence of Laos and Cambodia appear to clash with Vietnamese ambitions to dominate Indochina. Hanoi's recent

shift toward Moscow might signal the beginning of a de facto Soviet-Vietnamese partnership against China. Available evidence indicates growing friction between North Vietnam and the PRC. If relations between Hanoi and Peking deteriorate further, Soviet use of Vietnamese military installations and naval bases should not be ruled out. Although supporting evidence for a Hanoi-Moscow security alliance is minimal at this time, this possibility should not be overlooked.

The Sino-Soviet rivalry can be readily observed as both nations escalate their efforts to normalize their relations with the member states of ASEAN. The Soviets appear to be continuing their efforts to play on Southeast Asian fears of China's support for regional insurgencies and Peking's potential to exploit the overseas Chinese populations. In turn, Peking is attempting to ease Southeast Asian concerns by reassuring those nations that China does not seek regional dominance. This also accounts for Peking's attempts to point out the gap between ASEAN neutrality proposals and Moscow's initiatives for collective security in Asia.

Overall, with the exception of North Vietnam, the PRC appears to be achieving a superior margin of influence in Southeast Asia. However, if it is willing to pay the price, Moscow would enhance its ability to compete. The Soviets can be expected to tailor their Asian collective security

initiative to accomodate the requirements of a regional proxy in order to demonstrate the credibility and reliability of its support. The Kremlin would attempt to influence the defense establishments of selected regional showcase nations. For example, if Malaysia, Thailand, Burma or Indonesia were faced with insurgencies which were attributed to Chinese backing, the Soviet security alternative would become increasingly attractive to those Asian nations.

This is particularly relevant if the West demonstrates a disinclination to become involved in supporting these nations' efforts to solve their internal difficulties. Irrefutably, Western indifference to a possible increase in China's involvement in Asian insurgencies could increase regional nation acceptability of a Soviet counterweight. In the foreseeable future, the Kremlin is likely to focus on providing alternative options for America's disillusioned allies.

2. East Asia. In East Asia the Soviet Union is primarily concerned about the future direction of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. A growing relationship between both China and Japan who have expressed claims to Soviet territory is a movement which Moscow can hardly ignore. Japan has agreed to sign a peace treaty which includes the controversial hegemony clause with China, despite Soviet warnings that such a course of action would be considered antagonistic. Moscow now realizes that the thinly veiled anti-Soviet codeword

ascribed to the hegemony clause has now been agreed to by China, Japan and the United States as well. Consequently, Moscow is now wary about the possibility that China's diplomatic triumph with Japan could eventually be translated into a hostile military pact against the Soviet Union. Moscow sees this condition as further complicated by the de facto support of a Sino-Japanese alliance by the United States.

To offset such a possibility, Moscow will reemphasize to Japan the benefits of closer economic cooperative efforts in Siberia. If this offer fails, Moscow would concentrate on the coercive military power element of its Asian security initiative in an effort to counter the most threatening aspects of a Sino-Japanese axis. However, more likely the Soviets can be expected to encourage Japan to diminish its security ties with America, particularly if the US adopts an isolationist global policy.

Moscow might even offer to guarantee Japan's continued access to vital raw material and energy resources including special spheres of influence in Manchuria which the Soviets could attempt to acquire by moving against the PRC if China lapses into a period of protracted disunity during the post-Mao era. Moscow would simply agree to divide the spoils with Japan to neutralize the threat of Tokyo's rearmament and offer Japan various incentives to become a neutral partner in its future collective security

design for Asia. In any event, Moscow will not hesitate in taking strategic countermeasures against any threat posed by Peking and Tokyo to the territorial status quo of the Soviet Union.

Taiwan represents a special case for possible membership in a Soviet security pact for Asia. Although there is every reason to believe that the Soviets would welcome the chance to supplant the US in Taiwan, this possibility would only be plausible if Taipai were left with no other security alternative. As long as America and Japan continue to emphasize their economic and low-key political-military ties with Taiwan, it is unlikely Taiwan would join the Soviet Union security scheme. China's fear of the foregoing possibility causes Peking to consider the need for a continued but limited number of US forces in Taiwan. Thus, Peking's desire to offset a possible Soviet-Taiwan connection diminishes a PRC military threat to Formosa and precludes a serious Moscow-Taipei link. China's attitude could change, however, if a significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement takes place. Under that circumstance, Peking's aggressiveness toward Taiwan would most probably increase. On one hand, extensive Japanese and American economic interests in Taiwan would force the US to reverse the drawdown of its military capabilities in Taiwan. On the other hand, if the United States continues its withdrawal from the region during a period of continued Sino-Soviet rivalry and tension, a

growing Taipei-Moscow security link, against the backdrop of growing Soviet naval power is quite likely.

The Soviets are expected to continue to compete with Peking for influence in North Korea. If China should become increasingly unstable in the post-Mao era, Moscow's superior resource base and increased aid could win increasing North Korean support for Soviet anti-Western objectives in Asia. Yet, it appears doubtful that North Korea would join Moscow in any collective security arrangement that is aimed against Peking. As in Taiwan's case, the delicate balance that now exists on the Korean peninsula would be threatened in the unlikely event of a Sino-Soviet accommodation.

3. South Asia. The case of Pakistan underscores the difficulty faced by Moscow's proposal for collective security in South Asia. At the present time, Pakistan and China are allies. Peking's consistent support for Islamabad's foreign policies make it doubtful that Moscow's concept would make any headway with Pakistan. This is especially true as long as Moscow's security design is perceived to be directed against China. Yet, bilateral relations with Islamabad might improve if Moscow acts as a restraining force on India and increases its aid and trade links with Pakistan.

Unmistakably, India remains Moscow's greatest success to date in South Asia. The 1971 Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace and Friendship serves as a model for bilateral relations between the USSR and other prospective Asian allies.

At the same time, the future possibility of a Sino-Indian rapprochement should not be discounted. This possibility could undermine Soviet attempts to develop India as a major counterweight to the growth of Chinese power in Asia. India's neutralization through adept Chinese Third World diplomacy continues to represent a major concern for Moscow and provides further rationale for an anticipated increase of Soviet power in South Asia.

Even though Moscow's capabilities do not match current US political-military power in the Western Pacific and East Asia, its position along the Indian Ocean littoral has been increased to the extent that the Soviet Union has become the predominant power in that region. South Asia appears to be the one region where Moscow can demonstrate that the balance of forces have indeed shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. The pattern established by Moscow in South Asia could possibly be repeated in other Asian regions if Soviet power capabilities continue to grow.

Through a series of economic aid, trade, and arms supply agreements, Moscow would continue to increase the credibility of its Asian relationships. Soviet-South Asian accomodations have already led to the establishment of bunkering rights for the growing Soviet fleet and overflight rights for both military and commercial aircraft. Hence, during the next decade Moscow is expected to continue to consolidate its regional power base. With superior military

capabilities in that region, Moscow could be tempted to demonstrate the relative weakness of China and the West during a future crisis situation. An example of this strategy was the Soviet success during the Indo-Pakistan War in 1971.

As indicated by the indirect Soviet support for the Arab oil embargo, Moscow would be in a more advantageous position to exploit regional crises in the Middle East, Africa and throughout Asia. Regional dominance along Indian Ocean littoral would significantly enhance the Soviet Union's potential to disrupt Western and Japanese oil interests in the strategic Persian Gulf. This contingency could become increasingly plausible in the South Asian theater whenever circumstances indicate a failure of American resolve coupled with a lack of countervailing Western capabilities.

Global Implications of a Soviet Success

Profound and rapid changes in the correlation of the world's forces in favor of socialism would surely result if Moscow succeeded in establishing an effective collective security system in Asia. Regardless of the degree of Asian membership, a favorable resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute would signify a major success for the Soviet security design. For, if the differences between China and Russia were resolved, a resulting Sino-Soviet rapprochement would be inimical to fundamental Western security interests. If the Kremlin's security campaign in Asia were to succeed, it might result in one of the following speculative outcomes:

- A significant reduction in China's anti-Soviet activities;
- A Sino-Soviet rapprochement if Peking fears a major Soviet coercive action without a corresponding Western response; or
- A scenario in which Moscow successfully exploits a post-Mao succession crisis and attempts to create a series of satellites or buffer states along the Sino-Soviet border. The East European and MPR relationship could serve as the traditional model for a Soviet strategy to cure its future Chinese problem.

The prospects of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement are to a great extent dependent upon Peking's assessment of the Western reaction to any major coercive action by the Soviet Union. As long as Peking perceives the probability of countervailing Western assistance a genuine Sino-Soviet rapprochement is unlikely. This view would change if Western aid, particularly US support is not credible. Peking is well aware of the various contingencies that may be conjectured. To influence a succession crisis in China, the Soviet Union might initiate hostilities in the guise of rendering aid to allegedly "friendly elements" along the disputed Sino-Soviet border. The Kremlin could hardly ignore any opportunity to resolve permanently its frontier security problems. Creating a belt of separate buffer states, i.e., Sinkiang and Manchuria, controlled from Moscow would provide the Soviet Union with more ideal security advantages.

A strong and unified China is detrimental to the national security interest of the USSR. A powerful Chinese neighbor would probably continue to raise the specter of

adverse territorial and ideological claims and would continue to threaten the global primacy of the Soviet Union. Hence, Mao's death would provide the most plausible period for a decisive Soviet move to exploit an available opportunity to weaken, divide and emasculate the power of the PRC.

The success of a Soviet coercive effort against China would cause the West to face some hard choices. These choices include retreat and global isolationism or massive rearmament. America would be faced with the vivid evidence of Soviet claims that the balance of forces had actually shifted in favor of Moscow. The neutralization of at least one quarter of the total Soviet Union's military capabilities along the Sino-Soviet front would no longer be assured. With its eastern front relatively secure, the preponderant capabilities which might be deployed along Moscow's western front would significantly increase NATO's security concerns.

Coupled with the rapid growth of Moscow's military potential, a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement would indeed represent a profound setback for Washington and would possibly result in a significant increase in global instability. One might assume that the Soviet propensity for risk-taking in support of anti-Western causes in the Third World would most likely escalate. Conversely, traditional Soviet caution would diminish if the Kremlin was convinced that the balance of the world's forces had actually shifted in its favor.

With the exception of manpower, a significant military imbalance between Moscow and Peking exists. Consequently,

China could not effectively resist serious Soviet coercive military pressures without substantial assistance from the West. As the other superpower, the United States is the only power capable of maintaining a credible regional balance. Hence, there is a conspicuous need to explore the full ramifications to US global strategy if China were successfully subdued by the Soviet Union.

Soviet coercive action against China would primarily depend upon the strategic objectives that the Kremlin's decision-makers hope to achieve. If Moscow's security concept for Asia were merely a trial balloon or a propaganda device devoid of serious intent, Peking would certainly not devote so much of its attention and energies in counteracting the Soviet proposal by rapidly improving its relationships with the West. One must assume, then, that the degree of potency within Moscow's broad security design is primarily dependent upon the actual state of Sino-Soviet relations. With an intense state of Sino-Soviet tensions and hostility existing, Moscow's security initiative would envision the need to employ a variety of coercive political-military instruments against China. With an easing of tensions between the two countries, however, there should be little doubt in the minds of Western policy-makers that Moscow's security scheme would then be primarily directed against the United States and Japan. The West can take little comfort from the fact that China receives the major brunt of current

Soviet coercive efforts, for the Western World is merely next in order of priority.

In view of the adverse impact that could conceivably result from a significant Sino-Soviet rapprochement, an assessment of the ramifications to US national interests is certainly in order. Since the Soviet Union is likely to exploit internal turmoil in China, particularly during a post-Mao succession crisis, key areas that require additional analysis include:

- The probable US reaction to a major Soviet coercive move against China;
- The degree of defensive support to China that America would willingly consider;
- Whether the US should maintain a posture of benign neutrality in case of a Sino-Soviet conflict;
- The need for more widespread public debate to promote national will, insure a timely and effective response and necessary congressional support on the important subject of US support to China.

Essentially, the underlying assumptions resulting from the Sino-Soviet relationship should be analyzed to determine the degree of US assistance that could be provided to counter a possible Soviet coercive effort against China. Continued Western failure or inability to counter future Soviet interventions in the Third World would tempt Moscow to move more boldly against China. A Soviet success against the PRC would subsequently encourage or lead to an even greater increase in the Kremlin's propensity for global risk-taking.

While many hypothetical questions and contingencies might be raised, the US is still faced with the need to develop appropriate options to minimize Soviet actions that are inimical to Western interests. Because of the Soviet threat, Peking might request US defensive assistance within the foreseeable future. Indeed, it is no longer a matter of pure speculation to assume that the PRC is a quasi-ally of the United States. In sharp contrast to the Kremlin's more recent moves to exploit Third World regional tensions and anti-Western causes, since the fall of South Vietnam, the PRC has done the following:

- Indicated a willingness to preserve a residual US military presence in Asia;
- Subordinated its support for wars of national liberation in Asia and throughout the globe and attempted to improve relations with the noncommunist members of ASEAN;
- Supported continued US political military ties with Japan;
- Tempered its threat to obtain control of Taiwan by force;
- Emphasized its desire to support the unification of Korea by peaceful means and backed the retention of US forces to prevent destabilization in this critical region;
- Supported the continual strong US backing of NATO and the strengthening of the European Economic Community;
- Condemned Soviet support of Cuban intervention in Angola and elsewhere in Africa. (The possibility of further Soviet intervention in the Third World to support ideologically rationalized wars of national liberation now raises some interesting strategic possibilities. Temporary Sino-American agreements

to counter the domination or threat of a successful Soviet intervention in selected Third World regions are possibilities that should be assessed. A de facto Sino-American partnership with China's significant Third World credentials linked with America's economic and technological capabilities might cause Moscow to reconsider the benefits of intervention in anti-Western or anti-Chinese caused in the Third World. Undoubtedly, this hypothetical question requires more detailed exploration.);

- Retained strong ties with Pakistan and indicated a willingness to improve relations with India;
- Agreed with the basic US global objective which has evolved from America's Open Door principles. (The Shanghai Communique which governs Sino-American relations indicates that both signatories have renounced hegemony. Furthermore, both Peking and Washington have indicated their joint opposition to the efforts of any other country or group of countries seeking hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and throughout the globe.)

Hence, US military assistance to China for defensive purposes should be favorably considered. As a quasi-ally of America, it would be rather odd to deny China the military, technological or economic capabilities which might guarantee the continuity of this relationship. There is hardly any reason to deny Peking at least the same type of assistance that has already been granted to the Soviet Union.

There are some who suggest that military assistance to China could have potentially destabilizing consequences in the long-term future. Undoubtedly, such a policy would require detailed and cautious assessment. At the same time, however, policy-makers should not be paralyzed by the unpredictable aspects of the distant future. Future hypotheses should not take priority over contemporary facts. It is still

far easier to shift policies to meet the essential strategic contingencies of tomorrow.

Today, America is faced with the requirement to develop credible options to enhance its interest in global stability and equilibrium. Few can argue with the significant factors of capabilities. As a global superpower the Soviet Union is undoubtedly the major adversary of the United States. To ignore the significant benefits derived from the Sino-American connection is to deny the obvious trends of international relations.

A Selective US Containment Policy

Genuine relaxation of tensions and the accommodation of mutual Soviet-American interests are far more preferable to the heightened tensions of the Cold War. Yet, it can also be argued that a policy of détente which permits the Soviet Union to continue its support for wars of national liberation and similar anti-Western causes merely serves as a subterfuge for unilateral advantage and is hardly conducive to the relaxation of global tensions. With Moscow continuing to give priority to policies which are adverse to Western security interests, Washington would inevitably be forced to take defensive countermeasures in the form of selected policies which would raise the risks and costs for alleged global "adventurism" on the Kremlin's part.

This study indicates that Moscow is currently waging a campaign of coercive diplomacy against China to influence

the current succession contest in Peking in a relatively pro-Soviet direction. Doubting consistent Soviet assertions that the main thrust of their coercive efforts are aimed towards influencing China to once again join Moscow in the struggle against the West would be sheer folly. Failure by the United States to comprehend the significance of the Soviet coercive Soviet strategy toward China represents a clear and present danger of profound significance. Hence, relevant answers to questions which concern the potential implications and outcomes of a possible Soviet move against China and its impact on the US are required.

If the United States is to be in a more advantageous position to counter a possible major Soviet coercive effort against the PRC, the option of defensive military assistance and other unspecified action may become an essential requirement. If this is so, then such a resolution would require widespread dissemination to galvanize popular and congressional support. The need to obtain popular support and promote national will indicates that this topic requires a greater degree of national debate. If America's links with China are obscure, without the broad mass of public and congressional support, US policy-makers might not be able to act decisively in defense of what is considered to be an important and valid national interest--the continued viability of an independent China.

Fortuitous drift or accidental default will not substitute for strategy. If American attempts to take defensive measures in support of a regional Sino-Soviet balance, or attempts to limit the coercive potential of Soviet moves against China, US capabilities may have to be used with calculation, purpose and dispatch. Without the essential backing of the national will, this option would not be credible. It is not too early to begin a public debate about the assumptions that underly the Sino-American connection.

When Moscow used détente as a strategy to influence a change in the status quo in the Third World to the perceived disadvantage of the West, President Ford announced the change in Soviet-American relations. The American strategy of "Peace through Strength" evolved in direct response to Moscow's willingness to subordinate détente or policies of relaxation of tensions to the pursuit of goals in support of wars of national liberation.

The policy of "Peace through Strength" assumes that America does not need to apologize for the essential requirement to deter an obviously threatening Kremlin objective which would prove adverse to the national interests of the United States. In this author's view, the Kremlin's objective which attempts to turn China against the West should not be overlooked. For this reason, if Moscow's initiative for collective security in Asia should result in major coercive action against China, and result in the subjugation

or dismemberment of the PRC, this outcome could have a detrimental impact on the United States. There are sufficient indications that the Kremlin is likely to exploit a weakened Chinese regime rent with factionalism. If so, the US should consider appropriate defensive alternatives. At this juncture of history, few could ignore the fact that relative Soviet global power has been growing while United States political-military options since the era of Pax Americana immediately after World War II have diminished. It is at this point that the possible need for a selective US containment policy based on the speculative issue of a Washington, Peking and Tokyo alliance, based on either de facto policies or a formal structure, should be assessed. While the possibility of such a defensive alliance among the three major powers is controversial and speculative, containing risks and pitfalls as well as opportunities and gains, its potential to enhance global stability and equilibrium should still be analyzed.

If such a Washington, Peking, Tokyo alignment were to exist, in the long-run, the combination of countervailing power might prove to be a credible deterrent to the anticipated rise of Soviet power in Asia and throughout the globe as well. At the same time, such a defensive alignment would likely deter Moscow's coercive pressure on China without substantially increasing Peking's unilateral offensive capabilities against the Soviet Union. While it is neither in

the interest of the US to destabilize the Sino-Soviet dispute to the distinct advantage of Moscow, nor should the Kremlin be permitted to move against Peking with impunity. A selective US containment policy would largely depend upon future Soviet global strategies. If a de facto alliance among America, China, and Japan is sufficient to temper Soviet "adventurism," then a formal relationship among the three powers would not be necessary. In essence, Moscow's actions should remain the key determinant to the degree of defensive countervailing power that could conceivably be used to deter Soviet efforts to exploit global tensions.

(See Appendix 3)

There is nothing more absolute about the future than the certainty of change. With the prospects of leadership changes in Peking during the coming years, a critical test lies ahead. The US has obtained many significant and obvious benefits from an independent and self-reliant China. As long as Peking does not succumb to the Kremlin's coercive pressures, Moscow will continue to have a powerful incentive to avoid military intervention in the Third World. With its constant focus on the danger of a second front in the Far East, the USSR is less likely to engage in serious military adventures in Central Europe, the Middle East and in other global areas.

The United States is obligated by self-interest to assess the mutual benefits of a de facto alliance with its

quasi-ally--China. The Sino-American relation should be based on the firm foundation of calculation and purpose rather than accident of fortuitous drift. As a result, America should make it easier for China to survive a post-Mao succession crisis and emerge as a self-reliant and independent regional actor.

US failure to counter the future implications of Moscow's concept for collective security in Asia, particularly a major coercive move against China, could have serious consequences for the West. The lessons of the past demonstrate with decisive clarity that the ultimate deterrent against global "adventurism" is still countervailing power.

The US Pacific Doctrine can certainly provide an appropriate framework for a selective Asian containment policy by the US, China and Japan to prevent a Pax Sovietica. This alignment could provide the most suitable counter against Moscow's potentially inimical concept for collective security in Asia. The failure to do so could result in the most dire consequences for American interests in Asia.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing chapters indicate that Moscow's "Grand Design" for Asia is not simply a propaganda exercise designed to secure short-term political objectives. Instead, the Kremlin's proposal for Asia constitutes a concrete, realistic policy option which challenges America's interests in that important region and deserves the attention of US strategists equal to that given Soviet interests in Europe. Generally, the Soviet concept represents a broad security framework to bolster the USSR's global position while accomplishing the following important regional strategic objectives:

- Deterring potential threats to the territorial integrity of the USSR;
- Increasing the Kremlin's regional power and influence at the expense of China and the Western world;
- Maintaining ideological primacy over the People's Republic of China (PRC) and other Communist Governments and Parties of Asia;
- Achieving a rapprochement with China during the post-Mao era on Moscow's terms;
- Minimizing the effects of the growing Sino-American rapprochement;
- Improving relations with Japan; and
- Preventing a Sino-Japanese partnership with de facto US backing.

Since more than two-thirds of its territory is in Asia, Moscow has sufficient motivation to increase its political-military regional power base to counter perceived threats to its national security interests. Although the Kremlin continues to stress that the bilateral underpinnings of their Asian security initiative might ultimately evolve into a multilateral structure, one should not lose sight of the fact that Soviet capabilities will still remain the decisive arbiter of any future Asian power equation.

Moscow's emphasis on the collective nature of its security design is probably rhetoric which obscures the real purpose of the Kremlin's security design--the advancement of the unilateral national interests of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet concept for Asia must still be grounded firmly on the basis of Soviet regional interests and global strategic objectives. Further, Moscow's emphasis on the collective basis of their security design can be construed as a secondary requirement. By focusing on the collective aspect of their initiative, the Kremlin is apparently attempting to legitimize the growth of its power in the Asian arena. Moscow is also attempting to avoid the impression that the Soviet Union would impose its own security system on weaker regional nations. If the self-interest priority of their security proposal is understood, one can hardly assess the importance of the Kremlin's proposal completely on the basis of Third World Asian receptiveness.

One must certainly conclude that the USSR, faced by the potentially dangerous irredentist claims by both Japan and China, will attempt to insure the territorial status quo of the Soviet Union. The requirement for secure frontiers in Asia, when coupled with conflicting Sino-Soviet national and ideological interests now provides a major impulse for the Kremlin's regional security design. Obviously, Moscow desires to achieve a guarantee for Soviet borders on the same basis that now exists in Europe. This security imperative underlies repeated Soviet statements which directly relate the objectives and achievements obtained by the Helsinki Conference with Russia's current security initiative for Asia.

Encouraged by the recent achievement of collective security in Europe, Moscow can be expected to intensify its requirement for a similar security framework for Asia. Since it appears doubtful that Peking or Tokyo will react favorably to any security proposal urged by Moscow, the Helsinki success which guaranteed Soviet territorial gains in Europe cannot be expected to be duplicated in Asia within the foreseeable future. Consequently, one can assume that the hostility and tension in the region, particularly between Moscow and Peking, will continue to fester. Tokyo's apparent "tilt" toward Peking represents another growing danger for Moscow.

It is difficult to imagine Moscow's leadership remaining silent in the face of Chinese claims that the USSR is a European rather than an Asian power. At the same time, there are no indications to conclude that Moscow will accept Peking as an equal partner in the Soviet version of "World Communist Movement" or that Moscow would accede to Peking's role as the leader and recognized model for the Third World. Further, China is unlikely to submit willingly to a position subordinate to the USSR within a theoretically united socialist camp. In the coming decade hostility and rivalry will probably continue to mark the Sino-Soviet relationship. As a result, the USSR is likely to increase rather than diminish its coercive capabilities against China.

Brezhnev's initiative for collective security in Asia should be viewed as a broad security framework to isolate, constrain and coerce Peking. By this means, the Kremlin would hope to reduce and eventually eliminate possible anti-Soviet activities by China. It is important to stress that the Kremlin has made no secret of their ultimate aim to bring China back into the "World Communist Movement" to participate in the struggle against imperialism. This factor has remained Moscow's consistent theme and condition for the normalization of relations with China in the post-Mao era.

Until Moscow's conditions for a Sino-Soviet rap-prochement are met, the Kremlin can be expected to execute a containment policy directed against Peking. This threat, in the form of a collective security design, is given continual play in the Soviet media.

While a Soviet intention to provoke a major war with China is unlikely, Moscow's initiation of sporadic border conflicts to coerce a recalcitrant adversary cannot be ruled out. At the strategic level, Peking is painfully aware that its comparative military capabilities are significantly inferior to the Soviet Union in all areas with the exception of manpower. Further, the PRC's military manpower is used for substantial internal tasks. Thus, the Chinese leadership is confronted by a dilemma. No matter what sacrifices are made, the PRC cannot hope to match the military might of the USSR. Despite the PRC's extensive military buildup during recent years, the gap between relative Sino-Soviet military capabilities is widening to the detriment of China. Peking's military equipment is largely obsolete. Further, China does not possess the sophisticated military technology, intelligence collection and command and control capabilities available to the Soviet Union. China's inherent weakness constitutes a standing invitation for an increase in the potency of Moscow's coercive diplomacy now being waged against Peking as a prelude to the post-Mao era. By matching their pronouncements with action, it is likely that the Kremlin

would follow through with their stated intent to exploit opportunities provided by a post-Mao succession struggle.

Deep hatred and fear of the Soviet Union's coercive actions and containment policies continue to preoccupy Peking's leadership. This apprehension intensifies the PRC's efforts to avoid the Soviet encirclement and to divert Moscow's capabilities away from China. These fundamental security concerns cause the Chinese to exploit existing areas of instability on other Soviet fronts. The relaxation of tension along European borders, signified by the Helsinki Conference, is attacked by Peking because an easing of tension in Europe is considered to be detrimental to China's security interests.

In view of Moscow's stated intent to exploit internal tensions resulting from a Chinese succession crisis, an increased buildup of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border would be a particularly ominous sign of a major Soviet coercive effort against China. Moscow's repeated refusal to change its ideological relationship with China from proletarian internationalism to peaceful coexistence indicates that the Soviets will not relinquish a potent ideological justification which legitimizes coercive action against the PRC.

While the Soviet collective security initiative for Asia supports Moscow's territorial status quo, it plays a role in underscoring Moscow's ideological primacy in the

socialist world. This concept also implies a growing Soviet desire to threaten China by diverting Peking's attention from the contested Sino-Soviet border region to flanks where the PRC may even be more vulnerable. By attempting to forge a bilateral or multilateral security alliance around the rimland of China, the Soviet Union appears to be increasing its regional political-military advantages should military clashes along the Sino-Soviet border escalate into wider conflict.

Yet, it would be naive to believe that solemn pledges embodied in the collective aspect of the USSR's security design would be the crucial factor. High sounding phrases and lofty principles in multilateral pacts could not provide a credible substitute for the unilateral capabilities of Soviet regional power. Consequently, the USSR is expected to increase its military power in the Asian arena. While the anticipated buildup of the Kremlin's regional military capabilities have significant anti-Western overtones and would be aimed at the accomplishment of Moscow's broader strategic objectives and interests, it should be stressed that Soviet military capabilities would form the backdrop of Moscow's campaign of coercion against China. In addition to a likely improvement of its military capabilities along the Sino-Soviet border, Moscow can be expected to increase its naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to remind China that its southern borders are also vulnerable to attack.

The Kremlin's rivalry with China for influence over the Asian nations along the rimland of the PRC to include India, North Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, and Taiwan provide a clear signal that Moscow intends to heighten Peking's security concerns should renewed conflict escalate along the Soviet Union's territorial frontiers with China.

At least three priority objectives can be derived from Moscow's security concept for Asia:

(1) Anti-Chinese Containment Policy. The primary motivation for the Kremlin's security design relates directly to deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations. China now dominates Moscow's regional focus. The Sino-Soviet dispute has reached the level where Moscow's national and ideological interests clash with the PRC throughout the globe. Consequently, the neutralization of the Chinese threat to Soviet security has become the Kremlin's priority concern in Asia. This concept appears to be a Soviet-led containment policy of China. Thereby, Peking has vehemently opposed it. Since a genuine Sino-Soviet rapprochement after the demise of Mao is doubtful, the anti-Chinese rationale for Moscow's security design is likely to remain in force.

(2) Anti-Western objectives. A major secondary objective of the Kremlin's security scheme relates to Moscow's desire to expand the USSR's regional power and influence at the expense of the Western World. Moscow hopes to fill the security vacuum left by the departure of British and perceived retrenchment of American power. The Kremlin has long opposed anti-Communist Asian groupings and hopes to capitalize on America's isolationist tendencies in the post-Vietnam era. Recent statements from Moscow indicate that their security design is seen as a means to:

- Replace the now defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO);
- Neutralize the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC);

- Neutralize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);
- Neutralize the US Pacific Doctrine.

(3) Prevent or Forestall an Anti-Soviet Containment Policy. Significantly, Moscow's security concept for Asia is explicable in terms of vital Soviet regional interests and objectives. No longer can Kremlin subordinate its Asian security concerns to those of Europe or to global Soviet political-military competition with the United States. The possibility of a Sino-Japanese partnership with the de facto backing of the United States has forced Moscow to focus its interests on its increasingly vital geopolitical East Asian front. Hence, Asia is now an area no less important to the interests of the USSR than Europe and the Middle East. An effective Sino-Japanese and American partnership in the post-Mao era would likely result in the following:

- Deterring the Soviet Union from initiating major coercive action against China;
- Reduction of the probability of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement on Moscow's terms during the critical post-Mao era;
- Limiting Moscow's political-military options in Western Europe, the Middle East and throughout the Third World;
- An increase of the Soviet Union's "two front" dilemma, while enhancing Western security interests and objectives at Moscow's expense;
- Minimizing Moscow's ability to undermine the Japanese-American alliance and forestall the emergence of a close Sino-Japanese alignment;
- Forcing the USSR to temper its support for anti-Western and anti-Chinese causes in order to offset the possible development of a more formidable Sino-American-Japanese security alignment.

In assessing the significance of the Soviet security initiative a word of caution is in order. While only the

Mongolian Peoples Republic (MPR) and Iran have officially declared their intention to cooperate in the Soviet security design, in Iran's case its support remains ambiguous and unlikely. India, Vietnam, the MPR, and possibly Afghanistan currently appear to be the only candidates for possible membership in the Soviet-backed regional security effort; however, to assess the significance of the Soviet initiative for collective security in Asia entirely on present Asian membership alone, would doom Moscow's concept to certain failure. Yet, one should tread cautiously before concluding that the concept is inherently weak or lacks substance. Notwithstanding the fact that there are few current Asian adherents to the Soviet security initiative, one should not fall into the trap of applying current evaluations of Asian government reactions as the sole criteria for the concept's significance. With the possibility of dynamic changes in the future regional power alignment, a more receptive climate for the Soviet Asian security initiative should not be precluded. At the same time, it is important to stress that the potency of visible and usable Soviet power throughout the Asian theater, rather than the more tenuous capabilities or allegiance of Third World regional nations will ultimately decide the success or failure of the Kremlin's security design for Asia.


Indeed, the available evidence suggests that Soviet interests in Asia deserve the serious attention of Western

policy-makers equal to that given Soviet interests in Europe. For Brezhnev's pronouncements represent an expression of Soviet intentions to construct a formidable security capability in Asia. By analogy, Moscow's broad formulation might even be contrasted with similar regional doctrines proclaimed by previous American administrations prior to the time they were actually implemented. The Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon Doctrines provided outlines of strategic American policy trends toward specific geographic regions of the globe.

With the possible exception of the Indian Ocean, the predominance of Soviet power throughout Asia is not yet apparent. Yet, one must transcend the current regional context in search of relevant trends. Notably, the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated long before the United States had the power to establish its own sphere of influence in Latin America. Similarly, the Sino-Soviet dispute, combined with repeated Soviet assertions that the correlation of world forces are shifting in favor of Soviet-style socialism, provide the Kremlin with sufficient incentives to create its own regional security design. For, like the Monroe Doctrine, the Soviet proposal appears to await the day when growing regional capabilities actually match Moscow's declared intentions.

APPENDIX 1

PENTAGONAL AND QUADRILATERAL BALANCE OF POWER



Appendix 1


Pentagonal and Quadrilateral Balance of Power

----- Constitutes Quadrilateral Balance of Power in Asia

Assumptions

- An even balance of power among the five major power centers neither exists nor is likely to exist in the foreseeable future.
- The global status quo will remain tenuous and subject to dynamic change.
- The US and USSR will remain global military superpowers in the foreseeable future.
- China is likely to remain a regional power with potential for increasing its global power, i. e., political, economic, and military.
- Japan is likely to forego the military option and concentrate on economic advancement.
- Western Europe will continue to strive for increased economic, political, and military integration and unity.

APPENDIX 2
PAX SOVIETICA
(SPECULATIVE RESULTS OF US ISOLATIONISM)



Appendix 2

Pax Sovietica

(Speculative Results of US Isolationism)

LEGEND

- ○ ○ ○ Sino-Japanese Rapprochement
- _____ Sino-Soviet Rapprochement
- Sino-Soviet-Japanese Rapprochement
- Europe Finlandization

Speculative Assumptions

USSR

- Attempts to achieve global primacy in partnership with PRC
- Expansionist and interventionist policies in Third World while increasing influence in W. Europe and Japan
- Continued attempts to exploit lack of Western national will and resolve
- Growing Third World Asian support for Soviet collective security pacts

PRC

- Rapprochement considered preferable to conflict with USSR
- USSR assents to PRC influence and spheres of influence in selected Asian areas, i.e., SEA and Taiwan
- Sino-Soviet agreements to settle border dispute, temper ideological conflicts and discussion of nuclear weapons controls

Japan

- Should US security treaty lack credibility because of limited US national will, Japan would likely accommodate with PRC and USSR. Although less likely, Japan may resort to rearmament and nuclear weapons capabilities.
- Given a limited Sino-Soviet rapprochement or continued tension a Sino-Japanese accommodation during a period of prolonged US isolationism should not be discounted.


Europe

- Evidence of US unwillingness to retain forward defense policy combined with American withdrawals resulting from MBFR might lead to: (1) Finlandization, or the recognition of USSR's political-military dominance, and growing economic dependence on the Soviet Union; (2) attempts to effectively unite, which would be less likely without a credible US counterweight to Soviet power; (3) West German rearmament or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

US

- Policy in this scenario is characterized by isolationism
- Emphasis is increasingly placed on homeland or Western hemisphere defense as forward defense forces are redeployed to CONUS

APPENDIX 3
US SELECTIVE CONTAINMENT POLICY
TO PREVENT PAX SOVIETICA



Appendix 3
US Selective Containment Policy
To Prevent Pax Sovietica

LEGEND

- Existing US security links (NATO-US-Japan)
- - - De facto alliance (Sino-US-Europe-Japan)
- Formalized alliance structure (NATO and PATO*)

Speculative Assumptions

USSR

- Continues to increase military capabilities and adopts coercive global intervention policies in Third World and China inimical to US interests
- Threatens PRC to inhibit anti-Soviet activities and to force Sino-Soviet rapprochement
- Attempts to achieve nuclear and conventional superiority (no progress on SALT)

*Pacific Treaty Organization, US-Japan-China

PRC

- Continues to improve economic, political and military relations with Japan, US and Europe
- Requests US balance to offset threatening Soviet actions to exploit internal unrest resulting from post-Mao succession crisis
- Requests Western arms transfers from Europe, Japan and US to increase defensive capabilities against Soviet attack

Japan

- Moves toward closer Sino-Japanese relationship, economic and political while maintaining strong US links

Western Europe

- Continues to improve economic relations with China
- Provides defensive arms to counter a perceived Soviet coercive threat
- Develops limited but increasing political-military relations with China to insure mutual security along Soviet Union's eastern and western fronts
- Continues progress toward unification with strong and credible US forward defense as part of NATO
- Growing economic interdependence with the US and mutual exploitation of energy and resources

US

- Threatens to counter Soviet policies of intervention in the Third World (i.e., Angola)
- Attempts to provide balance between PRC and USSR
- Adopts policies that are likely to lead to enhanced global stability and equilibrium
- Should Soviet Union continue to adopt policies inimical to the West, the US considers formal arrangements based on potential threat, i.e., Pacific Treaty Organization (PATO) with membership of China to counter Soviet security designs in Asia
- Adopts US Pacific Doctrine as framework to meet essential countervailing policy requirements to minimize the effectiveness of Soviet coercive efforts against China and to prevent the probability of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement

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